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Summary
The premise behind this thesis is the observation that Operating Systems (OS),
being the foundation behind operations of computing systems, are complex entities
and also subject to failures. Consequently, when they do fail, the impact is the
loss of system service and the applications running thereon. While a multitude
of sources for OS failures exist, device drivers are often identiﬁed as a prominent
cause behind failures.
In order to characterize the impact of driver failures, at both the OS and
application levels, this thesis develops a framework for error propagation-based
robustness proﬁling for an OS. The framework is ﬁrst developed conceptually and
then experimentally validated on a real OS, namely Windows CE .Net. The choice
of Windows CE is driven by its representativeness for a multitude of OS’s, as well
as the ability to customize the OS components for particular needs.
For experimental validation, fault injection is a prominent technique that can
be used to simulate faults (or errors) in the system by inserting synthetic ones
and study their eﬀect. Three key questions with such a technique are where, what
and when to inject faults. This thesis shows how injecting errors at the interface
between drivers and the OS can be very eﬀective in evaluating the eﬀects driver
faults can have.
To quantify the OS’s robustness, this thesis deﬁnes a series of error propaga-
tion measures, speciﬁcally tailored for device drivers. These measures allow for
quantifying and comparing both individual services and device drivers on their
susceptibility and diﬀusing abilities.
This thesis compares three contemporary error models on their suitability for
robustness evaluation. The classical bit-ﬂip model is found to identify a higher
number of severe failures in the system. It also identiﬁes failures for more services
than both other models, data type and fuzzing. However, its main drawback is
that it requires substantially more injections than the other two. Fuzzing, even
though not giving rise to as many failures is able to ﬁnd new additional services
with severe failures.
A careful study of the injections performed with the bit-ﬂip model shows that
only a few bits are generally useful for identifying new services with robustness
weaknesses. Consequently, a new composite model is proposed, combining the
most eﬀective bits of the bit-ﬂip model with the fuzzing model’s ability to identify
new services, giving rise to new model without loss of important information and
at the same time incurring a moderate number of injections.
To answer the question of when to inject an error this thesis proposes a novel
model of a driver’s usage proﬁle, focusing on high-level operations being carried
out. It guides the injection of errors to instances when the driver is carrying out
speciﬁc operations. Results from extensive fault injection experiments show that
more service vulnerabilities can be discovered. Furthermore, a priori proﬁling of
the drivers can show how eﬀective the proposed approach will be.
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Kurzfassung
Der Hintergrund dieser Dissertation beruht auf der Beobachtung, dass das
Betriebssystem, welches die Grundlage fu¨r den Betrieb von Rechnersystemen
darstellt, eine sehr komplexe Struktur aufweist, was ha¨uﬁg zu Fehlern im Be-
triebssystem fu¨hren kann. Wenn diese betriebssysteminternen Fehler Ausfa¨lle von
Diensten zur Folge haben, sind auch die im Rahmen des Betriebssystems laufenden
Applikationen gefa¨hrdet. Auch wenn es im allgemeinen viele Fehlerquellen gibt,
werden oft fehlerhafte Treiber als die ha¨uﬁgste Ursache angegeben.
Um die Auswirkungen von Treiberdefekten auf der Betriebssystem- und App-
likationsebene zu charakterisieren, wird in dieser Dissertation ein auf der Ausbre-
itung von Fehlern basierendes Framework fu¨r Robustheitsauswertung entwickelt.
Das Framework wird sowohl konzeptionell entwickelt als auch auf einem echten Be-
triebssystem experimentell validiert. Das gewa¨hlte Betriebssystem, Windows CE
.Net, ist repra¨sentativ fu¨r viele andere Betriebssysteme. Es ist modular aufgebaut,
was die Anpassung der Betriebssystemkomponenten an verschiedene Bedu¨rfnisse
erheblich vereinfacht.
Fehlerinjektion ist eine bedeutende Technik fu¨r die experimentelle Validierung,
wobei Fehler simuliert werden indem man sie in das System injiziert und ihre Fol-
gen beobachtet. Drei wichtige Aspekte, die hierbei beru¨cksichtigt werden mu¨ssen,
sind: Welche Fehler sollen wo und wann injiziert werden. In dieser Dissertation
wird gezeigt, dass Fehlerinjektion in die Schnittstelle zwischen dem Betriebssystem
und den Treibern eine eﬀektive Vorgehensweise darstellt, die Folgen von Treiber-
fehlern abzuscha¨tzen.
Um die Robustheit eines Betriebssystems zu quantiﬁzieren, werden eine Reihe
von Fehlerausbreitungsmetriken deﬁniert, die speziell auf Treiberfehler zugeschnit-
ten sind. Anhand dieser Metriken ko¨nnen Dienste und Treiber hinsichtlich
Empﬁndlichkeit und Ausbreitungsvermo¨gen verglichen werden.
Diese Dissertation vergleicht drei zeitgema¨e Fehlermodelle in Bezug auf ihre
Tauglichkeit zur Robustheitsbewertung. Das klassische Bit-Flip-Modell ermittelt
am ha¨uﬁgsten schwere Ausfa¨lle im System. Mehr als die beiden anderen Modelle,
Data Type und Fuzzing, ermittelt dieses Modell auch die meisten Dienste, die zu
Ausfa¨llen fu¨hren ko¨nnten. Der gro¨te Nachteil dieses Modells ist allerdings, dass
es sehr viele Injektionen erfordert. Fuzzing ermittelt weniger Dienste, dafu¨r aber
neue fehlerhafte, von Bit-Flip nicht erkannte Dienste.
Eine sorgfa¨ltige Untersuchung der Ergebnisse des Bit-Flip-Modells zeigt, dass
schon eine Teilmenge der Bits ausreichend ist, um neue Dienste, die zu Robus-
theitsausfa¨llen fu¨hren, zu ermitteln. Daraufhin wird ein neues, zusammengesetztes
Modell vorgeschlagen, das die guten Eigenschaften des Bit-Flip-Modells und das
Vermo¨gen des Fuzzing-Modells neue Dienste zu identiﬁzieren miteinander kom-
biniert. Das neue Modell verliert keine wichtige Information, und erfordert insge-
samt deutlich weniger Injektionen.
Um die Frage zu beantworten wann es sinnvoll ist Fehler zu injizieren, wird ein
neues, an das Benutzerproﬁl des Treibers angelehntes Timingmodell vorgeschla-
v
gen. Das neue Modell basiert auf der Ausfu¨hrung von Befehlen in einer ho¨heren
Schicht. Bestimmte Fehlerinjektionen werden zum Zeitpunkt der Ausfu¨hrung bes-
timmter Befehle geta¨tigt. Die Ergebnisse der Fehlerinjektionen zeigen, dass ein
Vielfaches an sto¨rungsanfa¨lligen Diensten gefunden werden kann. Auerdem gibt
das Benutzerproﬁl des Treibers im Voraus Aufschluss u¨ber die Eﬀektivita¨t der
neuen Methode.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What is robustness, and why is it important?
As the usage of computers proliferates, a consequence is our increasing
reliance of their operations in diverse application environments. The use
of computers, and especially computer software, promises many advantages
compared to electronic or purely mechanical solutions, including rapid devel-
opment, ﬂexibility, eﬀective component reuse (both software and hardware),
no aging eﬀects etc.
However, software brings about new problems. Fulﬁlling not only func-
tional requirements, but also requirements on determinism, real-time and
dependability properties become increasingly diﬃcult. Software engineer-
ing tries to handle these problems by structuring the development process.
However, that engineering software is diﬃcult has long been known. Leveson
notes that as software is divided into components (a well established tech-
nique to handle complexity) a new complexity is introduced in the many
explicit and implicit interfaces that arise [Leveson, 1995]. Furthermore, the
lack of physical constraints makes software inherently more ﬂexible (which is
positive) but also gives rise to new, unexpected and unintended interactions
(which may be hard to ﬁnd, quantify and master). In contrast to physi-
cal systems, small perturbations in software may give rise to serious failures
without much delay. These problems require new methods for building and
verifying systems based on software.
A key design model used to handle some of the complexities is to use
standard platform components to build applications upon, the OS being the
most signiﬁcant such software platform. The OS forms the basic interface
to which applications and services can be built. Consequently a reliance on
continued provisioning of correct service is put on the OS, and when this is
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not the case the system might not function properly.
This thesis addresses the problem of evaluating the robustness of an OS,
i.e., to which degree an OS tolerates perturbations in its environment. Such
evaluations can serve several purposes, such as gaining information on how
the system can fail when operational, guiding veriﬁcation/validation eﬀorts
towards services which are more likely to spread or be the of errors, and to
guide the addition of robustness enhancing components where they are most
eﬀective.
This chapter ﬁrst presents the basic terminology used in the thesis and
then introduces the area of robustness evaluation. The research problems
addressed are presented and discussed together with the contributions pro-
vided.
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1.1 Dependability: The Basic Concepts
Dependability is the ability of a system to avoid service failures that are
more frequent and more severe than is acceptable [Avizˇienis et al., 2004].
This deﬁnition implies that the system is well speciﬁed, together with the
services it provides, such that failures of the system can be clearly deﬁned
and detected. It also requires acceptable service failure frequencies to be
established and that the severities of failures are known and can be estimated.
[Avizˇienis et al., 2004] is a collective eﬀort by the dependable computing
community to agree on a set of standard terms. Further deﬁnitions can for
instance be found the the IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering
[IEE, 1990] or in Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology, which
presents the basic terminology in ﬁve diﬀerent languages [Laprie, 1992]. This
section provides a brief introduction to the terms most commonly used in the
ﬁeld and relevant to the work in this thesis.
Dependability can be seen as an umbrella, incorporating several at-
tributes, including not only attributes directly related to functionality, but
also attributes related to security. In this thesis, no emphasize is put on
security related attributes. They are included and discussed shortly in this
chapter for completeness. Figure 1.1 shows an overview of the attributes of
dependability, the threats to dependability and the means to achieve depend-
ability.
Dependability
and
Security
Attributes
Reliability
Safety
Threats
Integrity
Confidentiality
Means
Maintainability
Errors
Faults
Failures
Error Prevention
Fault Removal
Fault Tolerance
Fault Forecasting
Availability
Figure 1.1: The dependability and security tree, from [Avizˇienis et al., 2004].
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1.1.1 Dependability Attributes
Dependability is a composite term, encompassing several aspects relating
both to provision of functionality, security and maintainability:
• Availability - The ability of the system to be ready for use when
required
• Reliability - The ability of the system to continuously provide stipu-
lated services for a speciﬁed period of time
• Safety - The absence of catastrophic consequences on users and the
environment
• Integrity - The absence of improper system alterations
• Conﬁdentiality - The absence of disclosure of conﬁdential information
to unauthorized entities
• Maintainability - The ability of the system to undergo repairs and
modiﬁcations
Dependability and security are obviously related. Availability, for in-
stance, is a concern both from a dependability perspective (lack of service)
and from a security perspective (denial of service). Figure 1.2 shows how
dependability and security attributes are related.
Dependability
Availability
Reliability
Safety
Confidentiality
Integrity
Maintainability
Security
Figure 1.2: The attributes of dependability and security, from [Avizˇienis
et al., 2004].
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1.1.2 Dependability Threats
To facilitate a discussion regarding the causes, eﬀects, detection and recovery
from faults in the system a distinction is made between faults, errors and
failures. Faults are the causes of failures in the system by being activated
(becoming errors) and then propagating to the outputs of the system and
there causing a failure. Figure 1.3 illustrates how a fault propagating to a
failure of one component (Component A) can be the input (fault) of another
component (Component B) and so on.
Error FailureFault
Component B Component CComponent A
FaultFailure
Figure 1.3: The fault → error → failure process.
Faults
Faults are the sources for errors and failures of a system or component,
including faults appearing during development, physical faults in hardware
and interaction faults occurring in interactions with external components. A
fault by itself is not suﬃcient to cause a failure of the system, it must also
be activated. Certain triggering conditions are required for the fault to be
activated. For instance, the part of the hardware containing the fault must be
used, or for software the code containing the fault must be executed. When
the fault is activated it becomes an error. As the triggering mechanism for the
fault activation process typically is time-dependent faults in the system can
be present without immediately being activated and are then called dormant
faults. A good example thereof is a software fault (bug) in a module that
is only triggered for certain input values, which may appear at some later
point in time as the module is used.
Errors
Errors change the internal state of the system in a way that may cause the
system to fail. For this to happen the error must cause a series of chain
reactions, where the error is propagated through the system by internal com-
putations. Errors are transformed into other errors in a similar manner as
faults are activated. Eventually a propagated error may cause an incorrect
service output (or lack of output) violating the speciﬁcation for the system,
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i.e., a failure. Thus, also errors can stay dormant in the system, waiting for
the triggering conditions for propagation to take place, before it propagates.
Failures
Failures are observed on the outputs of the system and are detectable as
deviations from an assumed speciﬁcation. As illustrated in Figure 1.3 a
failure may itself cause a fault in another component. There are multiple
facets to failures in a system. Some failures may be of higher criticality
than others. Similarly, a failure must not mean a total absence of service
provisions, some systems can provide a limited level of service, i.e., there is
a service degradation.
1.1.3 Dependability Means
There are four ways in which dependability can be achieved and analyzed:
fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting. This
thesis is mainly concerned with fault forecasting, and to some degree with
fault tolerance and removal.
Fault Prevention
The main intent with fault prevention is to avoid introducing faults in the
system during its development by use of mature software engineering prac-
tices and tools. Faults arising in the ﬁeld are avoided by the use of high
quality hardware.
Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance is a fundamental switch in mental model compared to fault
prevention. In fault prevention one avoids to introduce faults in the system.
In fault tolerance on the other hand, faults are assumed to be present in the
system, due to imperfect design methodologies, aging of hardware, interac-
tion faults with components outside the control of the development team etc.
Fault tolerance is based on the premise of error detection and recovery. Er-
rors are detected and recovered from, or errors are masked using redundancy.
Dependability is then achieved by tolerating the faults rather than avoiding
to introduce them, which may be very hard, or too costly.
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Fault Removal
Fault removal aims to remove faults either during the development stage of
the system or during the operational stage. Development stage methods are
broken down into veriﬁcation and validation, where veriﬁcation relates to
verifying that an implemented system actually implements the speciﬁcation
given, and validation to checking the speciﬁcation itself. At runtime diagnosis
and compensation techniques can be used to remove faults from the system.
The contributions in this thesis relates mainly to veriﬁcation, more specif-
ically to dynamic veriﬁcation, such as testing.
Fault Forecasting
Fault forecasting aims to qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate system
behavior in the presence of faults. It aims to establish failure modes of the
system and to evaluate other system attributes regarding the dependability of
the system. The intent is not the same as in fault removal (e.g., veriﬁcation)
but to establish operational characteristics of the system.
The thrust of this thesis is on robustness evaluation, which is a part of
fault forecasting.
1.1.4 Alternate Terminology: Software Engineering
In the area of software engineering a slightly diﬀerent terminology for de-
pendability facets exists. In software engineering an error represents the
mistake made by the programmer that made him/her introduce a ﬂaw in
the code, the fault (also known as bug). The consequence of the dormant
fault is that it may get activated and then propagate to the software outputs,
causing a failure of the component.
In this thesis we will consistently use the terminology from the depend-
ability community as presented in 1.1. It allows for a discussion on the
representativeness of injected errors and is aligned with the large body of
work presented in Chapter 2.
1.1.5 Bohrbugs and Heisenbugs
As stated our main focus is on faults originating from software. Furthermore,
we focus on the subset of software faults that are transient in nature and re-
quire complex triggering for activation. These faults, known as Heisenbugs
[Gray, 1985] are of key interest because they are less likely to be found using
traditional testing techniques. They represent faults that rarely appear in
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normal circumstances and contexts and are therefore harder to ﬁnd. The op-
posite, Bohrbugs, have simpler and deterministic activation conditions and
are easily repeatable. Some authors use the term Mandelbug for bugs which
given the exact same conditions, sometimes appear, sometimes not [Grot-
tke and Trivedi, 2007]. Using this terminology Heisenbugs are a subset of
Mandelbugs.
1.2 Robustness Evaluation
A related term to dependability is robustness. Robustness is deﬁned as “the
degree to which a system or component can function correctly in the pres-
ence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions” [IEE, 1990].
Robustness is therefore related to and an inﬂuence on the dependability of
the system. At the same time it is more restricted than dependability, since
it only relates to external perturbations and not internal ones.
The focus of this thesis is on the robustness of OS’s, as it gives useful
and meaningful information about the system without requiring a speciﬁc
operational scenario to be in place, as would be the case for for instance reli-
ability or availability. Robustness is concerned with the cases were external
components (including human users) do not behave as expected or as stip-
ulated/assumed by the designer of a component. As such, robustness eval-
uation complements traditional veriﬁcation and validation techniques (also
formal ones). The goal of robustness evaluation is to identify potential vul-
nerabilities1 in the system. Such vulnerabilities may or may not be triggered
in a speciﬁc operational scenario. They may or may not constitute design
faults (e.g., software bugs) in the system, and they may lead to severe con-
sequences for availability, reliability, safety or security.
As Commercial-Oﬀ-The-Shelf (COTS) components are more and more
becoming standard building blocks in modern designs their composition is a
key aspect of the veriﬁcation process. Robustness of individual components is
of great importance since components built to be re-used in multiple contexts
cannot be built with any such explicit context in mind. When combined with
new components, having diﬀerent failure characteristics, components may be
faced with unexpected and abnormal inputs. Therefore, components should
be built to respond robustly to such inputs and evaluating their robustness
may reveal information on how well suited they are for a particular compo-
sition.
1The term vulnerability does not refer only to security vulnerabilities, but to weaknesses
in a system that might lead to robustness failures. These might also include security-
related weaknesses.
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Many types of users may be interested in performing robustness evalua-
tions as described in this thesis, including developers for debugging or pro-
ﬁling purposes; integrators for ﬁnding possible interaction problems between
components; testers for identiﬁcation of vulnerabilities; or system designers
and managers for suitability tests, resource guidance or identiﬁcation of weak
components. We will emphasize when aspects apply to a particular aspect
of software development, but use the more general term evaluator for the
person or entity conducting the evaluation.
1.3 Thesis Research Questions & Contribu-
tions
The use of COTS components, such as OS’s, is becoming more and more
common, also for products with stringent requirements on dependability.
For such component-based designs to fulﬁl these requirements, one needs to
establish the amount of trust that can put on these components to work
in a speciﬁc environment, including how well they handle faults appearing
in other components of the system. To answer such a question, the failure
characteristics of the OS need to be established. This includes how the
OS can fail due to faults in the environment. Are certain services provided
by the OS more vulnerable? Are certain other components more likely to
cause a failure of the OS and consequently a failure of the system?
Using a model where the OS is the main platform component in a system
also containing applications and device drivers interfacing with the hardware,
these fundamental questions regarding the OS has guided the work presented
in this thesis. To give insights into how such questions can be answered an
experimental error propagation and eﬀect framework has been deﬁned, where
synthetic errors are injected in the interface between the OS and its drivers.
Drivers has been identiﬁed as one of the main contributors of OS failures
[Murphy and Levidow, 2000; Simpson, 2003; Ganapathi et al., 2006]. Along
the same line Chou et al. found that driver code contains up to seven times as
many bugs as other parts of the Linux kernel [Chou et al., 2001]. As data on
how a system handles errors typically is not available as the system is built,
techniques are needed to speed up this process. One such technique is fault
injection, where synthetical faults (or errors) are injected and the behavior
of the system is observed. This methodology raises additional questions
regarding how to inject errors2, where to inject them, when to inject them
and which error model to use. These three questions are fundamental to any
2Traditionally, the technique is called fault injection, even when errors are injected.
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fault injection approach and are orthogonal, as illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Location
Type
Timing
Figure 1.4: Three fundamental dimensions in fault injection.
Each injected error modiﬁes some part of the system. The error type
refers to how the system is modiﬁed, like ﬂipping a bit, or assigning a wrong
value. Where the error is injected is its location dimension, like in CPU
registers, memory or in parameters to function calls. The timing of the
injection speciﬁes when the error is injected, relative to some system event,
like boot up time. The timing can principally be time or event triggered.
One may argue that fault injection, being an experimental technique is
inherently limited since it does not provide completeness. Injecting a number
of faults and not ﬁnding any failures is no proof of correctness (as in the
system’s ability to handle all faults/errors). However, we argue that even
with lack of completeness, evaluation using fault injection is still very useful
since it gives information about how the system behaves in practise. Even
though formal techniques and addition of several layers of fault-tolerance
software may be desirable it is not always possible for large systems, such as
an OS, due to performance, compliance or cost limitations.
On these premises we are interested in ﬁnding out how OS’s behave in
presence of errors, more speciﬁcally errors in device drivers. Consequently
the following research questions are posed for this thesis:
Thesis Research Questions
The research questions posed for this thesis are grouped into two broad cat-
egories, ﬁrst the conceptual deﬁnition of robustness proﬁling and the associ-
ated measures, and then the quantiﬁable experimental aspects of validating
the proposed measures.
Category 1: Conceptual
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Research Question 1 [RQ1]: How do errors in device drivers propagate
in an OS? What is a good model for identiﬁcation of such propagation paths?
Chapter 3 sets up the model used to evaluate and proﬁle the OS. The
model must allow for clear deﬁnition of propagation paths, and for useful,
easily interpretable results to be extracted.
Research Question 2 [RQ2]: What are quantiﬁable measures of ro-
bustness proﬁling of OS’s?
Chapter 5 presents a framework that allows for identiﬁcation of error
propagation paths, that help us quantify which services are more likely to
spread errors in the system. It also allows us to identify for an application,
which OS services used are more likely to be vulnerable to propagating errors.
Additionally, device drivers can be ranked based on their potential diﬀusion
of errors, allowing a designer to make informed choices on whether to include
a driver in the system, to enhance its robustness or to ﬁnd an alternate
driver. Chapter 6 presents experimental results for a case study conducted
for Windows CE .Net.
Category 2: Experimental Validation
Research Question 3 [RQ3]: Where to inject? Where are errors
representing faults in drivers best injected? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of diﬀerent locations?
We have chosen to inject errors in the interface between the OS and its
drivers. This level of injection provides ﬂexibility and portability among
other advantages. Chapter 3 presents our system model and shows where
errors are injected. Chapter 4 details our injection framework, which allows
for error to be injected.
Research Question 4 [RQ4]: What to inject? Which error model
should be used for robustness evaluation? What are the trade-oﬀs that can be
made?
The choice of error model is not straightforward and there are trade-oﬀs
to be made on the amount of details provided, the time/eﬀort required and
the implementation complexity. It is shown in Chapter 6 how such trade-oﬀs
can be made and three distinct error models are evaluated, bit-ﬂips, data-
type and fuzzing. A novel composite error model is provided, combining the
higher vulnerability exposure of the bit-ﬂip error model with the low costs
of the fuzzing error model.
Research Question 5 [RQ5]: When to inject? Which timing model
should be used for injection?
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When doing in-situ fault injection experiments, which are needed for ro-
bustness evaluation, the time of injection becomes an issue. The state of
the system evolves as it executes and consequently also its susceptibility to
faults. A novel approach to selecting the time of injection is presented in
Chapter 7, based on the usage proﬁle of the driver.
Thesis Contributions
The research presented here constitutes several important contributions to
the research community. Each contribution lists the corresponding research
questions it helps answer in brackets.
Contribution 1: A framework is presented for characterizing error prop-
agation in an OS, focusing on a key source of OS failures, errors in device
drivers. [RQ1, RQ2, RQ4]
Contribution 2: A series of error propagation measures are deﬁned,
which are used to proﬁle the robustness of the OS. [RQ2, RQ4]
Contribution 3: A large scale case study for Windows CE .Net has been
carried out, where fault injection is used to validate the proposed measures.
[RQ3, RQ4, RQ5]
Contribution 4: A detailed investigation on the eﬀectiveness and eﬃ-
ciency of several error models for use in OS robustness evaluations. Models
are compared on several parameters, including number of provoked failures,
service coverage, required execution time and implementation complexity.
[RQ3]
Contribution 5: We show how a new composite error model can be
used when proﬁling drivers, combining desirable properties of other models
giving excellent coverage characteristics for a moderate number of injections.
[RQ3]
Contribution 6: The impact of the time of injection is studied and it is
shown that for a certain class of drivers, the impact is high. This indicates
that controlling the time of injection is important. [RQ5]
Contribution 7: A novel approach to selecting the right time to inject is
presented together with a large case study supporting the results. The model
uses the new concept of call block to deﬁne the time of injection. [RQ5]
Contribution 8: A ﬂexible fault injection framework for Windows CE
.Net has been implemented and used to carrying out the fault injection ex-
periments required. The framework allows for easy extension to new error
models, drivers and services. [RQ3, RQ4, RQ5]
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1.4 Thesis Structure
The structure of the following chapters follows the structure of the research
questions postulated previously:
Chapter 1 introduces the research problems studied and the contribu-
tions. Also, it introduces the terminology used throughout the thesis.
Chapter 2 gives a background and context to the problems approached
in this thesis by surveying related work.
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the system and error model used.
The experimental environment is presented, both in terms of hardware and
software.
Chapter 4 presents our experimental methodology and presents details
regarding the fault injection technique used.
Chapter 5 introduces our error propagation framework and introduces
the key measures used for of error propagation and eﬀect analysis. Their use
and interpretation is discussed.
Chapter 6 investigates the impact of the choice of error model by pre-
senting a comprehensive experimental evaluation of three error models. The
evaluation builds on the measures introduced in Chapter 5.
Chapter 7 shows the impact of the time of injection and presents a novel
approach to choosing relevant injection times.
Chapter 8 ﬁnally puts the contributions of the thesis back into context
by discussing the general conclusions to be drawn. Additionally a discussion
on how the results can be applied for several other research ﬁelds is provided
and future research directions are outlined.
Chapter 2
Background and Context
What is an OS, and how has its robustness been evaluated? What
is the state of the art and state of the practice in OS robustness
evaluation?
Over the years the OS has evolved in its complexity and roles. What
started as a program to help computer operators read jobs from tapes for
large mainframe computers, is today present in a multitude of computing
products and responsible for serving multiple concurrent users and handling
a wide range of devices. The sophistication of the services provided has
increased tremendously over the years, as has the reliance on the correct and
timely provision of service to applications and users. This has given rise to
a whole area of dependability evaluations and enhancements.
This chapter aims to relate the work presented in this thesis to the large
body of work performed by other researchers. Thus it forms the background
and the context for the research questions posed and puts the contributions
presented into perspective.
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2.1 A Short Operating System History
The ﬁrst computers were programmed per hand and the programs were given
to an administrator as punch cards, which then placed them in the card
reader for the computers. As computers evolved and the uses and require-
ments for computations increased it became evident that some form of con-
trol software was needed, both to abstract away the intricacies of the hard-
ware and to allow for concurrent access for multiple users. The OS was born
to handle multiple jobs that needed time on the CPU. At ﬁrst these jobs were
batched and the role of the OS was to read the code for one job into memory
(from tapes or punch cards) and when it was ﬁnished write the output on
printers, tapes etc. One major issue with batching of jobs was that while the
computer, which was a horrendously expensive piece of equipment, was wait-
ing for some external device it could not make any progress and was simple
idle. This was solved when multiprogramming was introduced in OS’s. The
memory available to the computer was partitioned across multiple jobs, such
that when one job was waiting for some I/O operating to complete, another
job could use the processor to perform computations. Further improvements
followed, such as timesharing where multiple users attached to terminals
could share the computer, by dividing the time used on the processor across
the users. As computers became smaller, faster and more user friendly, the
number of computer users also increased. Several diﬀerent OS’s evolved,
the most prominent ones being ﬁrst UNIX (which comes in many ﬂavors,
including OS’s like GNU/Linux and Mac OS X/Darwin), later followed by
Microsoft DOS and Windows. Many special purpose OS’s were developed,
for instance for Real-Time systems, or for large-scale servers. Good text
books on general OS related themes include the classical books by Tanen-
baum [2001] and Silberschatz et al. [2004].
2.1.1 OS Design
One of the key goals for an OS is protection. It should prevent users and
processes to gain access to data (read, modify, execute etc), devices and other
processes in an uncontrolled manner. This includes both unintentional and
intentional (even malicious) accesses. A common technique to enforce this is
to deﬁne (in hardware) diﬀerent privilege levels, where processes executing
with higher privilege can access lower privilege processes, but not the other
way around. For most OS’s two such levels (or modes) are deﬁned, user
level and kernel level. Only at the kernel level is it possible to use some
processor instructions. By executing the OS at the higher privilege level
(kernel mode) it can control user processes’ access to the system. Naturally
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failures of kernel mode components are potentially more severe than user
mode components, since few protection mechanisms exist to prevent them
from corrupting important system data and components.
Client
process
Client
process
Process
server
Terminal
server . . .
File
server
Memory
server
User mode
Kernel mode
Microkernel
Figure 2.1: Example of microkernel design. Figure from [Tanenbaum, 2001].
There have been two main design principles for general OS’s, the mono-
lithic kernel and the microkernel-based design. In a microkernel-based design
the OS kernel is kept small and provides only low level services, such as pro-
cess and memory management, inter-process communication (IPS) etc. The
microkernel is the only entity of the OS running in privileged mode. Other
services that one wants the OS to provide, such as ﬁle systems, device drivers
etc execute in user mode (and are often referred to as servers) as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. Applications request OS services using IPC to the particular
server providing the service, as shown by the arrow in the ﬁgure.
In a monolithic design on the other hand, all OS services execute in
privileged mode, and applications make system calls to use the services1
provided by the system. The model of the OS layered vertically, with each
layer using services of lower layers, whereas the microkernel design is more
of a horizontal design. This design is reﬂected in our system model, which is
shown in Figure 3.1.
2.1.2 Device Drivers
Device drivers are, as the name suggests, responsible for interaction with
devices. There are also drivers for virtual devices (protocols etc) and other
software making use of the driver architecture to extend the functionality
of the OS. A driver’s role is to encapsulate and handle the device speciﬁc
interaction needed in order for the OS and applications to use the device.
As many devices have special functionalities, or use speciﬁc protocols, the
drivers provide a middle layer between the OS and the devices.
1Throughout we will use the term service which is more general than the term system
call. However, for the system used in this thesis they are synonyms.
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In order to facilitate OS-driver interactions, and to make it easier to de-
velop drivers, the interface between a driver and the OS is typically standard-
ized. This means that a driver needs to implement certain functionality for
the OS to be able to interact with it. In exchange the OS provides functionali-
ties that make it easier to develop and maintain drivers. This way the OS can
handle whole classes of drivers the same way, making it signiﬁcantly easier
to develop new devices (and drivers) for existing OS. Using device drivers
also potentially simpliﬁes the porting of the OS to multiple hardware archi-
tectures, as the drivers can be used handle parts of the hardware-speciﬁc
features of diﬀerent architectures.
2.1.3 What is the Problem?
There are several reasons why it is diﬃcult to design and test an OS. First
of all, most OS’s are general-purpose, i.e., they are built to handle a wide
variety of workloads and they can be highly parameterized to be used in
diﬀerent environments. Furthermore, the OS kernel runs in high-privilege
mode, were failures easily take down the whole system. OS’s often have long
run-times, especially in the server and embedded areas, making them sensi-
tive to resource exhaustion and leakage problems. Many OS functionalities
are service-oriented, meaning that correctness of execution may be hard to
deﬁne and limit, making testing and other means of veriﬁcation and valida-
tion hard. Lastly the sheer size of modern OS’s poses a problem for thorough
veriﬁcation and validation. To give a hint on size, Steve Jobs (CEO of Apple
Inc.) was quoted to say that MacOS X contained 86 million lines of code
[Jobs, 2006].
2.2 Sources of Failures of Operating Systems
This section will survey some of the sources for OS failures. To get infor-
mation on common sources for failures the most straightforward technique
is to collect data from deployed system in the ﬁeld. Most companies collect
failure data for their systems to some extent, but there are several aspects
warranting consideration, such as privacy, user participation, unbiased data
sets etc [Murphy, 2004].
One of the most inﬂuential papers within its ﬁeld is Gray’s 1985 classical
paper “Why Do Computers Stop and What Can Be Done About It?” [Gray,
1985]. Studying outage reports for a large number of Tandem systems four
main classes of sources for outages were identiﬁed: administration, software,
hardware and environment. Administration and software were were found to
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be the largest contributors (42% and 25% respectively). Another interesting
ﬁnding was that a majority of the software faults investigated for a speciﬁc
subsystem were Heisenbugs, not Bohrbugs, which supports the idea of using
software fault tolerance through redundancy, e.g., process pairs etc. A later
report in 1990 reports on a trend that software is increasingly being the
source of failures (up to 60% in 1989).
The rest of the section covers diﬀerent sources of faults. There are many
possible classiﬁcations of faults, and in this thesis we will consider three
classes: hardware, software and user-related faults. This section will review
each of these in turn and relate them to OS failures. As device drivers is a
major source of OS failures and of interest to this thesis, the last subsection
is dedicated to faults in device drivers.
2.2.1 Hardware Related
Hardware related faults are faults stemming from physical defects or phe-
nomena in the hardware platform upon which the OS is running. Hardware
faults may have diﬀerent causes, such as power glitches, wear-out/aging, ra-
diation/EMI etc. Much work has been spent on characterizing and protecting
against hardware faults. Common examples include error correcting codes on
memory, redundant bus lines, redundant disks (RAID etc) and many other
techniques. From an OS perspective these four classes of faults have broadly
be deﬁned in [Kao et al., 1993]:
• Memory faults, corrupting memory locations, either code or data,
• CPU faults, computation, control ﬂow and register faults. They appear
as register corruptions (PC, PSR SP etc),
• Bus faults, aﬀecting bus lines, and
• I/O faults, external devices causing problems.
Cosmic rays penetrating the atmosphere may cause transistor voltage lev-
els to transiently change when they hit chips. Due to their nature (transient)
such errors are often referred to as soft errors (compared to hard, perma-
nent errors). The rate at which they occur is referred to as the soft error rate
(SER). It is expected that future chips will have an increase in SER due to the
scaling of size and supply voltage [Shivakumar et al., 2002; Constantinescu,
2003, 2005].
By the principle of error containment, errors are best handled close to the
source. However, many hardware errors may propagate to the software level
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undetected. This is especially true for system-level software, including device
drivers. Such errors may be diﬃcult to discriminate from software faults.
This relation was studied in [Iyer and Velardi, 1985]. Data was collected for
an installation of the MVS OS at Stanford. The purpose of the study was
to evaluate the OS’s ability to detect and diagnose software errors that are
related to hardware errors. The investigation showed that the OS was rarely
able to correctly diagnose the error as hardware related, and less so than for
pure software errors.
2.2.2 Software Related
Sullivan and Chillarege studied error reports for software errors in the MVS
OS, between the years 1985-1989 [Sullivan and Chillarege, 1991]. Two main
groups of software defects (termed errors henceforth) were analyzed, regu-
lar and overlay errors. Regular errors represents a “typical software error
encountered in the ﬁeld”. Overlays are errors where memory areas have
been overwritten, such as buﬀer overruns. The most common types of mis-
takes were found to be related to memory allocation, copying overruns and
pointer management. Other error types identiﬁed include register reuse,
type mismatch, uninitialized pointer, undeﬁned state, synchronization, dead-
lock, sequence error, statement logic, data error, compilation errors and oth-
ers/unknown. The study was later extended to include database management
systems and further reﬁned and related to the development process through
the concept of defect type [Sullivan and Chillarege, 1992]. This gave rise
to the classical Orthogonal Defect Classiﬁcation (ODC) process [Chillarege
et al., 1992; Chillarege, 1996]. ODC contains seven defect types: function,
assignment, interface, checking, timing/serialization, build/package/merge
and documentation. Each defect can be classiﬁed to belong to one of these
types. These types have later been used to build libraries for injection of
artiﬁcial faults in systems, for instance [Christmansson and Chillarege, 1996;
Christmansson et al., 1998; Dura˜es and Madeira, 2006].
2.2.3 User Related
Murphy and Levidow investigated the sources for outages for Windows NT,
and found drivers to be a signiﬁcant source of system crashes [Murphy and
Levidow, 2000]. However, system outages are mostly found to be planned
(installation of hardware/OS/applications etc). Xu et al. [1999] investigated
the causes for Windows NT system reboots and found planned maintenance
and conﬁguration to be responsible for 31% of the downtime for a produc-
tion environment network of servers. Software and hardware to also cause a
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signiﬁcant part of system downtime (22% and 10%).
Even though user-related faults is a key to minimizing outages of system
it is not the focus of this thesis. We focus on software related faults and their
consequences.
2.2.4 Device Drivers
Device drivers are typically developed by a diﬀerent party than the OS ven-
dor. However, for some general drivers (bus drivers, for instance) generic
drivers may be developed by the vendor. Testing of drivers is therefore nor-
mally performed by the device manufacturer. Due to the number of devices
produced and the time-to-market pressure, device drivers are often not of the
same level of quality as other parts of the OS. Developers may not have time,
or be skilled enough, to handle the sometimes intricate interaction required
with the OS and the devices. Device drivers typically execute in kernel mode,
meaning that a critical fault in a device driver may take down the whole sys-
tem. Recent eﬀorts have made user-mode drivers possible in many modern
OS [Corbet et al., 2005].
Device drivers today form the largest part (in terms of lines of code)
within the OS. Chou et al. [2001] reported that 70% of the Linux kernel code
is device drivers. That device drivers is a major source for OS failures is
therefore no surprise. Several ﬁeld studies have found drivers to be a main
source of system failures, e.g., [Murphy and Levidow, 2000; Ganapathi and
Patterson, 2005; Ganapathi et al., 2006].
Ganapathi et al. investigated the causes of kernel crashes for the Win-
dows OS [Ganapathi and Patterson, 2005; Ganapathi et al., 2006]. Crash
reports were collected from volunteers using the BOINC (Berkley Open In-
frastructure for Network Computing) platform [BOI]. Device drivers were
found to be the major cause for kernel crashes, but the study is based solely
on crashes, not outages, which may not be due to crashes.
In contrast to the previous studies, which were based on collecting error
reports and logs Chou et al. has studied Linux kernels spanning seven years
using static analysis [Chou et al., 2001]. The analysis was static compiler
based, using the source code of the kernel. They found device drivers to have
error rates of up to three to seven times that of other parts of the kernel.
Furthermore they found that some functions have distinctly more bugs than
others (clustering of bugs) and that newer ﬁles are more prone to errors than
older ones.
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2.3 Fault Injection
Fault injection is a technique where faults (or errors) are intentionally in-
serted in a system to observe how the system reacts. The technique started
in the hardware area, with the speciﬁc purpose of testing fault-tolerance
mechanisms [Arlat et al., 1993]. It has also been proposed to use fault injec-
tion as part of certiﬁcation for high-assurance systems [Voas, 1999].
Fault injection can be performed at diﬀerent levels in the system (like
hardware, software, protocols) and at diﬀerent stages in development (on
design models, prototypes or deployed systems). The focus in this thesis is
on executable systems, i.e., at least a prototype of the system needs to exist
for the evaluation to be performed. Furthermore, we focus on techniques
implemented in software, so called SWIFI techniques (SoftWare Implemented
Fault Injection). Other techniques require use of special-purpose hardware or
use abstract models of the system to inject faults. SWIFI has the advantage
of being more ﬂexible and cheaper. Surveys of fault injection techniques,
covering all three classes, include Clark and Pradhan [1995], Hsueh et al.
[1997] and Carreira et al. [1999]. This rest of this section covers a wide range
of SWIFI tools.
FIAT (Fault Injection-based Automated Testing) is a fault injection tool
for dependable distributed applications [Segall et al., 1988; Barton et al.,
1990]. System dependability properties, especially error coverages and la-
tencies were evaluated. Injections were performed by bit-level corruption of
a task’s data and/or code memory areas. Three types of corruptions were
used, zero-byte, set-byte and 2-bit compensate. The outcome of experiments
were classiﬁed on a ﬁve-grade scale, from machine crash to invalid output
and no error.
In an early work on fault injection, Chillarege and Bowen introduced the
concept of failure acceleration achieved through fault injection. Failure ac-
celeration occurs when the fault → error → failure process is accelerated, by
decreasing the fault and error latencies, and increasing the probability that a
fault causes a failure [Chillarege and Bowen, 1989]. This makes experiments
faster to perform and allows for estimations of the transition probabilities
(fault → error and error → failure), which is typically not possible from
ﬁeld data (which focus mostly on failures). They reported on a fault injec-
tion study performed on the MVS OS, where a random (virtual) page in
memory was set to 0xFF, generating an invalid address/opcode, thereby in-
creasing the probability that a fault causes a failure. It was found that only
a small fraction of the injected faults led to a complete failure of the primary
service of the system (16%), whereas most (70%) led to no loss of service
at all. Careful study of the latter category led to the deﬁnition of potential
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hazard, an error which has caused damaged in the system but does not lead
to failure under the current operating state. Potential hazards may lead to
failure at a later stage, triggered by changes in workload, and may explain
previously observed relations between workload and failures.
FERRARI (Fault and ERRor Automatic Real-time Injector) injects er-
rors in application and OS processes simulating low level hardware faults.
Injection is performed either by ﬁrst corrupting the memory of the process
before it is started, or by injecting faults during execution, triggered either
spatially (i.e., after a certain code location is reached) or by a timeout de-
ﬁned by the user [Kanawati et al., 1995]. Injections are performed purely in
software, using software traps. Faults are injected in the address, data or
control line for the targeted instruction, resulting in for instance diﬀerent in-
structions being executed or operands being modiﬁed. The actual injection
is performed using bit-level modiﬁcations. Both transient and permanent
faults can be injected.
FINE (Fault Injection and moNitoring Environment) was used to study
the propagation of errors in OS’s. FINE can inject both hardware (CPU,
memory, bus) and software related faults (initialization, assignment, condi-
tion). FINE was one of the ﬁrst fault injectors to be implemented in kernel
space, making OS evaluation possible. Previous tools, such as FERRARI
executed in user-mode and thus had no access to kernel memory areas [Kao
et al., 1993]. A new system call was implemented (ftrace) used to specify
injection and insertion of probes from user-space. [Kao et al., 1993] reports
on experiments for SunOS 4.1.2 using randomly placed bit-ﬂips in code mem-
ory and randomly selected global variables. Software faults were manually
injected in the kernel text segment. Only 8% of the injected faults led to error
propagation to another subsystem, with most of them caused by corrupted
function call parameters. FINE was later extended for use with distributed
systems as DEFINE [Kao and Iyer, 1994].
FTAPE (Fault Tolerance And Performance Evaluator) was used to com-
pare fault-tolerant computer systems [Tsai and Iyer, 1995]. The tool com-
bines a fault injector with a workload generator and monitor, to allow in-
jection of faults under high stress conditions, when faults are more likely to
propagate [Tsai et al., 1996, 1999]. Faults can be injected throughout the
system (CPU, memory, disks). The tool can inject single, as well as multiple
bit-ﬂips and stuck-at faults.
FTAPE was later extended to NFTAPE, which is an extensible tool using
generic components to perform fault injection in a distributed fashion. So
called lightweight fault injector components are deﬁned to perform the actual
injection, monitor and trigger components can similarly be provided by the
user [Stott et al., 2000]. NFTAPE has been used to study error sensitivity
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of Linux [Gu et al., 2004].
MAFALDA (Microkernel Assessment by Fault injection AnaLysis and
Design Aid) uses fault injection to assess the robustness of microkernel-based
OS’s [Arlat et al., 2002]. Injections are made into both code and data areas of
the OS, as well as into the parameters of kernel calls using the bit-ﬂip error
model. MAFALDA can be used to study system failure modes and error
propagation across the components of the system. The authors also showed
how, using a formal description of function behavior, error detection wrappers
can be deﬁned for kernel functions. An extension of the tool, MAFALDA-RT,
was designed to also handle real-time systems [Rodriguez et al., 2002].
DOCTOR (integrateD sOftware fault injeCTiOn enviRonment) is a tool
for SWIFI for distributed real-time systems [Han et al., 1995]. It can inject
communication faults, such as lost or duplicated messages. Hardware faults
are simulated in CPU registers, bus or memory as single or multiple bit
faults. The location (in memory) can be deﬁned by the user or randomly
selected. For driving the experiments various synthetic workloads can be
automatically generated or user-deﬁned programs are used. DOCTOR was
for instance used to evaluate a distributed diagnosis algorithm implemented
on HARTS, a distributed shared-memory-based real-time architecture [Shin,
1991].
Xception uses debugging and performance monitoring capabilities of
processors to inject errors in CPU functional units. The processor is in-
structed to halt when faults are to be injected and low-level exception han-
dling code performs the injection. The advantage of this approach is that
interferences with the target system is minimized, it requires no source code
access, or trace-based execution of applications or OS. Focus is on simulating
hardware transient faults, as these form the majority of faults in modern pro-
cessors [Shivakumar et al., 2002; Constantinescu, 2005]. Several triggers are
supported, including address-based (fetch of opcode from speciﬁc address)
and timeout-based. Faults are injected as bit level faults (stuck-at, ﬂips and
masks). Xception was later used for other studies, including [Madeira et al.,
2000, 2002].
PROPANE (PROPagation ANalysis Environment) is a fault injec-
tion tool used to primarily study error propagation in embedded soft-
ware [Hiller et al., 2002b; Hiller, 2002]. Data-level errors are targeted, by
modifying data values, either on the bit-level or by ﬁxed values or oﬀsets.
Injections are triggered by selecting injection locations. Additionally timers
can be set, either using clock counters or counters on reaching injection lo-
cations. PROPANE can inject both transient, intermittent and permanent
errors. Since instrumentation is done on the source code of the target soft-
ware, propagation can be studied down to individual signals (variables) of
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the components of the system. Together with the measures deﬁned in the
EPIC framework (Exposure, Permeability, Impact, Criticality), PROPANE
was used to evaluate the propagation of errors in an aircraft arrestment sys-
tem [Hiller et al., 2004; Hiller, 2002].
RIDDLE (Random and Intelligent Data Design Library Environment)
tests application and system services/libraries on Windows NT using random
but syntactically correct strings as input [Ghosh et al., 1998]. The program
is observed for unexpected termination, crashes, unhandled exceptions etc.
The approach taken is similar to that of [Miller et al., 1990] described in
Section 2.4.
FST (Failure Simulation Tool) wraps applications running on the Win-
dows family of OS’s with an instrumentation layer, whereby failing OS func-
tions can be simulated. On a technical level the wrapping is performed in
a very similar manner to the Interceptor modules used in this thesis (see
Section 4.5 for more details). Failures in the OS are simulated by throwing
exceptions and returning error codes. The faults were selected from the set
of outcomes from previous experiments on the system using RIDDLE [Ghosh
et al., 1998]. Applications are deemed as robust if they do not hang, crash
or disrupt the system in presence of perturbations.
HEALERS (HEALers Enhanced Robustness and Security) is a system
for automatically increasing the robustness of C libraries [Fetzer and Xiao,
2002a,b]. HEALERS uses adaptive fault injection to evaluate the robustness
of individual parameters in library functions. Information present in header
ﬁles and manual pages is used to build fault injectors, which progressively test
functions to compute the robust argument type, i.e., the set of values for which
the function does not crash or return with an error. This information is used
to automatically build robustness wrappers for the selected library functions.
HEALERS was later extended (the new tool is called Autocannon), using
an extended type system from Ballista (see Section 2.4) to further simplify
the generation of robustness wrappers [Su¨ßkraut and Fetzer, 2007]. Wrappers
are deﬁned as predicates over a set of tests on parameter values, making the
approach more ﬂexible and extensible than the original HEALERS approach.
AutoPatch reuses parts of the HEALERS system to investigate appli-
cations’ handling of error codes from library functions [Su¨ßkraut and Fetzer,
2006]. Error injection is used to ﬁnd unsafe functions, i.e., error code re-
turn values are injected for function calls, and applications not handling
them (crashing) are labeled unsafe. Unsafe functions can be automatically
patched using a variety of patching techniques.
DTS (Dependability Test Suite) tests applications running on Windows
NT by corrupting the parameters to library calls [Tsai and Singh, 2000]. The
server in a client-server system (Apache IIS, SQL Server) was targeted and
26 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
outcomes were classiﬁed from a client’s perspective, i.e., retry required, server
restart required, complete failure etc. The servers were tested running stand-
alone and using two diﬀerent fault-tolerance middleware solutions. Three bit-
level fault models were used for the parameters to the library calls: setting
all bits, zeroing all bits or ﬂipping all bits. Large-scale injections veriﬁed that
the evaluated middleware reduced the number of failures considerably.
G-SWFIT (Generic Software Fault injection Technique) uses soft-
ware mutations to inject software faults into the binary of a target program
[Dura˜es and Madeira, 2006]. A ﬁeld study of real faults was used to generate
mutations. First the faults were classiﬁed according to ODC (see Section
2.2.2). This classiﬁcation is then reﬁned with an orthogonal classiﬁcation
of missing, wrong and extraneous constructs, which allow for more precise
fault injection. The binary of the target is searched for patterns relating to
higher-level code constructs, where code mutations chosen from a represen-
tative set of software faults are inserted. Using failure mode analysis the
behavior of three test programs is compared, when inserting low-level mu-
tations and source code faults. Overall most of the source code level faults
could be reproduced by the mutations to some extent.
Several hardware-based techniques have been developed as well, injecting
faults at diﬀerent levels of the system. MESSALINE [Arlat et al., 1990, 1993]
injects faults at the pins to ICs of fault tolerant systems. Karlsson et. al.
[Karlsson et al., 1994] use heavy-ion radiation for validation of fault-handling
mechanisms.
Fault injection has mainly been used to evaluate fault tolerance mecha-
nisms or robustness issues. However, it has also been found useful in the area
of security, especially for protocols [PRO]. In [Chen et al., 2002] errors were
injected in two kernel-based ﬁrewalls on Linux, and it was found that errors
in ﬁrewalls can in some cases lead to security vulnerabilities. Modeling a real-
istic installation suggests that error-caused vulnerabilities is a non-negligible
source for security concerns. Du and Mathur [2000] injected errors in the
environment of an application and observed the applications for security vi-
olations. NFTAPE has been used to inject control ﬂow bit-ﬂips in the user
authentication section of sshd and ftpd on Linux and it was found that
such faults may open up the aﬀected servers for vulnerabilities [Xu et al.,
2001]. Neves et al. present the AJECT tool which perform attack injection
for detecting vulnerabilities [Neves et al., 2006]. Attacks target protocols by
varying the messages used.
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2.4 Operating Systems Dependability Evalu-
ation
Several past eﬀorts have focused on evaluation of dependability and robust-
ness issues in OS’s, including the previously mentioned ﬁeld studies. This
section is dedicated to dependability benchmarks, where a standard method-
ologies and tools are used to evaluate and compare systems.
In benchmarking the aim is to compare competing systems using a fair
and repeatable process. Benchmarks for comparing computer performance
are abundant and have found widespread use, even though the interpretation
of the results often is non-trivial. One of the most inﬂuential benchmarks is
the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) benchmark [SPE;
Henning, 2000]. The most well known benchmark from SPEC is probably
SPECint for measuring integer computing capabilities of CPUs, but the orga-
nization oﬀers benchmarks in many areas, such as graphics, high-performance
computing (HPC) and web-based systems. Several other benchmarks exist
for speciﬁc areas, such as the Embedded Microprocessor Benchmark Consor-
tium’s (EEMBC) benchmarks [EEM; Weiss and Clucas, 1999], Transaction
Processing Performance Council (TPC) [TPC] and LINPACK [LIN] to men-
tion but a few.
Dependability benchmarks are not aimed at comparing performance
(only), but how “dependable” a system behaves. Two well known projects
on dependability benchmarking are the Ballista project from Carnegie Mel-
lon University [Bal] and the EU-IST project DBench [DBE; Kanoun et al.,
2001]. An introduction to the general problem of benchmarking and speciﬁc
issues related to dependability benchmarking is given in [Johansson, 2001].
Ballista is a robustness benchmark [Koopman, 1999; DeVale et al., 1999;
Koopman and DeVale, 1999]. The ﬁrst version of Ballista targeted the POSIX
interface found on many OS’s. It builds a testing wrapper for the function
targeted and then automatically builds test cases by selecting parameter
values from a set of valid and invalid values for that particular data type.
Since the number of diﬀerent data types used in the POSIX interface is
relatively low, the number of types for which injectors need to be speciﬁed is
also low. Addition of new functions to be tested requires only to deﬁne values
for any new type not previously used, making the approach very scalable.
Extensive experimentation done on several OS’s revealed multiple robustness
issues [Koopman and DeVale, 1999, 2000]. Ballista was later used for testing
I/O libraries [DeVale and Koopman, 2001], CORBA implementations [Pan
et al., 2001] and for Win32 interfaces in Windows [Shelton et al., 2000].
Mendonca and Neves used fault injection to test functions in the Win-
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dows DDK (the interface for device drivers) [Mendonca and Neves, 2007].
Since the DDK for Windows exports more than a thousand functions, only
functions used in at least 95% of the drivers were tested. Each function
was tested in isolation, similar to tests in Ballista, and failure mode analy-
sis was performed. The failure modes were related, not only to the system
robustness (crash, hang etc) but also to consistency of data on disk, where
FAT32 and NTFS were compared. Three versions of Windows were com-
pared (XP SP2, Server 2003 and Vista RC1) and the results showed great
similarities, indicating that the tested functions have not undergone funda-
mental changes impacting robustness throughout the three versions tested. It
was also found that NTFS, as expected, showed no ﬁlesystem inconsistencies,
whereas FAT32 did in some cases.
Early benchmarking projects aimed at OS’s target UNIX systems. The
crashme program was developed to test the robustness of the OS by executing
random data [Carrette]. This was achieved by ﬁrst allocating an array and
ﬁlling it with random data. Then several child processes are spawned that try
to execute the data as if it was a code segment. The system is submitted to a
large number of such processes, with the intent of testing the error detection
and handling capabilities of the OS. This simple test successfully crashed
several UNIX systems. The program was later extended to CMU Crashme
which subjected UNIX system calls to random strings, thereby testing their
parameter checking code [Mukherjee and Siewiorek, 1997]. This modiﬁed
version could crash the Mach 3.0 OS in less than ten seconds. The authors
also pointed out the usefulness of modular benchmarks, targeting speciﬁc
areas of the system, such as ﬁle, memory and inter-process communication
subsystems for an OS [Siewiorek et al., 1993; Dingman et al., 1995; Mukherjee
and Siewiorek, 1997].
Another approach using random data was carried out by Miller et al.
[1990], where a series of commercial UNIX implementations were bench-
marked and compared. The target was not the UNIX kernel per se, but a
set of utility applications commonly included in most UNIX OS’s, such as
awk, diﬀ and grep. The tests consisted of supplying random strings as inputs
to these utilities (which typically work on text input). The technique was
named fuzzing and has served as inspiration to the area of Random Test-
ing and also to the fuzzing error model used in this thesis. Robustness was
measured but observing the behavior of the application, where crashes or
hangs were undesirable outcomes (shows non-robust behavior). A surprising
number of deﬁciencies were found, with large diﬀerences between the bench-
marked systems. The experiments were later repeated with similar results
[Miller et al., 1995]. Also studies for Windows NT [Forrester and Miller,
2000] and MacOS have been conducted [Miller et al., 2006].
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A dependability benchmark for fault-tolerant systems was developed in
[Tsai et al., 1996] using the FTAPE fault injection tool. Measured was the
number of catastrophic incidents and the performance degradation of the sys-
tem. Faults were injected into the CPU, memory and I/O components of the
system. Since the systems tested consisted of redundant computers (Triple
Modular Redundancy - TMR) the expected outcome is only a performance
degradation.
Using PostMarkTM, a ﬁle system performance benchmark, as workload,
Kanoun et. al. developed a dependability benchmark for several versions
of Windows and Linux [Kanoun et al., 2005]. The benchmark is deﬁned as
a measure of the robustness of the OS’s ability to withstand invalid API
inputs. Measured is also reaction and restart times for the compared OS’s.
The same authors have also deﬁned a dependability benchmark using the
TPC-C transactional performance benchmark as workload [Kalakech et al.,
2004a,b] for Windows.
Brown et. al. argue that the human factor must be included in a depend-
ability benchmark by showing that most of the outages for large systems are
caused by (human) operators [Brown and Patterson, 2001]. They present a
dependability benchmark which includes real human operators, performing
both detection and recovery actions to injected faults and to perform stan-
dardized maintenance tasks [Brown et al., 2002]. Vieira and Madeira also
consider operator faults for studying recovery procedures in database man-
agement systems (DBMS) [Vieira and Madeira, 2002a,b]. A portable fault-
load for DBMS’s is deﬁned in [Vieira and Madeira, 2004], used to form a de-
pendability benchmark for On-Line Transaction Processing systems (OLTP).
Two kinds of measures are used, performance-related (from TPC-C) and
dependability-related. Performance related measures were taken both with
and without faults injected. Dependability-related measures include data
integrity and availability measures. The benchmark was applied to four dif-
ferent DBMS’s and three diﬀerent OS’s, and comparisons were made across
them.
2.5 Other Techniques for Veriﬁcation and
Validation
This section presents complementary techniques for veriﬁcation and valida-
tion and their relation to the fault injection-based techniques used in this
thesis. In general, no one single technique is to be preferred and we empha-
size that also the proposed techniques must be used as complements to other
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veriﬁcation and validation techniques.
2.5.1 Testing
Software testing is the most basic form of veriﬁcation for software. The
developer (or a designated tester) builds a test case which deﬁnes the context
for the test and the inputs, as well as the expected outputs, based on the
speciﬁcation of the tested component. The test is executed and the result
compared to the expected result. A plethora of testing techniques exist
and in this section we highlight the more relevant ones to this work. Good
introductory texts to software testing includes the seminal book The Art of
Software Testing by Myers [2004], or Testing Computer Software by Kaner
et al. [1999].
From an implementation point of view testing and fault injection have
many commonalities. Especially fault injection focusing on interfaces, which
is the case in this thesis. This type of fault injection resembles widely spread
unit testing approaches, such as equivalence class testing or boundary value
testing [Myers, 2004].
Conceptually, software testing’s goal is to identify faults, i.e., bugs,
whereas the goal of a robustness evaluation is to identify weaknesses. A
weakness in this sense may not be a bug (although it might), because it may
lie outside of the scope of the speciﬁcation, or may arise only in a certain
context.
In equivalence partitioning testing of a function one typically focuses on
both valid and invalid classes of inputs. The input space is split into a set of
equivalence classes where it is assumed that the function behaves similarly
(in terms of correctness) for all values within a class. The speciﬁcation for the
input is required for performing the partitioning. Boundary-value testing can
be seen as an extension of equivalence partitioning testing where one focuses
on the values around the boundaries of the equivalence classes.
2.5.2 Formal Methods
Any form of fault injection is inherently a dynamic testing method [My-
ers, 2004]. We consider dynamic testing techniques as ours, and more formal
techniques, including static analysis (like [Ball and Rajamani, 2002]) as com-
plements. Both are useful for building more dependable systems and both
have their strengths and weaknesses. Formal proofs (like theorem proving)
are used to prove that the implementation is made according to the speci-
ﬁcation, which also needs to be expressed formally. Another approach is to
using a model of the system, build and check all the states of the system and
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verify that they do not violate the speciﬁcation, for instance lead a violation
of the safety speciﬁcation for the system [Kumar and Li, 2002].
[Hayes and Oﬀutt, 2006] uses static analysis of the user input speciﬁca-
tions to programs to both identify inconsistencies in the speciﬁcation itself
and to generate test cases for testing. A large empirical case study showed
that the automatic tool found defects faster than expert testers, but not
necessarily more. It also found defects not found by human testers at all.
The results supports the complementary use of automatic tools with domain
expertise.
Even though formal methods are theoretically attractive, since they oﬀer
means to reach completeness, testing techniques and related experimental
techniques like fault injection are likely to prevail for many years to come,
due to their ease of use and understanding. However, test automation is a
necessary evolution in testing, as systems grow larger and more complex.
2.6 Summary
This chapter has presented background information and reviewed related
research within the areas of OS robustness evaluation and fault injection.
On this background we have identiﬁed the OS as being the key to system
dependability and robustness since it is the platform on which applications
and services are built. Furthermore, device drivers were identiﬁed as the main
source of software-related causes of system failures. Several previous studies
have focused on interfaces (OS-Application and OS-Driver) as it facilitates
portability and fair comparison, important aspects of benchmarks. Fault
injection has in multiple previous studies been shown to be an eﬀective means
for evaluation of dependability attributes of OS’s.
Our report on related work does not stop with this chapter. Throughout
the thesis we will give pointers to relevant studies where appropriate.
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Chapter 3
System and Error Model
What are the system boundaries, and what is an error?
OS’s are key building blocks in virtually all computer based system, rang-
ing from small deeply embedded control systems, to desktop workstations and
large servers for online transactions. Consequently OS dependability is an
important objective and a prerequisite for dependable provision of services.
This chapter builds the foundation for the following chapters, starting by
presenting the system model used. Then a general error model is deﬁned, in
terms of location, type and trigger, followed by the presentation of the three
error models used in the following chapters. The experimental setup used is
presented, both in terms of hardware and software. The chapter is concluded
with a summary containing a table of the symbols introduced for reference
in later chapters.
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3.1 System Model
Most modern OS’s are monolithic, i.e., the OS kernel providing the most
basic functionalities runs in kernel space, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. This is
in contrast to, for instance, micro kernel-based OS’s, where the functionality
of the OS kernel is spread across multiple subcomponents with well speciﬁed
interfaces.
We use a generic model of the OS. Similar to many other studies, e.g.,
[Albinet et al., 2004; Dura˜es and Madeira, 2003], we model a monolithic
system. The model consists of four layers: applications, OS, drivers and
hardware platform. We have chosen this model as it is generic enough to
apply to several commercial OS’s, like Windows or Linux. It is also suﬃ-
cient for measuring the robustness of the system due to errors in drivers by
studying error propagation.
Each layer consists of one or more subcomponents (like diﬀerent applica-
tions in the application layer, or diﬀerent drivers in the driver layer). Our
model does not specify the subcomponents required in each layer since they
diﬀer for each speciﬁc OS. Each layer provides services to be used by neigh-
boring layers. A service can be realized in many ways. Common is for
instance function calls (like API’s, Application Programming Interfaces or
system calls), but in general other mechanisms could be used like the message
passing paradigm used for communication between the OS and the drivers
deﬁned in the Windows Driver Model (WDM) found on Windows XP [Oney,
2003]. The nature of the communication is not important for the model,
important is that the service is syntactically speciﬁed, and that the ﬂow of
information can be intercepted and modiﬁed. This is required to be able to
inject errors and to observe the outcome of each injection. The speciﬁca-
tion is deﬁned in an interface. The two interfaces of interest here are the
OS-Application and OS-Driver interfaces indicated in Figure 3.1.
The system has a set of n applications, APP1 . . .APPn. The application
set includes all applications running on the system which are not required for
the OS to function properly. This includes applications added for the pur-
pose of the evaluation, called benchmark applications, or test applications.
Applications make use of OS-level libraries to implement their functionali-
ties. Typically, applications run in user space and the OS and the device
drivers execute in privileged mode.
The OS layer includes the OS kernel and all required libraries delivered as
parts of the OS. An example of such libraries are libraries used by applications
to interface with the OS (POSIX, C-runtimes etc.).
The OS provides a set S of services to be used by applications (si’s in
Figure 3.1). The OS-Driver interface consists of services provided both by
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the OS (osx.y’s in Figure 3.1) and services provided by drivers (the dsx.y’s
in Figure 3.1). Collectively they are referred to as the set O of services in
this interface. Each application APPx uses a set of OS services, termed Ax,
where Ax ⊆ S
...
Operating System
APP1
...
D1 D2 DN
... ...
APPn
...
... ... ...
...
... ...
Hardware Platform
... ...
... ... ... }
OS Layer
Application layer
Driver Layer
Hardware Layer
[OS-Application inteface]
}si
dsx.y
} osx.y[OS-Driver interface]
Figure 3.1: System model.
A driver is modeled as a component having both import and export inter-
faces as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The exported interface consists of a set of
services that the OS calls to request the driver to perform operations. These
services are termed dsx.y for the y
th service provided by driver Dx. The im-
ported service interface is used by the driver to accomplish these requests and
can be from the OS itself or other libraries in the system. These services are
termed osx.y for the y
th service imported by driver Dx. When no distinction
is made between imported and exported services we term a services at this
interface sx.y ∈ O. In the target environment used in this thesis (Windows
CE .Net) a service corresponds to a function call.
To perform error propagation analysis we require suﬃcient access (with
speciﬁcation) to the system to be able to intercept information ﬂow in the two
interfaces deﬁned (OS-Driver and OS-Application). In most cases this can be
achieved without requiring access to source code, neither for the drivers, nor
for the OS itself. For Windows CE .Net no such access is required. However,
access is needed to the source code of the benchmark applications, for instru-
menting them with assertions used to track the outcomes of injections. The
availability of interface speciﬁcations is a basic requirement for any OS open
for extensions by new types of drivers/applications.
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Target driver Dx
Services exported
by the driver (dsx.y)
Services imported
from the OS and 
other components (osx.y)
Figure 3.2: Driver model.
3.2 Error Model
In order to conduct fault injection based experimental stressing, three ques-
tions arise, namely:
• Where to inject?
• What to inject?
• When to inject?
The answers to these questions correspond to three properties of an error
model, referred to as the error type, error location and error trigger. Another,
fourth property, related to the error trigger is for how long to inject. Each of
these properties of an error model is discussed in the following subsections.
Throughout this thesis we do not make any distinction between the terms
errors and faults. Consequently, we will use error when discussing the per-
turbations inserted in the system. When the distinction is needed, we will
explicitly use the term fault.
3.2.1 Error Type
The error type constitutes the nature of the error. The error type relates to
the origin of the error, i.e., the fault, but also to the manifestation of faults as
errors. The error type describes how an error changes some internal state of
the system, from the originally (assumed) correct state, to another, possibly
erroneous, state.
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Depending on the goal of the evaluation, error types are chosen either to
as closely as possible match errors expected to appear in the system as it is
deployed in the ﬁeld, or generic error types are used, based on their ability
to provoke the system such that weaknesses in handling perturbations are
discovered. As our interest is on robustness , i.e., how the system handles
external perturbations, our goal is to use models that provoke as many and
as diverse vulnerabilities as possible. It can also be argued that when the
purpose of the evaluation is comparative, as is the case here, the value of
using a realistic error model is decreased, assuming that the relative eﬀect of
diﬀerent models is the same [Hiller, 2002]. Chapter 6 studies the selection of
diﬀerent error models explicitly. As previously noted, robustness evaluation
can also be a means for ﬁnding security-relevant vulnerabilities.
Fault injection originates from the desire to estimate the eﬀectiveness
of error detection and recovery mechanisms (EDRMs) built into a system.
For this purpose one chooses to use the error model used for the design of
these mechanisms. The second type of evaluation is explorative in nature.
Without knowledge of presence or coverage of any EDRMs, the system is
evaluated to see how it handles the perturbations injected. This type of
evaluation can be guided by the need to explore extra-functional behavior of
the system (or lack thereof) or by lack of operational scenarios. The second
case is especially true for general purpose system components, such as OS’s,
which may be used in many, fundamentally diﬀerent, operational contexts.
The focus of this thesis is on exploration of robustness vulnerabilities of
OS’s. To this end we have chosen error types based on their usefulness in
other research projects as well as real-world projects as reported in literature.
Three main error models have been used: data type-based errors, bit-ﬂips
and fuzzing (random values).
An error appearing at the interface of a component (such as a device
driver) appears as a data level error, i.e., the (data) value of some parameter
used in the interface has an erroneous value. What constitutes erroneous
depends on the interface/parameter in question and the state the system
is in. For instance, a driver returning an erroneous “busy” value may only
cause a small delay for the overall system (provided that a retry mechanism
exists). A driver responding “ready” when it in fact is not ready to receive
commands may cause severe failures in the system.
There are many possible sources for erroneous values to appear at the
interface, such as propagating hardware errors, faulty assignments of vari-
ables in the driver code, wrong user inputs or concurrency problems. ODC
is a framework to classify software defects and many of them can manifest
as interface errors (one class in ODC refers speciﬁcally to interface defects)
[Chillarege, 1996]. As we model the eﬀects of faults, i.e., errors, the interface
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level errors model the eﬀects of many of the underlying faults (and conse-
quently ODC classes of defects) as propagating errors. However, as we focus
solely on data level errors for device drivers at the interface to the OS we do
not oﬀer complete coverage of all operational faults. Therefore, our approach
should be treated as a complement to other techniques.
All three models used represent data level errors, but diﬀer in the imple-
mentation and the level of semantic expressiveness. The three models will
now be presented one by one.
Data Type Error Model
The manifestation of a data error also depends on the data type of the
parameter in question. Since modern compilers contain type checkers, not all
assignments are possible to do for a parameters, restricting the set of possible
errors for the parameters. The erroneous value for data type (DT) errors are
therefore selected depending on the data type of the parameter in question.
As most device drivers are written in the C programming language we will
consider C-style data types. This excludes high level abstract data types
supported in other high-level languages, such as classes/objects in object-
oriented programming languages.
Some OS’s do provide the possibility to write device drivers in other
programming languages, for instance C++. However, since most drivers are
still written in C we focus on such interfaces. In principle, object-oriented
interfaces can be seen as extensions of the data structures used (we already
support the struct data structure) in C.
For each data type used a set of injection cases are deﬁned. These are
predeﬁned, before injection, and are chosen based on their eﬀectiveness in
exposing vulnerabilities in the system [Koopman et al., 1997]. Values include
predeﬁned (no randomness involved) test values, oﬀset values and boundary
values. Oﬀset values modify the original value, for instance using addition
or substraction operations on the original value. The number of injections
deﬁned is typically relatively low, allowing this error model to incur fewer
injections (on average) than, for instance, the bit-ﬂip model [Koopman et al.,
1997]. Chapter 6 discusses the number of injections required compared to
other error models.
Since the injection cases are deﬁned on a data type-basis the number of
such data types used becomes the scaling factor for the data type error model.
Typically, multiple services in such interfaces use the same data types. For
instance, in [Kropp et al., 1998] only 20 data types were used for the 233
POSIX functions targeted. Each of the 233 functions used a combination of
the 20 data types, making this error model scale very well with the number
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of functions. No specialized injection scaﬀolding is required for each tested
function. However, one caveat is that information on the data type used is
required to select the right injection cases.
Table 3.1: Overview of the data types used.
Data type C-Type #Cases
Integers int 7
unsigned int 5
long 7
unsigned long 5
short 7
unsigned short 5
LARGE INTEGER 7
Misc * void 3
HKEY 6
struct {...} *
Strings 4
Characters char 7
unsigned char 5
wchar t 5
Boolean bool 1
Enums multiple cases #identiﬁers
Table 3.1 shows an overview of all the data types used and the number
of cases implemented for each of the types. The injection cases were cho-
sen based on their reported used in literature, such as the Ballista project
[Bal] and to include cases modifying the original value. Not relying solely
on statically deﬁned values, like boundary values and special values allows
exploration of “close to correct” values, which may be very problematic to
detect and recover from. Furthermore we have only selected values which
can occur in real code. It is important to be able to match the injected error
to a hypothetical fault in the code. Since we simulate mostly software faults,
each error injected must have been possible to introduce by an implementa-
tion fault. Consequently, each injected error must be compilable, i.e., it must
pass the type check by the compiler. By having a speciﬁc injection case for
each data type this property is maintained.
Data type errors also treat pointers as a special data type and reserves
one injection case for the pointer, namely setting it to NULL. Wrong use of
NULL-pointers is a common programming mistake. This done for explicit
pointers, but not for implicit pointers, such as strings, which have this case
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Table 3.2: Data type error cases for type int.
Case # New value
1 (Original value) - 1
2 (Original value) + 1
3 1
4 0
5 -1
6 INT MIN
7 INT MAX
Table 3.3: Data type error cases for strings.
Case # New value
1 Overwrite end of string (’\0’)
2 Increase reference pointer
3 Replace with empty string
4 Set reference to NULL
deﬁned as a special injection case. To further illustrate how data type errors
are deﬁned, Table 3.2 shows the cases for the type int. Cases 1 and 2
modify the original value by adding an oﬀset to it. Cases 3-7 use commonly
diﬃcult values and boundary values. Table 3.3 shows the errors injected
for string parameters (both for Unicode and ASCII strings). The ﬁrst case
eﬀectively evaluates the reliance on the end character for strings. The second
case shortens the string by disregarding the ﬁrst character and the third case
replaces the entire string with an empty string. The last case sets the pointer
to the string to NULL.
The choice of values was done based on known problematic values, and
previous studies; and it was kept relatively low. The choice of eﬀective values
(those exposing vulnerabilities) is diﬃcult and context dependent, and is
similar to the problems arising when selecting suitable equivalence classes
for functional testing [Hamlet, 2006]. For this study we have therefore opted
for a simple and lightweight data type model. Our model does not have
the same expressive power as the ones used for instance in [Koopman et al.,
1997] or [Fetzer and Xiao, 2002b], as it is based solely on the data type of
the parameter. The in-situ injection strategy eﬀectively limits the possible
types of injections that can be carried out. The model used is chosen for its
simplicity and low number of injection cases.
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Bit-Flip Error Model
When hardware elements are exposed to, for instance, radiation or EMI the
voltage levels in transistors can change, causing the logical ones and zeros to
change values or even get stuck at a certain value. The bit-ﬂip model (BF)
simulates these types of faults in hardware, by selectively ﬂipping certain
bits, changing the value from one to zero or vice versa.
The BF model was ﬁrst introduced to simulate hardware errors as above,
and was used in multiple fault injection tools (see Section 2.3 for several ex-
amples of such tools). At ﬁrst, hardware-based injection tools were used, but
SoftWare Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI) soon emerged, where hard-
ware faults are injected using software mechanisms. SWIFI improves ﬂexibil-
ity and ease implementation (no special hardware components needed), but
may be limited in which areas of hardware can be targeted. Once injection
could be conducted using software, bit-ﬂips were soon also used to simulate
software faults [Voas and Charron, 1996]. There is still a debate whether
the BF model accurately reﬂects software faults. Some authors argue that
this relation is of lesser importance, especially for robustness evaluation, and
that the important question is whether the eﬀects of the injected faults (the
errors) are the same as those of real faults [Jarboui et al., 2002b].
In the BF model each parameter is seen as a data word, where selected
bits are ﬂipped to simulate faults in the module. A diﬀerence is made be-
tween single event upsets (SEU, also referred to as soft errors in discussions
on hardware reliability) where only one bit is ﬂipped, and the case where
multiple bits are ﬂipped. In this thesis focus is on the simpler SEU model,
where one of the bits is selected as target and ﬂipped. For a 32 bit architec-
ture this typically results in 32 injections per parameter. Some data types
do not use the full 32 bits and thus a smaller number of bits can be used.
The greatest advantage of the bit-ﬂip model when used on interface pa-
rameters is simultaneously its greatest weakness, namely simplicity. While
being very simple to implement it lacks in expressiveness for more complex
errors in abstract data types, such as strings etc.
Fuzzing Error Model
The ﬁrst use of the fuzzing error model (FZ) in the context of robustness
evaluation was reported in [Miller et al., 1990]. Here UNIX utility programs
were fed random input data and their behavior was observed. The technique
of random input for robustness evaluation was further developed in [Ghosh
et al., 1998; Oehlert, 2005; Godefroid et al., 2007] and is advocated for in-
stance by Microsoft as part of their Secure Development Lifecycle [Howard
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and Lipner, 2006] and is mainly focused on ﬁles and network protocols.
For interface fault injection, fuzzing translates into replacing the value of
a parameter in the interface with a random value. The random value is uni-
formly selected across all 32-bit values. The uniform distribution is selected
since no knowledge regarding operational proﬁles or equivalence classes of
parameter values are present (or assumed), which could justify using a dif-
ferent distribution. More sophisticated techniques can also be applied, as in
the area of random testing (see Section 2.5.1). As true randomness is diﬃcult
to achieve, pseudo-random generators are used. Care needs to be taken to
make sure that the seeds used to these generators are selected diﬀerently for
each experiment, else the same value will be chosen for each injection.
It is important to note that whereas BF (and in some cases also DT)
modiﬁes a given value, i.e., the new erroneous value depends on the original
(presumably correct) value, fuzzing completely replaces the value with a new
one. This means that BF can be expected to more eﬀectively test “close to
correct” values, whereas FZ is better (thanks to the random selection) at
ﬁnding more rare values causing vulnerabilities.
3.2.2 Error Location
As location and distribution of actual faults may be unknown, or too costly
to fully explore, a common approach to inject errors instead of faults, i.e., to
inject the consequences of activated faults rather than the faults themselves
[Barton et al., 1990]. Many faults may manifest as the same error, i.e., at the
same location/level in the system. This concept is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
An injected error may represent multiple faults (at 2a or 2b), originating at
diﬀerent locations. An error injected at the interface (at 3.) may therefore
represent multiple errors having propagated to the same location.
Jarboui et al. [2003] makes a distinction between the level in the system
where a fault is injected and the reference location of the originating fault,
dr. In Figure 3.3 this corresponds to the distance between point 1 and 2.
Furthermore, a distinction is made between the location of the injected error
and the level where the failures of the system are observed, do. In Figure 3.3
between points 1 and 4.
In this thesis we have focused on errors appearing in the interface between
the OS and its device drivers. For the purpose of robustness evaluation of
an OS, this interface represents a good location for injecting errors for the
following reasons:
• This is a standard interface deﬁned for the OS. Using a standard inter-
face facilitates fair comparisons across drivers for the same OS.
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Figure 3.3: Error manifestation example.
• The interface allows for low-intrusion interception of the calls being
made across the interface. Low intrusion means that no source code
changes are needed, neither to OS, nor to drivers, which may not be
available for commercial products.
• As described above, injecting errors in the interface between the driver
and the OS allows for simulating multiple faults within the driver and
in the hardware it controls.
• Injecting errors at this level allows for achieving 100% activation ratio
for the injected errors using pre-proﬁling. This process is described in
Section 4.6.
• No driver-speciﬁc knowledge is needed, making the approach readily
available also for non-driver experts.
• The interface is an open interface, in that other 3rd party developers
are given access to the full interface, making robustness a key issue for
the vendor of the OS.
3.2.3 Error Trigger
An error can be a permanent defect present in the system, or a combination
of defects and external perturbations that together lead to an error. This
gives rise to two distinct properties of an error, relating to timing: the event
triggering the appearance of an error and the duration of the error once it
appears.
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For hardware related errors, permanent errors are not uncommon, even
though recent research indicates that the ratio of transient errors is increas-
ing. For software, permanent errors (Bohrbugs) are targeted using testing.
For robustness evaluation the main target is Heisenbugs. Furthermore, the
very nature of Heisenbugs make them diﬃcult to ﬁnd since a simple rela-
tion between inputs and failure cannot be established. Therefore, they are
instead simulated by the injection of errors in the system. In this work we
have focused on a transient error model as we believe this to more closely
represent behavior by the drivers not found through standard testing rou-
tines. Multiple other fault injection tools allow for injection of both transient,
intermittent and permanent faults, e.g., [Han et al., 1995; Stott et al., 2000].
The trigger used for an injection is studied in depth in Chapter 7. Which
type of trigger to use (event- or time-driven) and which parameters to use
is a non-trivial task. This thesis proposes a novel event-driven approach,
resulting in an eﬀective, yet simple, process for the selection of triggering
events. The proposed approach is based on the usage proﬁle of the drivers,
which allows injection in diﬀerent states of the system.
3.2.4 Other Contemporary Software Error Models
The work reported in [Albinet et al., 2004; Dura˜es and Madeira, 2003; Arlat
et al., 2002; Gu et al., 2004; Jarboui et al., 2002a] explored the use of vari-
ous error models and injection techniques for OS robustness evaluation and
benchmarking. In [Jarboui et al., 2002a], for instance, error models similar
to ours are used, but are injected at diﬀerent levels within the Linux kernel.
Dura˜es et. al. use a code mutation error model, where code segments of
device drivers are targeted [Dura˜es and Madeira, 2003]. Mutations have long
been used to assess the eﬀectiveness of testing. For instance, DeMillo used
code mutations for investigating the eﬃciency of a set of test cases in discov-
ering ﬂaws of a piece of software [DeMillo et al., 1978]. The authors develop a
theory regarding the coupling eﬀect, namely that if a set of test cases (input
values) can distinguish all (simple) mutations of a program from the correct
one, then it will also detect more complex faults in the code. Mutations were
later used in fault-based testing (for instance [Zeil, 1983; Morell, 1990]) to
verify that certain code level errors are not present in a piece of software.
Finally, in [Moraes et al., 2006] the authors note that errors appearing
at interfaces of components, though being useful for robustness evaluation,
do not necessarily represent faults in the code. Since we are indeed focusing
on robustness, interface errors are relevant. However, continued research on
error propagation can hopefully reveal which errors can be represented at the
interface, and which not.
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3.3 Experimental Environment
The experimental environment detailed in this section was chosen to repre-
sent a commonly used OS. We chose Windows CE .Net because it provides
the possibility to customize the whole system image in an easy manner and
it is a wide-spread OS, with uses in a wide range of products. Furthermore,
its architecture resembles that of most modern OS’s, making it an excellent
case study. This section ﬁrst introduces Windows CE .Net , its architecture
and tool support. Then the hardware setup used is presented together with
a description of the software setup.
3.3.1 Windows CE .Net
Windows CE .Net is an OS from Microsoft, targeted mainly at the embed-
ded market. It is highly conﬁgurable, making it widely used in diﬀerent
conﬁguration in diverse products, such as mobile phones and PDAs, Internet
surf stations, Point-of-Sale stations, GPS navigators etc. Windows CE is the
foundation for more speciﬁc embedded OS’s from Microsoft, such as Pocket
PC and Windows Mobile.
The ﬁrst released products based on Windows CE were released in 1996
as so called Handheld PCs. Further revisions of the ﬁrst version has led to
the currently latest version 6.0 at the time of writing this thesis. The work in
this thesis is based on version 4.2 of the OS, called Windows CE .Net, which
was released in 2003. For reasons of continuity we have chosen not move to
a newer version. Therefore, the rest of this thesis describes version 4.2 of
the OS. A good introductory text book on programming for Windows CE is
Douglas Boling’s book Programming Microsoft Windows CE .Net [Boling,
2003].
Figure 3.4 shows an overview of the architecture if Windows CE .Net.
It shows how the OS layer is split in two parts, the generic OS layer pro-
vided by Microsoft, which forms the interface used by applications, and the
OEM layer which is provided by the OEM (Original Equipment Manufac-
turer) embedding Windows CE in a product sold to customers. The OEM
layer makes it possible to use Windows CE for many hardware architectures
and for a multitude of peripheral devices and technologies. Although device
drivers are the main responsibility of the OEMs, some generic drivers are
also provided by Microsoft as part of the OS package.
In relation to our system model (Figure 3.1) the Driver Layer is formed
by the drivers provided either by the OEM or Microsoft. The rest of the
OEM layer is considered as part of the OS Layer.
Windows CE .Net, although being a completely diﬀerent OS than other
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Figure 3.4: An overview of the architecture of Windows CE .Net. Figure
adopted from [MSDN].
OS’s produced by Microsoft, oﬀers many of the same services and interfaces
used on the Windows platform. Examples include the .Net platform (as a
subset known as .Net Compact Framework), Win32, MFC etc. At design
time the designer can choose which components to include in the OS image.
A component is a separate piece of functionality that can either be included
in the OS image or not. The designer uses the Platform Builder tool to build
the OS image and to download it to the target machine.
3.3.2 Device Drivers in Windows CE
A device driver for Windows CE .Net is a dynamic link libraries (Dll). It is
dynamically linked into another process at load time. This host process can
then use the services provided by the driver. Most drivers in Windows CE
.Net are loaded by the device manager (device.exe). The Registry1 is used
to specify which drivers are to be loaded in the system, and in which order
(if there are dependencies across drivers the order might be important).
The interface used for communication between the OS and the driver
1The Registry is a Windows speciﬁc technique to centrally store conﬁguration infor-
mation, both for the system and for applications.
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is deﬁned in the C programming language. Each driver exports a set of
services and uses (imports) service from the OS to perform service requested.
Applications access devices through the OS, for example through the ﬁle
system interface. These calls are translated to corresponding calls into the
driver.
Since Windows CE .Net is supported on many hardware platforms and
used mainly for embedded systems it supports many diﬀerent peripheral
devices. Windows CE .Net supports three basic types of drivers, native, bus
and Stream interface drivers. Native drivers are built-in drivers provided
by the hardware vendors. They are typically tied to speciﬁc hardware and
OS versions, for controlling things such as keyboards, touch screens etc. They
might use completely custom interfaces to the OS and therefore often require
changes when new versions of the OS are released. Native drivers can be seen
as extensions of the OS for the required hardware, rather than supporting
add-on devices.
The most common type of interface is the Stream interface, which pro-
vides standard entry points for a driver. Since the interfaces is well speciﬁed
it allows for 3rd party developers to build drivers of the OS. Table 3.4 shows
an overview of the entry points provided. The preﬁx COM is by conven-
tion used for serial drivers, other drivers use other preﬁxes, such as CON for
console drivers or WAV for audio wave drivers.
Table 3.4: Stream interface for serial driver.
Number Name
0 COM Init
1 COM Deinit
2 COM Open
3 COM Close
4 COM Read
5 COM Write
6 COM Seek
7 COM IOControl
8 COM PowerDown
9 COM PowerUp
We focus mostly on Stream interface drivers, as these use a standard
interface allowing fair comparison across drivers, are typically developed by
3rd parties and represent add-on peripherals where a choice among competing
products can actually be made.
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3.3.3 Hardware
The hardware setup used for the experiments presented in this thesis is
an XScale-based reference board produced by Intrinsyc Ltd [Int]. Multiple
boards were acquired to allow for parallel execution of the injection experi-
ments.
The boards are based on the Intel PXA250 architecture, with an Intel
XScale processor chip. Each board carries 64 MB RAM and 32 MB Flash-
based ROM. A boot loader is present in ﬂash and allows for simple download
of new OS images, either to the ROM, or to RAM for immediate boot. A
dedicated ﬂash chip is also present, with access from user space applications.
The boards are equipped with a set of serial port connections (standard
RS232), where one acts as debug port. Two standard Ethernet sockets
(RJ45) allow for network connection. Each board is also equipped with a
CompactFlash socket, where peripheral devices can be attached onto the
PCMCIA bus.
3.3.4 Software
Using the provided Platform Builder tool, a small-footprint image contain-
ing the OS and the associated software modules described in Section 4.5 is
built and downloaded to the target board using Ethernet. Starting with the
smallest supported image, only components for the desired drivers and the
hardware speciﬁc components supplied by the vendor were included. This
resulted in an image with a footprint of less than 3 MB. Since the boards used
are headless, only minimal graphics and windowing components are needed.
Also media related (e.g., readers and viewers of diﬀerent ﬁle formats) and
Internet components (web, telnet, and ftp servers etc.) are left out of the
image. This way we get a system which contains a minimum number of
components that may inﬂuence the result of the experiments.
3.3.5 Selected Drivers for Case Study
Three drivers were chosen as representative for a case study: a serial port
driver (cerﬁo serial), a network card driver (91C111) and a driver for access-
ing a CompactFlash card connected to the PCMCIA bus (atadisk). These
drivers were chosen as they represent diﬀerent classes of drivers, the ﬁrst
two are common types of communication and the third access to external
sources attached to the system. The ﬁrst two are supplied, in this case, by
the vendor of the development board (not the same as the producer of the
hardware circuits), whereas the CompactFlash driver is delivered as part of
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the OS. They also represent drivers typically found on many systems and
platforms. All three provide the required Stream interface entry points and
are loaded by device.exe at load time.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has introduced the preliminaries needed for the discussion in the
following chapters. The system model used was introduced and for reference
Table 3.5 provides an overview of the symbols deﬁned. The error models used
were introduced and discussed followed by a description of the experimental
environment used, including both hardware and software aspects.
Table 3.5: Summary of symbols introduced.
Symbol Description
APPi
Application i out of a total n applications running on
the system
Dx Driver x from a total of N drivers in the system
si
A service provided by the OS, to be used by an applica-
tion.
osx.j A service provided by the OS, used by driver Dx.
dsx.j A service provided by driver Dx to be used by the OS.
sx.y
Any service in the OS-Driver interface, disregarding the
diﬀerence between imports and exports.
S The set of OS services provided in the OS-
Application interface.
Ax The set of OS services used by APPx.
O The set of services in the OS-Driver interface.
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Chapter 4
Fault Injection Framework
How to perform fault injection for device drivers?
In order to provide the infrastructure and support needed to perform the
required experiments a fault injection framework has been implemented for
Windows CE .Net. The framework allows for injection of a varied set of
error models in the interface between the OS and its device drivers. This
chapter ﬁrst discusses the requirements on the injection framework and then
describes the architecture of the framework, its implementation for Windows
CE .Net and the extension possibilities it provides.
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4.1 Introduction
When performing research using fault injection a ﬂexible environment is
needed, such that new ideas can easily be pursued, without extensive re-
design of the underlying tool1. The framework should support automatic
conﬁguration, such that management of conﬁguration settings is simpliﬁed
and the risk of mistakes is minimized. It should also simplify the collection,
storage and analysis of data.
A plethora of fault injection tools exist in literature (see Section 2.3 for a
comprehensive list). However, even though some of the tools may have been
able to adapt we decided to implement a new injection framework to better
suit our needs. For the implementation several requirements were postulated,
which allow for a ﬂexible fault injection environment:
• Extensibility: Injection of multiple drivers, using multiple error mod-
els should be supported. The per-driver scaﬀolding should be mini-
mized.
• Black-box: No access to source code should be assumed, to allow
external evaluators the possibility to use the tool.
• Data handling: The data extracted from the experiments should be
processed and stored without loss of information, and allow for easy
extension and interoperability with external tools.
• Automation: Automation is key to a) reduce the time overhead asso-
ciated with conﬁguring and running fault injection experiments; b) to
minimize the risk of user mistakes in conﬁguring the experiments; and
c) to more easily adapt to changes in the setup requiring conﬁguration
changes.
These design requirements were the basis for the design of our fault in-
jection framework. Even though one of the goals is extensibility we have
chosen to implement the framework for a speciﬁc OS, Windows CE .Net.
Extending the framework for other OS’s is part of future directions. The
rest if the chapter describes the overall design of the framework, the physical
setup used and the functionality of the system components.
1As our tool is ﬂexible and supports extensions we will refer to it as a framework for
fault injection.
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4.2 Evaluation, Campaign & Run
To simplify the discussion we make a distinction between an evaluation, an
injection campaign and an injection run. An injection run is the injection of a
speciﬁc error and the observation (and logging) of the eﬀects of the injection.
An injection campaign is a collection of injection runs, pertaining to, in our
case, a speciﬁc driver, error model and interface (Dll, imported/exported).
A set of injection campaigns form the basis for the evaluation of a system,
including possibly multiple drivers and error models.
4.3 Hardware Setup
The target system for the evaluation runs on a dedicated computer, the
Target Computer. As already mentioned we use special development boards
for the evaluation. The evaluator controls the evaluation from a normal PC
workstation (in our setup running Windows XP SP2).
Ethernet
Switch
Host
Computer
Serial connection
Target 
Computers
Figure 4.1: The hardware setup. Using an Ethernet switch to connect each
development board to the private network. Each board is also connected
directly to the Host Computer via serial cables.
Figure 4.1 shows the hardware setup, with two target boards connected.
Each board is connected to a private network using an Ethernet switch, which
provides dynamic IP addresses using a built-in DHCP server. Each board is
connected to the Host Computer over a debug serial connection to access the
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boot menu of the boot loader and to read debug output. Additional serial
connections are used by each board’s workload, as described below.
4.4 Software Setup
The binary image downloaded to a board for each experiment campaign
contains all necessary software components required for performing the ex-
periments. This includes all components comprising the system depicted on
the target computer side of Figure 4.2.
Platform Builder together with the Embedded Visual C++ 4.0 tool were
used to compile and build the applications and OS images used. Most of the
code for the components detailed in Section 4.5 was written in C++, or in
some cases the C programming languages. Furthermore SQL Server was used
on the Host Computer (Windows XP workstation) to store the experiment
data. Applications running on the Host Computer are written either in C#
(.Net) or C++.
4.5 Injection Setup
Each injection is speciﬁed using three (integer) parameters: service ID, pa-
rameter number and injection case number. The service IDs can be selected
in any order, as long as each service for each campaign is uniquely identiﬁed.
When storing data in the database on the Host Computer, each service ob-
viously has to have globally unique identiﬁer. Parameters (including return
values) are simply numbered as they appear in the argument list. Finally
injection cases have to be uniquely identiﬁable for each parameter and are
deﬁned for the data type and error model used.
To support extensibility and to have a ﬂexible injection framework we
have opted to use SWIFI. No specialized hardware support is required and
injections are performed using software only. Figure 4.2 shows an overview
of the main software components of the system, showing both the target and
Host Computer. Apart from the OS itself and its drivers, the system contains
the following main modules:
• Host Computer: The main responsibility of the Host Computer is to
receive and store log messages sent by the Experiment Manager.
The Host Computer is additionally used to build and download new
OS images to the target computers.
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Figure 4.2: An overview of the experimental setup.
• Experiment Manager: Responsible for setup, control and logging of
experiments. It communicates with the Host Computer, which stores
log messages.
• Interceptor: The Interceptor is a module used to intercept commu-
nication between the OS and the targeted driver. Two types of Inter-
ceptors are used, one for tracking calls and one for injecting errors.
• Test Applications: The workload consists of a set of test applications
exercising the system and the drivers in a multitude of ways.
The Injector and the Experiment Manager interact to coordinate each
injection run and to send log messages to the Host Computer. Similarly, the
test applications report their progress to the Experiment Manager, which
forwards log messages. Information between modules is exchanged using
message queues, a message passing primitive native to Windows CE .Net.
The components of the target computer are built into a new OS image
as described in the previous section. The OS image is downloaded to the
onboard ﬂash memory and loaded into RAM each time the OS (cold) boots.
A possible risk when conducting fault injection is the presence of dormant
faults, i.e., faults from previous injections that are left dormant in the system.
This can lead to unpredictable and non-reproducible results, as the outcome
of an injection may be aﬀected by such dormant faults. To minimize this
risk the system is (cold) restarted between each injection, resulting in a
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fresh copy of the OS image being loaded for each injection run. Logs are
sent and stored on a diﬀerent machine (the Host Computer) and a minimal
set of conﬁguration information is stored in ﬂash memory. This process is
conservative and common for fault injection experiments, e.g., [Chillarege
and Bowen, 1989; Gu et al., 2003]. However, the restart before for each
injection incurs a substantial run-time overhead when errors are masked or
overwritten.
The process of producing an injection-ready OS image is illustrated in
Figure 4.3. First the binary of the original driver is scanned to identify ex-
ported and imported services. Together with information in system header
ﬁles and the online documentation the Interceptor module is constructed (A
in Figure 4.3). For intercepting imported functions the binary of the origi-
nal driver is modiﬁed to import the functions from the Interceptor module
instead of the original services (B in Figure 4.3). For exported services the
system is conﬁgured to use the Interceptor module instead of the original
driver, by modifying the conﬁguration of the loading process of drivers in
the system Registry (C in Figure 4.3). Lastly the (modiﬁed) driver, Inter-
ceptor, conﬁguration and other system components are merged into a single
OS image to be downloaded onto the target computer (D in Figure 4.3).
Driver Injection
image
Header
Files
Interceptor
Modified
Driver
Test
Applications
Experiment
Manager
Registry
configuration
Specification/
Documentation A
B
C
D
A Build specialized interceptor wrapper
B Modify driver to use wrapper
C Modify Registry
D Build new OS image
Figure 4.3: Building an OS image for injection.
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4.5.1 Experiment Manager
The Experiment Manager runs as a separate process on each board and
is responsible for setup, monitoring and logging. The parameters needed to
conﬁgure the system are set up using the system Registry, which is part of the
binary image of the OS built oﬄine. These settings remain static throughout
the experiment. Dynamic information concerning which injections have taken
place and the conﬁguration for the next injection is stored in a plain text
conﬁguration ﬁle in persistent (ﬂash) storage on the device.
At boot time it starts by setting up a connection for sending log messages
to the Host Computer, either using Ethernet or serial communication. From
this point on log messages can be sent to the Host Computer. Depending on
the targeted driver either serial or Ethernet communication is used to send
log messages to the Host Computer.
Next it reads the conﬁguration ﬁle to ﬁnd out which service is to be tar-
geted for the next injection (see Figure 4.4). When the injection data has
been read they are marked as pending and the change is ﬂushed to be made
persistent. Once an experiment has ﬁnished, and before rebooting, the pend-
ing ﬂag is changed to ﬁnished, indicating that the Experiment Manager could
reboot the system in a clean way. This simple mechanism allows us to de-
tect hangs and unclean reboots by the system. If, at boot time, a pending
ﬂag is found for the next injection a special log message is sent with this
information.
The Experiment Manager then waits for the Interceptor to send a “Ready
for injection” message, after which it sends the injection data (service, pa-
rameter and injection case). The Interceptor then handles the rest of the
actual injection.
After an injection has been conﬁgured the test applications are started
and monitored. Each test application updates the Experiment Manager, on
any assertion violation. Their exit status is also monitored by the Experiment
Manager and if they exit abnormally this is logged. If they have not exited
within a given time period (about three times normal execution time) they
are considered hung/crashed and this fact is logged.
Once the outcomes for each of the test applications is known the system
is automatically cold restarted. The cold restart ensures that any data left
in RAM is replaced and that a clean image of the OS is read back in from
ﬂash storage. For the case when an error causes the system to not respond
to the Experiment Manager’s attempts to reboot the system, a dedicated
reboot process is used. This process is started automatically at boot time
and simply tries to reboot the system after a speciﬁc timeout has triggered
(currently four minutes). To deﬁne such a timeout is common practice for
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fault injection [Arlat et al., 1990; Dura˜es and Madeira, 2006]. If this also
fails a manual hardware reset is required by the evaluator.
4.5.2 Host Computer
The Host Computer is used to manage and support the experiments. The
Host Computer runs a set of experiment servers. Each server is responsible
for communicating with one Target Computer. The server can be conﬁgured
to respond both on network and serial communication. It is responsible for
both echoing test application data sent as part of the workload on each Target
Computer and for receiving log messages. It also keeps a timer for each log
stream and if no message is detected within a given time the operator is
alerted that the board may have hung, requiring a hardware reset.
Log messages are stored sequentially in a text ﬁle, one ﬁle per managed
board. The operator can also add custom log messages to the log ﬁle, for
instance that a board was manually restarted. The log ﬁles are processed
oﬀ-line and the results are stored in a relational database. Currently we use
SQL Server 2005 from Microsoft, but other databases could be used as we do
no rely on speciﬁc functionalities of the underlying server. Header ﬁles are
processed to match services to function names for easier handling of the log
data. The use of a database signiﬁcantly improves working with the data.
Queries can be posed in a structured way and saved for later use using the
SQL query language, in our case Transact-SQL [TSQ].
Experiments are classiﬁed into failure classes as presented in Section 5.2.
This is done automatically on the data stored in the database for each ex-
periment. Failure classes are deﬁned as disjoint predicates on the experiment
data, and are implemented as views in SQL. This is a very ﬂexible approach
as improvements to the failure classiﬁcation scheme can be introduced very
quickly by modifying the SQL deﬁnitions for each view. It is also very easy
to run consistency checks on the data to check that the failure classes are
indeed disjoint and complete (each experiment is in one, and only one class).
4.5.3 Interceptors
Communication between the targeted driver and the OS is tracked using
Interceptor modules. There are two types of Interceptors, trackers and in-
jectors. The Tracker is used only in Chapter 7 to track the calls made to a
driver. The Injector is used to perform the actual injection.
Each service exported and imported by a driver is a function call to/from
a dynamic link library (Dll). As previously described in Section 3.2.1 some
error models require that the data types of the parameters used in function
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calls to be tracked. Tracking the data type used serves two purposes, ﬁrst
and foremost it is used to select the speciﬁc error to inject, but it is also used
to reduce the number of injections for error models based on bit strings (like
the BF model described in Section 3.2.1) by restricting injection to the bits
used.
The C-language does not provide any reﬂective mechanisms whereby the
data type of a parameter can be discovered at run-time. This information is
pertinent for data type-based injection. For most functions the information
is available in the form of header ﬁles present on the system. In some rare
cases online product documentation is used to resolve parameter deﬁnitions,
in this case Microsoft’s online developer documentation [MSDN].
Injection is done on one interface at a time. Exported functions are
targeted separately from imported functions, thereby deﬁning a single in-
jection campaign. Functions from one imported Dll are targeted separately.
The injection module wraps the driver and acts as a “trojan horse” to both
the driver and the OS, by imitating the behavior of the other party. Simi-
lar strategies have been used in previous fault injection tools, for instance,
[Segall et al., 1988].
For each injection campaign (driver/Dll) a separate Injector module is
built, where an injection wrapper is built for each function in the service
interface. The Injector interacts with the Experiment Manager and activates
the targeted injection wrappers and can be conﬁgured to make multiple wrap-
pers active for an injection run. However, for the experiments carried out only
one was made active and the non-activated wrappers act as passthroughs,
without touching the the parameter values used.
To make sure that the system itself does not modify or perturb the be-
havior of the system each experiment campaign starts with an error-free run,
i.e., a run where all wrappers are in place but act as passthroughs. This
run allows the evaluator to verify that communication with the Host Com-
puter is setup properly and that no unexpected problems have arisen, before
any actual experiments are carried out. During this error-free run the system
is proﬁled to minimize the number of injections that need to be carried out.
This process is further detailed in Section 4.6.
When targeting imported services the binary of the driver is modiﬁed.
The binary format of drivers on Windows CE .Net follow the Portable Ex-
ecutable (PE) format [Mic, 2006], where Dlls being dynamically linked to
the driver are speciﬁed together with the services used. By modifying the
name of the library being linked, the Interceptor Dll can be linked instead
of the original Dll. A dedicated application has been implemented for per-
forming the modiﬁcation of the binary image of a driver. It runs on the Host
Computer and is used before building a new OS image. The Interceptor is
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implemented to export all functions that the driver uses in the original Dll.
The Interceptor then in turn loads the original Dll and can pass any calls
along.
The Injector can work in three modes: a) for testing purposes it can act
as a complete passthrough, b) it can wait for injection instructions from the
Experiment Manager and then activate the appropriate injection wrapper,
and c) it can build all injection wrappers with passthrough functionality and
query their injection cases. The latter mode allows the creation of injection
cases on the ﬂy. This is important, as when a new error model is imple-
mented/enhanced or when new functions are wrapped, the injection cases
are automatically generated without human assistance, saving time and re-
ducing the probability for mistakes. The two latter modes are illustrated in
Figure 4.4
In Figure 4.4, when the system boots it check for the presence of a con-
ﬁguration ﬁle, specifying which errors are to be injected and which injections
have already been performed, as previously described. If one exists it is read
and the Interceptor builds the required injection wrapper. Next the Inter-
ceptor sends the “ready for injection” message to the Experiment Manager,
which then starts the test applications (workload). The Interceptor is now
ready to inject the error when the speciﬁed trigger ﬁres. When injection is
ﬁnished (intermittent and permanent error models may inject multiple er-
rors) the system waits for the test applications to exit before updating the
conﬁguration ﬁle and then rebooting. Note that if the system is still pre-
pared to inject errors when the test applications exit the system is rebooted
anyway, else permanent errors, or errors not being triggered by a certain
workload lead to livelock (the system waiting for the error to be triggered,
which will not happen).
In parallel to the injection process a watchdog timeout process is started
which reboots the system after a set timeout from boot time has elapsed. The
purpose of the watchdog is to reboot the system in case the rest of the system
fails due to an error and the normal reboot step is not reached. Currently
the timeout is set to 200 seconds, more than twice the normal execution time
of the system.
Building injection wrappers is currently a manual process, but since the
information required is (mostly) available in parsable header ﬁles an auto-
matic processing is possible, similar to the approach used in [Fetzer and Xiao,
2002b]. As the wrapper only needs to be implemented once for each func-
tion, and can thereafter be used for any error model, the approach still scales
reasonably well. However, for a large scale deployment of the approach this
step needs to be automated as much as possible.
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Figure 4.4: An overview of the injection process.
Specifying Error Model
Each Injector builds an in-memory data structure (a C++ object) containing
information regarding the data types used, and pointers to the values passed
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for the targeted service. For each service one such object is built. The data
types used for a speciﬁc service are hard coded into the code. This is no real
limitation as the information is static (function deﬁnitions) and only need to
be deﬁned once for each function. The error model is speciﬁed using a plugin
model, where a model is speciﬁed using the error type, timing (duration) and
trigger, analogously to the description in Section 3.2.
For each parameter targeted for injection the data type needs to be
recorded and the error selected accordingly. The data tracking mechanism
is implemented in C++, but the interface between device drivers and the
OS is deﬁned using C. We make a distinction between three major classes of
parameter types, namely:
• Basic types - The basic types include the built-in types provided
by the programming language, like integers and booleans, as well as
specialized types where it makes sense to use speciﬁc injection cases,
for instance HKEY representing a handle to a Registry key.
• Structures - This is the struct type used in C. It contains a set of
members which themselves could be of any of the three classes.
• Pointers - These are references to other values, which could basic
types, structures or other pointers.
The tracking mechanism is built around the concept of a Parameter.
A Parameter is of any of the three classes: basic type, structure or pointer.
Figure 4.5 shows the relation between the three classes of types found. Struc-
tures and pointers refer to other parameter values, which in turn can be any
of the three classes.
The three classes are implemented as C++ classes inheriting from a Pa-
rameter base class. For each data type tracked a new specialized class is
implemented. A Parameter provides methods for specifying error models,
querying for injection cases and to inject errors. Structures and pointers
furthermore contains methods for adding members and references.
Figure 4.5 illustrates our implementation of the data tracking mechanism.
For each targeted parameter an object is deﬁned, whose class inherits from
the Parameter class. Using inheritance, new data types can easily be added,
provided they inherit from the Parameter class and implement the required
methods for injecting errors etc.
As previously explained in Section 4.5.3 an injection wrapper is built for
each targeted function. The wrapper builds a model of the interface using the
classes explained above together with information regarding the error model.
Using this information, the Experiment Manager can query the wrapper for
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Figure 4.5: Data type tracking mechanism.
the injection cases possible for the given error model. This enables automatic
conﬁguration and generation of injection cases, illustrated in the right branch
of Figure 4.4.
The plugin model makes the injection framework considerably more ﬂex-
ible, compared to hard coded injections on a service/driver basis. Once the
injection wrapper is deﬁned several injection campaigns can easily be per-
formed by specifying diﬀerent error types, durations and trigger models. The
error type, duration and trigger are speciﬁed as keys in the Registry, which
are extracted by the Experiment Manager at boot time. The injection wrap-
per is then instructed to build the corresponding injection object online. This
facilitates a very ﬂexible architecture, that automatically extract the injec-
tion cases to be performed. The number of injections required is extracted
from the error type object. The ﬁrst time the system is booted all injection
objects are built and the injections to be performed are stored in a ﬁle.
Three error type plugins have been implemented (BF, DT and FZ), but
additional models can easily be implemented, including timing errors (de-
lays). Three error durations are implemented, transient (occur only once),
intermittent (occur x times) and permanent. As previously described only
the transient model has been evaluated. The triggering mechanisms imple-
mented include ﬁrst-occurrence, call block-based and timeout-based models.
One can also specify more advanced triggering mechanisms, where errors are
triggered after x calls to a service or only after calls to a certain (other)
service.
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4.5.4 Test Applications
The workload for a robustness evaluation is typically the set of user appli-
cations running on the system, together with their inputs. The purpose of
the workload in this context is two-fold: a) to drive the use of the system
and make sure that all relevant parts of the OS are used, including devices
attached to the system; and b) to detect any robustness violations in the
OS services used.
When robustness evaluation is carried out on a ﬁnished product (or proto-
type) the workload should as closely as possible mimic the use of the product
in its operational setting. However, for generic components, like an OS, in-
formation on operational settings might be unknown. For such cases generic
workloads are typically used. Examples include standard performance bench-
mark applications [Barton et al., 1990; Kanawati et al., 1992; Carreira et al.,
1998]. The same problem arises when testing components, which may be
reused in the future. The future uses may not match the operational pro-
ﬁle available at development time and thus testers are forced to anticipate
“typical” use of the component [Weyuker, 1998].
Another approach is to test each service individually by deﬁning a test
harness simulating operational conditions. The harness needs to setup any
speciﬁc context (such as held resources, open ﬁles etc) needed for the ser-
vice to be called in a realistic setting. This approach was used for instance
in Ballista [Koopman and DeVale, 1999] and HEALERS [Fetzer and Xiao,
2002b]. We have opted to use a realistic workload instead, thus avoiding the
problem of deﬁning appropriate context scenarios.
The workload used in this thesis consists of a set of test applications. The
purpose of the test applications is to exercise a wide variety of OS services and
speciﬁcally the device drivers evaluated. Each test application is enhanced
with additional assertions that verify that each call to an OS service returns
the expected result. The expected result is derived from the documentation
of the OS and a golden run of the application. The test applications are kept
as simple as possible to make them deterministic. This allows assertions to
be manually inserted into the code of each test application to verify the cor-
rectness. Three types of test applications are used, using the OS in diﬀerent
ways:
[Memory Management]: The application allocates memory and access it.
The memory is then released.
[File System Operations]: Normal text ﬁles are created and opened.
Some text is written to the ﬁle and read back. File attributes are
set and checked. The ﬁle is ﬁnally deleted.
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[Driver Speciﬁc] The driver speciﬁc test application uses the driver by
issuing driver speciﬁc operations.
For each driver tested a speciﬁc test application is built to test the driver’s
functionality. For a network card driver packets are sent and received using a
connection to the Host Computer. Similarly, the serial driver reads and writes
on the serial port connected to the Host Computer. Speciﬁc consistency
checking assertions are added to check for any errors in the received echo
strings. Similarly, the echo server on the Host Computer also checks for
incomplete or otherwise erroneous messages. The CompactFlash driver is
tested in a similar fashion to the ﬁle system tests above.
To get a consistent system for all injections, and to establish a common
ground for comparing drivers, all driver speciﬁc test applications are executed
for each test, even when the speciﬁc driver is not targeted.
4.6 Pre-Proﬁling
A key concern with any fault injection is to keep the level of activation
for the injected faults as high as possible, i.e., as many as possible of the
faults should be activated and become errors. Since typically the goal of
fault injection is to exercise the system’s fault/error handling mechanisms
and observe how it behaves in the presence of faults, the activation rate is a
measure of how eﬀectively these mechanisms are tested. Note that the goal
of injecting faults can also be to assess the activation rate itself, i.e., how
easily faults are activated and become errors. However, this is not the case
in this thesis. In general, one wants to achieve an acceleration of the fault
→ error → failure process [Chillarege and Bowen, 1989].
Robustness evaluations of large systems, such as OS’s do not target evalu-
ation of speciﬁc fault tolerance mechanisms. Therefore, one cannot generally
know if a non-activated injected fault is still dormant, has been overwritten,
or detected and corrected. To cope with this an experimental timeout is set,
after which the fault is declared to have disappeared, either by being over-
written or handled by the system. The timeout needs to be long enough to
justify this assumption, but short enough to make experimentation feasible.
A high activation level naturally helps speed up the experimental process,
as fewer experiments need to run until the timeout elapses. For the experi-
ments presented in subsequent chapters a timeout of four minutes was used.
This was set to be more than 100% longer than the execution time of the
test applications in fault-free scenarios. Initial experiments with signiﬁcantly
longer timeouts did not reveal any dormant faults surfacing.
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By injecting errors at a high-level interface which is readily accessible
one can achieve 100% activation ratio of injected errors, by employing a
pre-proﬁling stage before the experiments starts. This stage proﬁles the
component in question and records each invocation made in the interface.
This information is then used to ﬁlter out any injections that would never
take place (because the function is not used). This technique assumes a
deterministic invocation pattern in the sense that the same set of services
are invoked for each run of the system. This property is also required to get
repeatable results, an important aspect of system evaluation. The use of test
applications that give rise to a deterministic workload makes this assumption
justiﬁed and indeed for the experiments carried out for this thesis, no such
deviations were observed. However, it is important to re-proﬁle the system
as any changes are made, especially regarding the test applications, as they
might give rise to new invocation patterns for the drivers.
For the injection experiments carried out a pre-proﬁling stage is run for
each experiment campaign. The ﬁrst time the system boots the test appli-
cations are executed as they are when errors are injected. In this case, an
invocation proﬁle of the targeted driver is automatically collected instead of
an error being injected (right branch of Figure 4.4). Based on the services
that are marked as used the injection cases generated can be ﬁltered, such
that errors are only injected for services that are actually used. By automat-
ically performing the proﬁling for each new conﬁguration any changes made
to the system conﬁguration are always considered.
Additionally to recording which services are invoked, also the number of
invocations is stored. This is used to further eliminate non-activated injec-
tions when investigating the time of injection in Chapter 7.
In the DTS tool a similar approach to ours is used [Tsai and Singh,
2000]. Library calls made by an application are targeted. Only calls actually
performed are targeted, reducing the potentially large set of functions consid-
erably. We use the same strategy, reducing the number of targeted functions
by 36.7% on average. Table 4.1 shows the number of services speciﬁed and
the number of services actually used. The table shows that many services
are not used, indicating that more complex workloads may potentially incur
more services to be targeted and thus for more injections to be performed.
In [Su¨ßkraut and Fetzer, 2007] static analysis of library code is performed
to reduce the number of injections. Using DT injections similar to ours, the
injection cases to use are selected depending on how each parameter might be
used. This information is found by statically analyzing the code to ﬁnd out
which (other) library functions are called for the targeted function and based
on this restrict the number of injections. This does not limit the number of
services targeted, but the number of injection cases required for each function
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Table 4.1: The number of services speciﬁed in the OS-Driver interface and
the number of services used for the speciﬁed workload.
Driver Speciﬁed Used [%]
cerﬁo serial 60 46 76.7
91C111 54 26 48.1
atadisk 47 30 63.8
parameter.
4.7 Summary of Research Contributions
This chapter presents the injection framework used for performing the fault
injection experiments performed for this thesis. The framework is imple-
mented for Windows CE .Net speciﬁcally focusing on extensibility and au-
tomation. Using a plugin model three error models have been implemented
and the framework is easily extended to include more error models. Sev-
eral aspects of the process have been automated, to minimize the risk of
user mistakes and to expedite experimentation. The framework provides the
following beneﬁts for the evaluation of OS robustness:
• A ﬂexible and extensible plugin model for easy adoption of new error
models.
• A low-intrusion, black-box injection methodology, not requiring access
to source code.
• A high degree of automation, not requiring manual actions to be taken
when changes to the used error model or workload are performed.
• An eﬃcient selection of injection cases, eliminating injections that
would not have been activated for the used workload.
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Chapter 5
Error Propagation in Operating
Systems - Where to Inject
How to measure error propagation in OS’s? What are quantiﬁ-
able measures of error propagation?
That software components contain faults that lead to undesirable behav-
iors in the form of errors and failures is a fact that will not disappear in the
foreseeable future. In a system design it is therefore important to quantify
how such errors may aﬀect the system as a whole. An important aspect of
this is how errors spread throughout the system, i.e., how they propagate.
Another aspect is the eﬀect they have, i.e., the failure modes they give rise
to. Both are important as they allow a designer to a) quantify potential
dependability bottlenecks in the system, b) assist in the designing higher
quality components and c) to guide addition of enhancements in the system
in an eﬀective manner.
This chapter introduces a series of measures that can be used to quan-
tify error propagation, RQ2 - quantiﬁable measures of robustness. They are
based on the previously described system model, and show that by introduc-
ing errors in the interface between device drivers and the OS can be used to
study how the OS treats faulty drivers. As such it also considers RQ3 - the
question of where to inject errors.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter deﬁnes a framework for the evaluation of error propagation
with respect to robustness in OS’s. As detailed in Chapter 1 an important
aspect when increasing the robustness of a system is identifying potential
sources and sinks for error propagation (RQ1). The goal of this chapter is
to deﬁne measures that help identifying such services. To achieve this we
use failure mode analysis and four separate measures: Service Error Per-
meability, Service Error Exposure, Service Error Diﬀusion and Driver Error
Diﬀusion. After their deﬁnition a discussion on their use and its implications
is presented.
As previously discussed, the use of the OS-Driver interface for measuring
error propagation and eﬀect is suitable for many reasons, such as portability
across drivers, low intrusion (as no source code changes are required) and
it allows injection of multiple driver faults. The measure presented in this
chapter are deﬁned for errors appearing at this level, and therefore further
substantiate the chose of error location, i.e., answers the question of where
to inject errors.
This chapter presents the analytical foundation upon which the following
chapters build. Further discussion on using the framework presented here
and its implication from a quantitative point of view will be discussed in
subsequent chapters.
5.2 Failure Mode Analysis
Robustness evaluation is similar to Failure Mode and Eﬀect Analysis
(FMEA), a well known technique in reliability engineering [Leveson, 1995].
In FMEA the failure modes of individual components are postulated and
their eﬀect on other components and the whole system derived. Robustness
evaluation diﬀers, as it is experimental in nature, treating a system not as a
static entity, but a dynamic system in context.
Failure modes for use in robustness evaluation are typically postulated
beforehand (they may be iteratively reﬁned of course) as a set of failure
modes, or classes. For safety critical systems, FMEA may also be performed
to investigate which failure modes the system or component shows in opera-
tion. Even though the techniques developed here may help towards this goal
as well, it is not the prime focus of this thesis.
The failure severity scale used in this thesis is similar to several previous
severity scales. Siewiorek et. al. used a ﬁve grade scale for their robustness
benchmark [Siewiorek et al., 1993]. Many fault injection tools have used
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similar scales as well, like MAFALDA [Arlat et al., 2002; Rodriguez et al.,
2002], NFTAPE [Gu et al., 2003] and others, for instance [Chillarege and
Bowen, 1989; Barton et al., 1990; Marsden and Fabre, 2001; Dura˜es and
Madeira, 2006]. As a representative example of failure modes deﬁned from
an application perspective, the CRASH severity scale presented in [Koopman
et al., 1997] is shown in Table 5.1. The API of the OS is tested by creating
a speciﬁc task that calls the targeted function and the outcome is classiﬁed
according to the CRASH scale.
Table 5.1: The CRASH severity scale from [Koopman et al., 1997].
Failure Mode Description
Catastrophic System crash
Restart The task is hung and requires a restart
Abort The task terminates abnormally
Silent No error report is generated by the OS, even
though the operation tested cannot be per-
formed and should generate an error
Hindering Incorrect error returned
The failure classes used in this thesis are listed in Table 5.2. We use the
term failure class as each failure class may correspond to multiple failure
modes depending on the desired level of granularity. The chosen classes
represent generic classes that apply to general purpose systems. The failure
classes are deﬁned to be disjoint, such that the outcome of an experiment can
be unambiguously determined to be a member of a speciﬁc class. Whenever
the outcome ﬁts the description of one or more classes it is assigned the more
severe one. For instance, an error that ﬁrst causes an application to crash
and then the rest of the system would only be considered in the latter class.
5.3 Error Propagation
Error propagation in software happens when a fault is activated (becomes
an error) and then subsequently used in a computation, leading to a new
error at a diﬀerent location [Lee and Iyer, 1993; Voas et al., 1996]. As an
example, consider a faulty line of code where the wrong value is assigned an
integer variable. This value is read and used in a condition statement and
the wrong decision is taken, leading to a set of statements being executed in
error. The error has now propagated from the assignment to another part of
the component. The error might continue to propagate and may propagate to
72 CHAPTER 5. ERROR PROPAGATION IN OPERATING SYSTEMS
Table 5.2: The failure classes used.
Failure Class Description
Class NF When no visible eﬀect can be seen as an outcome of
an experiment, the No Failure class is used. This
indicates that the error was either not activated or
was masked by the OS.
Class 1 The error propagated, but still satisﬁed the OS ser-
vice speciﬁcation as deﬁned in the documentation.
Examples of Class 1 outcomes are when an er-
ror code is returned that is a member of the set of
allowed codes for this call or if a data value was
corrupted and propagated to the service, but did
not violate the speciﬁcation.
Class 2 The error propagated and violated the service
speciﬁcation. For example, returning an unspec-
iﬁed error code or if the call directly causes the
application to hang or crash but other applications
in the system remain unharmed, result in this cat-
egory.
Class 3 The OS hung or crashed due to the error. If the
OS hangs or crashes, no progress is possible. For
a crashed OS, this state must be detected by an
outside monitor unless this state is automatically
detected internally and the machine is rebooted.
other components by function calls, message passing, shared memory areas
etc. Eventually, the error might propagate to the outputs of the system,
there causing a failure.
Knowing which errors propagate and where is important because it en-
ables counter measures to be taken. A general design principle in the design
of dependable systems is the concept of error containment, i.e., that a compo-
nent masks any errors, not exposing interacting components to propagating
errors [Pradhan, 1996]. For software this is diﬃcult to realize in practice for
every type of errors. Instead, the failure modes and the propagation paths
need to be found, such their impact can be characterized.
At least three main uses for knowledge regarding error propagation can
be envisioned:
• Identifying robustness bottlenecks in the system. Some components may
be more likely to spread errors or more likely to be the sink for errors
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propagating in the system. These components should be the focus of
other veriﬁcation and validation eﬀorts.
• Expose ﬂaws and and their impact on system dependability. Error prop-
agation may reveal real ﬂaws in the software and may thereby assist in
the designing higher quality components. The impact of such ﬂaws can
be characterized using for instance failure mode analysis, which helps a
designer focus attention to the components which cause severe damage.
• Locating error detection and recovery mechanisms. The error propaga-
tion paths identify locations where speciﬁc error detection and recover
may be added. By placing them along such paths their eﬀectiveness is
increased.
The framework presented in this chapter aims at all of these three goals.
A discussion is provided on how the measures deﬁned can help achieve this.
Chapter 6 presents an implementation of these measures on a real OS and
discusses their suitability.
5.3.1 Failure Class Distribution
The simplest way to compare a system’s ability to withstand errors in drivers
is to compare the number of severe failures the system incurs as a result of
injected errors. Since the number of failures depends on the chosen error
model, i.e., the number of injections performed, one can use the ratios of
failures into diﬀerent failure classes, the failure class distribution.
The failure class distribution highlights key diﬀerences between drivers
and gives a fast overview of diﬀerent driver’s and/or error model’s ability
to provoke failures in the system. However, when more detailed results and
guidance is needed more reﬁned measures should be used, as the one pre-
sented in the next section.
5.3.2 Error Propagation Measures
In the context of this thesis we are interested in how errors in device drivers
propagate throughout the system. To do this, we need to clearly specify the
observation points where error propagation is measured. Errors are injected
in the interface between the driver and the OS. Observations are made from
a user perspective by observing the behavior of user-space applications. This
gives us the ability to characterize the relation between drivers’ ability to
spread errors and an application’s use of OS services.
74 CHAPTER 5. ERROR PROPAGATION IN OPERATING SYSTEMS
... ...
Operating System
APP1
D1 D2 DN
APPn...
... ...
Operating System
APP1
D1 D2 DN
APPn...
... ...
Operating System
APP1
D1 D2 DN
APPn...
... ...
Operating System
APP1
D1 D2 DN
APPn...
a b c d
Figure 5.1: The four propagation measures introduced: a) Service Error
Permeability, b) Service Error Exposure, c) Service Error Diﬀusion, and d)
Driver Error Diﬀusion.
With the intent of ﬁnding robustness bottlenecks in the system three main
goals are identiﬁed: a) to identify services in the OS-Application interface
that are the likely sinks for propagating errors, b) to identify services in the
OS-Driver interface that are more likely to spread errors, and c) to identify
drivers that are more likely to spread errors in the system, given that errors
are present. To facilitate such an identiﬁcation, a basic propagation measure
is deﬁned, the Service Error Permeability, capturing the likelihood that an
error in the OS-Driver interface will spread to an OS-Application service. The
objectives for our measures are illustrated in Figure 5.1 and are summarized
as follows:
(a) Measure for degree of error porosity of an OS service: Service Error
Permeability,
(b) Measure for error exposure of an OS service: Service Error Exposure,
(c) Measure of a driver service’ proneness to spread errors, Service Error
Diﬀusion, and
(d) Measure of a driver’s ability to spread errors in the system through the
OS-Driver interface: Driver Error Diﬀusion.
Service Error Permeability
The Service Error Permeability is the probability that an error propagates
from a speciﬁc service in the OS-Driver interface to a speciﬁc service in the
OS-Application interface. It is conditioned on the presence of an error in the
ﬁrst place. That it is a conditional probability is signiﬁcant, since else we
would have to know the probability of error occurrence, which is inherently
diﬃcult and system speciﬁc. With the conditional probability we still get
an assessment of the system’s ability to contain error propagation and when
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a error occurrence probability is know it can be combined with the Service
Error Permeability.
Two classes of services are identiﬁed in the OS-Driver interface, as shown
previously in Figure 3.2 (page 36). Each driver Dx exports a set of services
dsx.1 · · · dsx.N . These are the services that the OS calls to instruct the driver
to perform a certain operation. To implement its functionality a driver also
use a set of OS services osx.1 · · · osx.M .
For a given driver or project, only one of the classes may be of interest, for
instance, for drivers that do not make extensive use of the export interface.
The Service Error Permeability is therefore deﬁned for each class explicitly.
PDSix.y is deﬁned for the exported services and POS
i
x.y for the imported.
The Service Error Permeabilities is deﬁned for a driver Dx, an OS-
Application service si and an OS-Driver service (either dsx.y or osx.y):
PDSix.y = Pr (error in si| error in dsx.y) (5.1)
POSix.y = Pr (error in si| error in use of osx.y) (5.2)
Typically, propagation is evaluated to a service in a speciﬁc application,
i.e., si ∈ Ax is deﬁned for a speciﬁc application APPx, and this is the way it
is interpreted here.
Service Error Permeability gives an indication of the permeability of the
particular OS service, i.e., how easily the OS lets errors in a speciﬁc service
in the OS-Driver interface propagate to a service used by an application.
A higher permeability implies that precautions need to be taken for the
services involved. Such precautions could entail either ensuring that the
services are properly used (fault prevention and removal methods), including
handling exceptional situations, or addition of error handling code. Note
that Equation 5.2 allows us to compare the same OS service used by diﬀerent
drivers. The impact of the context induced by diﬀerent drivers can thus be
studied.
Note that the Service Error Permeability is deﬁned with respect to subsets
of the services at the OS-Application interface, S, and OS-Driver interface,
O. For service pairs not members of this subset, no assertion can be made
about their permeability. It is therefore desirable to make these subsets
representative of the set of services used when the system is operational.
Service Error Exposure
To the ﬁnd OS services that are more exposed to errors propagating through
the system, a set of relevant drivers needs to be considered. The propagation
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from this set of drivers can be combined into a composite measure, namely the
Service Error Exposure1 (Ei). Service Error Exposure considers each driver’s
contribution to the propagation of errors to a speciﬁc OS-Application service
si (see Figure 3.1). Thus it is an estimation on how exposed this service is
to propagating errors from these drivers. Both PDS and POS contribute to
the Service Error Exposure, and consequently both are part of Equation 5.3.
We use the measure Service Error Permeability, to compose the Service
Error Exposure for an OS service si, namely E
i:
Ei =
∑
∀x
∑
∀j
POSix.j +
∑
∀x
∑
∀j
PDSix.j (5.3)
Service Error Exposure considers all drivers inﬂuence on one OS service.
Thus its use is mostly to compare OS services and rank them based on their
exposure to propagating errors. It can therefore be used to guide veriﬁca-
tion eﬀorts of applications or placement of error handling mechanisms on the
application level. Note that this expression implies aggregating all imported
and exported Service Error Permeabilities (5.1 & 5.2 above) and all consid-
ered drivers. When comparing services on a driver per driver basis the driver
speciﬁc Service Error Exposure can be applied:
Eix =
∑
∀j
POSix.j +
∑
∀j
PDSix.j (5.4)
The driver speciﬁc service exposure allows study of driver attributed dif-
ferences in exposure of propagating errors. It also makes assessment of ex-
posure independent of the selected set of drivers.
Service Error Diﬀusion
As Service Error Exposure considers a speciﬁc service at the OS-
Application level, Service Error Diﬀusion (SEx.y) focuses on speciﬁc services
on the OS-Driver level. This allows us to pin-point services which are more
likely to spread errors through the system. SEx.y for an imported services is
deﬁned for a driver Dx and a speciﬁc osx.y:
SEx.y =
∑
∀i
POSix.y (5.5)
Service Error Diﬀusion for exported services can be calculated analogously
to 5.5 using PDSix.y.
1We will use the term Service Error Exposure and Service Exposure interchangeably.
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Service Error Diﬀusion can be used to rank driver services on their ability
to spread errors in the system. Values can be compared either globally (across
all drivers) or locally, for a speciﬁc driver Dx.
Driver Error Diﬀusion
Driver Error Diﬀusion is used to rank drivers on their ability to spread errors
in the system. To do this, the Service Error Permeability values for one driver
are aggregated. A higher value means that the driver may more easily spread
errors in the system. For a driver Dx and a set of services, the Driver Error
Diﬀusion, Dx is deﬁned as:
Dx =
∑
∀i
∑
∀j
POSix.j +
∑
∀i
∑
∀j
PDSix.j (5.6)
Analogous to Service Error Exposure, a higher Driver Error Diﬀu-
sion value is an indication of where eﬀorts need to be spent on veriﬁcation
or where error detection/recovery mechanisms should be placed in the sys-
tem. Since Driver Error Diﬀusion focuses on the driver level, locations are
identiﬁed on this level as well.
Once a ranking across drivers exists, the driver(s) with the highest Driver
Error Diﬀusion should be the ﬁrst targets. Details on speciﬁc error paths can
now be used (i.e., Service Error Permeability) to guide the composition and
placement of detection and recovery mechanisms.
5.3.3 Use of Measures
The previous section presented six diﬀerent measures. A natural question an
evaluator might have is therefore which of these to use for a speciﬁc project.
Three key uses for error propagation analysis were identiﬁed in Section
5.3. When the goal is to identify robustness bottlenecks, Service Error Expo-
sure and Service Error Diﬀusion can be used to guide the search for speciﬁc
services, and more information can be then be gained by studying individual
Service Error Permeability values for each considered services. Driver with
potential for spreading errors can be identiﬁed using Driver Error Diﬀusion.
Information used for debugging (exposing ﬂaws) can be gained by looking
at the speciﬁc injection cases identiﬁed by Service Error Exposure and Service
Error Diﬀusion. These also help in locating error detection and recovery
mechanisms in the system by identifying prominent propagation paths.
Ultimately it is the level of detailed required that guides the use of the
proposed measures. As all presented measures are based on the same raw
data, no signiﬁcant overhead is attached to the calculation of each measure.
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For the experimental setup used all measures are predeﬁned as SQL scripts,
which are loaded and executed on the data stored in the database. All
scripts execute for at most a few seconds on the used workstation. The use
of a database means that the only operation required when new experiments
have been conducted is to load them into the database, a task for which a
dedicated application has been implemented greatly simplifying the task.
5.4 Discussion
This section provides a general discussion on some of the concepts presented
in this chapter. A more detailed discussion regarding implementation details
and interpretation of the measures is found in Chapter 6.
Failure Classes
When investigating error propagation in a system not all errors can be treated
equally. Some errors lead to severe failures and some to mere annoyances.
What constitutes the “severity” of a failure is system dependent and a sub-
jective property. Diﬀerent users may consider diﬀerent failures as worst. For
instance, Dura˜es et. al. [Dura˜es and Madeira, 2003] deﬁne a set of generic
failure modes, and depending on the user of the evaluation deﬁne severity
scales as subsets of the generic failure modes accordingly. From a feed-
back point of view the worst failure is the loss of data without any warning,
whereas from an availability point of view a completely unresponsive system
is the worst.
For general purpose systems, such diﬀerentiating views become problem-
atic. As an example, many users are frustrated when their desktop PC
crashes due to failure for some driver they did not know existed on their sys-
tem. However, that the system “crashes” may be an explicit decision by the
OS to avoid inconsistencies of data or even loss of data. When no knowledge
of the cause or remedy for an error exist, the only sane thing to do might
be to take the system down and hope that the error has disappeared when
the system is restarted. Had the system been written for a dedicated pur-
pose, correct diagnosis and recovery might have been possible, and the crash
avoided. A crash can also be desirable if the OS is to implement “fail silent”
behavior, i.e., when the system fails it does so by stopping to respond and
without any other side eﬀects [Powell et al., 1988].
Since this thesis is concerned with robustness of OS’s we have opted to use
a generic severity scale for the failure modes deﬁned. It is important to note
that even though we do consider the scale as containing progressively more
5.4. DISCUSSION 79
severe failures, this only reﬂects a generic severity ranking. Context input
is needed to reﬁne the severity scale used for a speciﬁc system, in order to
deﬁne useful and comparable failure classes. Additionally, more ﬁne-grained
failure modes can be deﬁned when knowledge regarding a speciﬁc system is
known. For instance, applications running on the system might be of diﬀerent
criticality and failure modes reﬂecting this may be desirable.
Interpretation & Evaluation
The usefulness of analysis using failure classes is that resources can be guided
to the more severe failure classes, thus using them more eﬃciently. This
applies to both fault prevention and removal eﬀorts, such as improvement of
the engineering process or diﬀerent kinds of veriﬁcation eﬀorts, as well as for
fault tolerance approaches where error detection and recovery is enhanced
by addition of software mechanisms.
A typical process is to start with the most severe failure class, and then
progressively approach the less severe classes as time and money permits.
This helps to ensure that eﬀorts are spent where the pay-oﬀ is the greatest
and may also be used as a stop criteria for robustness enhancement.
Another important practical aspect is the impact diﬀerent failure classes
have. Class 3 failures force the whole system to halt, i.e., one could argue
that the error propagated to all services on the OS-Application level. In
such cases, the services on the OS-Application layer do not impact the rela-
tive comparison of drivers, i.e., the Driver Error Diﬀusion. When comparing
drivers using Driver Error Diﬀusion for Class 3 failures one can therefore
simplify Equations 5.1 and 5.2 to only consider the probability that an error
propagates at all (since we know it propagates to all services). The consid-
eration of each OS-Application level service would only give a linear scaling
of the Driver Error Diﬀusion, not aﬀecting the relative order across drivers.
Chapter 6 shows how such simpliﬁcations can be made for a real system.
Imports vs. Exports
In this chapter we make a distinction between the imported and the exported
services of a driver. This distinction may not be useful in all contexts, and the
services can then simply be “bundled” together to form one set of services.
This would simplify Equations 5.3 - 5.6 by using only one term PSix.y deﬁned
as follows:
PSix.y = Pr (error in si| error in use of sx.y) (5.7)
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where sx.y is a service from the combined set (O) of all imported and
exported services for driver Dx.
Error Distribution & Operational Proﬁle
An important aspect when interpreting the values for the measures presented
is the lack of explicit dependence on error input distribution. In any practical
setting such a distribution is very important. From a robustness point of
view, the error distribution may be of less importance since the goal is not to
estimate the reliability of the system. Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are conditioned
on the presence of an error and can be combined with an error distribution
when available.
Another important aspect is the implicit dependence on the operational
proﬁle of the system. The operational proﬁle includes the usage proﬁle of
the applications running on the system which implicitly gives rise to a driver
usage proﬁle. Depending on how applications are used, diﬀerent services
provided by the OS are used and the usage proﬁle of drivers diﬀer. For a
certain proﬁle some services may not be used at all, whereas in others they
are frequently used. This inﬂuences the values of the measures, since only
services actually used are included.
The operational proﬁle of a system may not be known at the time of
the evaluation, or may change with time. This means that the robustness
proﬁle of the system may change as well. It is therefore important to try
to use a proﬁle closely matching the expected one when doing experimental
estimations of the measures.
As a last point it is important to note that we do not try to test drivers
per se, so this measure only tells us which drivers may corrupt the system
by spreading errors. Also, we emphasize that the intent of these measures is
not for absolute values, but to obtain relative rankings.
5.5 Related Work
Error propagation analysis and failure mode analysis are two intertwined
concepts. Since both are well established techniques there is a plethora of
literature making use of them. This section reviews some of the more impor-
tant research contributions within both areas.
Error propagation studies how the eﬀects of errors percolate through the
system and aﬀect other components than the source component of the fault
[Lee and Iyer, 1993]. Voas et. al. presents EPA (Extended Propagation
Analysis) [Voas et al., 1996, 1997; Voas, 1997a] which identiﬁes code locations
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which might violate the safety requirements of the system if faults occur in
these locations. The authors introduce the term failure tolerance to mean
that the system is tolerant to failures of 3rd party software. In [Voas et al.,
1997] the authors further speculate that a similar technique would be most
useful for an OS setting, since system software consists of a multitude of
interacting components.
For dependable system designs, error propagation is a phenomena that is
to be avoided, since it allows the failure of one subsystem to aﬀect the behav-
ior of other subsystems and lead to a failure of the entire system. However,
error propagation is a useful property in software testing, as it helps to reveal
state corruption due to faults by propagating such faults to the interfaces of
the system [Voas and Miller, 1994a, 1995; Voas et al., 1997]. Therefore, for
components with high error propagation probability, testing is more likely to
reveal faults in the code, if they are present. From this point of view, robust-
ness evaluation identiﬁes hot-spots in the system where errors can lead to
severe consequences. Once these hot-spots have been identiﬁed and treated
(either by ensuring that faults are not present or by adding error detec-
tion/recovery capabilities) the likelihood of the system propagating errors is
lowered. In [Voas and Miller, 1994b] the propagation information is used to
place such assertions at the most eﬀective locations in the code, such that
testing becomes eﬀective.
Michael and Jones show that data state errors in software propagate
uniformly, i.e., either all data state errors for a speciﬁc location propagate
to the outputs of a program, or none of them do [Michael and Jones, 1997].
From a theoretical viewpoint this is surprising, but to a practitioner it might
not be. When only a small subset of the value domain for a variable can
be considered “correct”, then most changes to this variable will be erroneous
and may trigger propagation of faults. This is especially true for values which
are assumed to be correct by the developer, and are therefore not checked
for validity in the code.
Hiller developed an extensive propagation proﬁling framework for embed-
ded control systems [Hiller et al., 2004; Hiller, 2002]. Based on a component
model error propagation metrics similar to the ones developed in this thesis
are presented. Whereas the focus there was on data level errors in control
software, we focus on a single (although complex) component of computer-
based systems, the OS.
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5.6 Summary of Research Contributions
This chapter introduced the concept of error propagation in OS’s, using fail-
ure mode analysis. A series of OS level propagation measures were deﬁned
that help an evaluator ﬁnd system bottlenecks and to guide further eﬀorts
to components that are more likely to spread errors or more likely to be
the sink for propagating errors. Related research projects in the area of
failure mode analysis and error propagation, especially related to OS’s were
reviewed. Table 5.3 summarizes the measures introduced in this chapter.
The following research contributions are presented in this chapter:
• Error propagation in the context of OS’s is deﬁned in a generic and
system independent manner. The fundamental propagation mea-
sure Service Error Permeabilityis used to measure the propagation
across services in the OS-Driver interface with services in the OS-
Application layer.
• The Service Error Exposure measure is introduced to measure the in-
ﬂuence propagating errors have on speciﬁc OS services. It can be used
to compare services in a relative manner.
• Service Error Diﬀusion can be used to rank services in the OS-Driver in-
terface on their ability to spread errors.
• The Driver Error Diﬀusion measure similarly allows relative comparison
across drivers on their ability to spread errors.
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Table 5.3: Summary of the error propagation measures introduced.
Symbol Equation Description
PDSix.y 5.1
The Service Error Permeability for driver
services is the probability that an error in a
driver service dsx.y will propagate to an OS-
Application service si.
POSix.y 5.2
The Service Error Permeability for an OS-
Driver services is the probability that an er-
ror in an OS service used by driver Dx will
driver service dsx.y will propagate an OS-
Application service si.
PSix.y 5.7
The combined Service Error Permeabil-
ity makes no distinction between imported
and exported functions.
Ei 5.3
The Service Error Exposure is used to com-
pare OS-Application services on their suscep-
tibility to propagating errors.
Eix 5.4
The driver speciﬁc Service Error Exposure is
used to compare OS-Application services on
their susceptibility to propagating errors. It
diﬀers from Ei in that it considers each driver
individually.
SEx.y 5.5
Service Error Diﬀusion is used to compare
OS-Driver services on in their ability to
spread errors in the system.
Dx 5.6
Driver Error Diﬀusion is used to identify and
compare drivers on their ability to spread er-
rors in the system.
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Chapter 6
Error Model Evaluation - What
to Inject
Which error model should be used for OS robustness evaluation?
What are the trade-oﬀs to make across error models?
The choice of error model for robustness evaluation of OS’s inﬂuences both
the results and the time required to perform the evaluation. This chapter
investigates the eﬀectiveness of three error models: bit-ﬂips, data-type errors
and Fuzzing errors. It builds on the measures introduced in Chapter 5 and
uses these to evaluate the three error models. It helps answering RQ2 -
quantiﬁable measures - and RQ4 - what to inject.
An extensive series of fault injection experiments show that the bit-ﬂip
model allows for more detailed results, however, at a higher cost in terms of
the number of injections required. Fuzzing is found to be cheap to implement
but is less precise compared to bit-ﬂips. A novel composite error model is
presented where the low cost of fuzzing is combined with the higher level of
details of bit-ﬂips, resulting in high precision with moderate setup/execution
costs.
Furthermore, this chapter shows how the error propagation measures in-
troduced in Chapter 5 can be used in the context of a real system.
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6.1 Introduction
When performing a robustness evaluation of an OS several factors inﬂuence
the choice of the error model used. In many cases the representativeness of
the used error model compared to the errors found in a deployed system is
of most importance. To be able to estimate the behavior of the OS in an
operational setting, the injected errors need to as closely as possible match
real errors. However, for COTS components, such as OS’s, this is diﬃcult,
since a) the type and distribution of real errors may not be known, b) the
operational setting might not yet be known, or c) the operational composition
of the system may not be known.
This thesis focuses on the robustness aspect of the OS, taking a speciﬁc
composition of the system into consideration. Robustness of the system is
evaluated with a typical composition, to identify system vulnerabilities in
the form of error propagation paths. This is for instance done when diﬀerent
platforms (OS and hardware) are evaluated on a prototype stage, or when
platform robustness is evaluated as part of quality assurance of an entire
system. In this type of setting, the evaluator typically lacks access to the
source code of system components, or lack the ability (or permissions) to
modify it.
Given the context of robustness evaluation (errors are external to the
OS) and lack of source code, we target the interface between device drivers
and the OS. This interface is typically deﬁned as a set of functions that are
called to perform services. The target for injection is the parameters to such
functions that carry erroneous information from a driver to the OS.
A key question becomes which error model to choose for the evaluation,
i.e., how are erroneous states of the system modeled by injecting errors. This
chapter evaluates three contemporary error models based on their eﬀective-
ness in ﬁnding system vulnerabilities, their ease of implementation and the
time required for performing the experimentation. A detailed discussion on
each of the criteria investigated is provided.
The error models are evaluated using the three drivers previously intro-
duced: cerﬁo serial (serial port), 91C111 (Ethernet card) and atadisk (Com-
pactFlash).
6.2 Considered Error Models
The considered error models for this study were introduced and described
in Section 3.2. This section ﬁrst brieﬂy discusses the three models. Table
6.1 shows an overview of the three models, showing the number of services
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in the OS-Driver interface and the total number of injections performed for
each of error model. The number of used services diﬀers across the models,
with the serial driver using the most. One can also see that the BF model,
as expected, incurs the highest number of injections and the DT model the
fewest.
Table 6.1: Overview of the target drivers.
# Injection cases
Driver #Services BF DT FZ
cerﬁo serial 60 2653 397 1395
91C111 54 1850 283 990
atadisk 47 1486 267 899
6.2.1 Data Type Error Model
The data type (DT) error model modiﬁes the value of a parameter based on
its data type, and is presented in detail in Section 3.2.1. It has been shown
in previous studies that this type of injection is very scalable in terms of the
number of data types used in API’s, such as POSIX [DeVale et al., 1999].
The total number of data types targeted for the experiments reported here
was 22. Given that the average number of services targeted across all three
drivers was 54, with typically more than one parameter, this is a fairly low
number.
6.2.2 Bit-Flip Error Model
For the bit-ﬂip (BF) error model each targeted parameter is considered as
a 32 bit value. 32 injections cases are deﬁned, ﬂipping the bits from 0 (least
signiﬁcant bit) to bit 31 (most signiﬁcant bit) one after the other.
The ﬂipping is achieved by casting the value to an integer and then using
the xor-function. This approach is also detailed for instance in [Voas and
Charron, 1996]. The new value is then used in the call to the real function.
The BF model does not necessarily need to be adapted to the data type
used. However, it is beneﬁcial to do so for some speciﬁc reasons:
• Reducing the number of bits used for data types using fewer bits reduces
the total number of injections required. For instance, the data type
char uses only 8 bits, whereas the type int uses 32. Since injecting
in the remaining 24 bits of a char does not reﬂect a software error for
this type, the number of bits targeted can be restricted to 8.
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• Many of the parameters used in the interface are pointers to a value of
some other data type (or void). By tracking such relations the pointer
target can be used for injection, more closely simulating software errors
than targeting the reference pointer values alone.
• A common feature in the driver interface is to use pointers to struc-
tures (struct’s). Without details on their members, BF errors cannot
directly target them. Data type tracking facilitates this.
6.2.3 Fuzzing Error Model
The fuzzing (FZ) error model uses a pseudo-random generator to generate
random values to inject. The targeted service invocation is intercepted and
a new random value is chosen to replace the existing value. We use the
standard C-runtime function rand() to generate the random values. Each
target computer (board) stores the generated random value in persistent
storage and uses this value as seed to the random generator for the next
injection. This way we avoid generating the same value for each injection
(which would have been the case had the same seed been used).
For each service targeted ﬁfteen injections with diﬀerent random values
are performed. This number was selected to give a reasonable execution
time of the experiments and yet produce useful results. Section 6.5.2 further
discusses the number of injections for the FZ model.
6.3 Error Propagation
This section details our experimental estimation of the error propagation
measures deﬁned in Chapter 5. It is demonstrated how the analytical ex-
pressions in the previous chapter can be adapted to assessment with fault
injection. A series of simpliﬁcations are presented and results and interpreta-
tions from large scale fault injection experiments are presented. To shorten
the discussion, focus in this section will be put solely on the bit-ﬂip model,
with Section 6.4 devoted to the comparison across the three models.
6.3.1 Failure Class Distribution
Table 6.2 shows the failure class distribution for the three drivers using the
BF model. The atadisk driver has the highest ratio of Class 3 failures, even
though for all three drivers the ratio stays below 4.5% of the injected errors.
The cerﬁo serial driver has considerably more Class 2 failures than the other
two drivers. This is due to a number of injections for this driver leading to
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Table 6.2: The failure class distribution for the BF model.
Driver NF [%] C1 [%] C2 [%] C3 [%]
cerﬁo serial 2060 77.65 38 1.43 481 18.13 74 2.79
91C111 1320 71.35 416 22.49 50 2.70 64 3.46
atadisk 1117 75.17 300 20.19 3 0.20 66 4.44
hangs in OS services used by applications, i.e., services hang unexpectedly.
The serial driver, being inherently of blocking nature, is the only driver to
show such behavior to a signiﬁcant extent. The other two drivers have higher
Class 1 ratios instead and all three drivers have roughly the same amount
of Class NF failures, above 70%. The high number of Class NF failures
suggest that there is potentially room for reducing the number of injections
further, beyond what is already done through the pre-proﬁling stage.
6.3.2 Estimating Service Error Permeability
Service Error Permeability is the conditional probability that an error ap-
pearing in a OS-Driver interface service will propagate to a service in the OS-
Application interface, given that one appears (see Equations 5.1 and 5.2). A
distinction is made between errors appearing in services provided by drivers
(exports) and those provided by the OS itself (imports). A simpliﬁcation is
also made in Equation 5.7 where no such distinction is made.
Service Error Permeability is estimated by the use of fault injection as the
ratio between the number of injections performed resulting in a failure to the
total number of injections for a given service. Service Error Permeability is
calculated the same way for both imported and exported services. We denote,
for a driver Dx, the number of injected errors in a service
1 osx.y with Nx.y
and the number of failures for service si with ni. The estimated Service Error
Permeability is then calculated as follows:
ŜP
i
x.y =
ni
Nx.y
(6.1)
Typically one studies each failure class in isolation. In this case ni is
the number of injections resulting in failure of the speciﬁc class under study.
ŜP
i
x.y is used as an estimate of both PDS
i
x.y and POS
i
x.y and as such corre-
spond Equation 5.7.
Service Error Permeability can be used to study the relation between
tuples of OS-Driver services and OS-Application services. The number of
1The calculation for exported services (dsx.y) is analogous to that for imported.
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services in the OS-Driver interface can be seen in Table 6.1. For each of
the services, Service Error Permeability is deﬁned in relation to each service
studied at the OS-Application layer. Since Service Error Permeability is a
probability, the values will be in the range [0 . . . 1]. It is important to note
that a value of 0.0 must not be interpreted as an proof that no errors will
propagate along this path. It is only an indication that the likelihood is low,
given the error model used. Similarly, a value of 1.0 only indicates that errors
are likely to propagate, but is again dependent on the used error model.
As previously mentioned, propagation results are best interpreted by
studying the individual failure classes separately. For Service Error Per-
meability Class 3 failures are not relevant, since a Class 3 failure will have
the same eﬀect on all application level services, since it renders the entire
system irresponsive, either through a hang or a crash. Similarly, error prop-
agation is hard to track for most Class 2 failures, since the eﬀect needs to
be pinpointed to the speciﬁc service being the victim of the failure. This
would require tracking not only negative reports for each service, i.e., when
errors propagate, but also positive reports, i.e., each service call needs to be
logged. This would put a tremendous pressure on the tracking mechanism
to safely store or forward information on each call. Consequently we have
not considered Service Error Permeability for Class 2 failures, and it thus
remains as a future extension to our work.
Our investigation using Service Error Permeability focuses on Class
1 failures. Many such propagation paths exist (although with many hav-
ing an estimated propagation permeability of 0.0). Therefore, Tables 6.3,
6.4 and 6.5 for brevity presents only the prominent error propagation paths
identiﬁed, for each of the three drivers using the BF model.
Table 6.3 shows all propagation paths for cerﬁo serial. “String compare”
is not a speciﬁc OS service per se, but an added consistency check for the
received echo strings sent by the test application. Similarly, “Serial Echo
Error” is the echo server check performed on the host side. Driver services
with the preﬁx COM are exported driver services.
Several observations can be made regarding the propagation paths re-
ported in Table 6.3. First, the table shows that both imported and exported
functions can lead to Class 1 failures. Second, some propagation paths are
distinctly more prominent than others, having Service Error Permeability val-
ues of up to 1.0, i.e., each injected error lead to a Class 1 failure reported
by the application testing the serial port functionality. Third, a “clustering”
eﬀect can be seen, where many OS-Driver services have multiple propaga-
tion paths with the same Service Error Permeability value. This indicates
that injecting a transient error in these services will corrupt the “state” of
the system and cause subsequent service invocations to fail as well. This
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Table 6.3: Class 1 error propagation paths for cerﬁo serial, based on Service
Error Permeability (SEP), for the BF model.
# OS-Driver OS-Application SEP
1 InterruptDisable CreateFile 1.000
2 InterruptDisable GetCommState 1.000
3 InterruptDisable WriteFile 1.000
4 InterruptDisable SetCommTimeouts 1.000
5 InterruptDisable ReadFile 1.000
6 InterruptDisable GetCommTimeouts 1.000
7 InterruptDisable String compare 1.000
8 InterruptDisable CloseHandle 1.000
9 memcpy SetCommState 0.042
10 COM Open WriteFile 0.031
11 COM Open SetCommState 0.031
12 COM Open ReadFile 0.031
13 COM Open SetCommTimeouts 0.031
14 COM Open String compare 0.031
15 COM Open GetCommState 0.031
16 COM Read String compare 0.016
17 EventModify String compare 0.016
18 EventModify Serial Echo Error 0.016
19 COM IOControl String compare 0.010
20 COM IOControl GetCommState 0.010
21 COM IOControl Serial Echo Error 0.010
is no big surprise considering the type of services involved. For instance,
COM Open, which when failing to open the serial port will cause subsequent
service requests by the application fail as well.
Table 6.4 shows the top thirty Class 1 error propagation paths for the
Ethernet driver. One service has a Service Error Permeability value of 1.0,
with several other having high permeability values. The Ndis preﬁx indi-
cates that these services are provided by the Ndis library, a system library
provided to support and simplify network card drivers. Similarly, the OS-
Application services are also network related, as expected since the test ap-
plication most aﬀected is using networking services heavily. The most perme-
able path is surprisingly enough for NKDbgPrintfW, a function which prints
debug information used by developers. This suggests that even functions
that are not “expected” by developers to cause propagating errors must be
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Table 6.4: Class 1 error propagation paths for 91C111, based on Service
Error Permeability (SEP), for the BF model.
# OS-Driver OS-Application SEP
1 NKDbgPrintfW WSACleanup 1.0000
2 NKDbgPrintfW connect 1.0000
3 NKDbgPrintfW shutdown 1.0000
4 NKDbgPrintfW closesocket 1.0000
5 NdisOpenConﬁguration WSACleanup 0.9375
6 NdisOpenConﬁguration connect 0.9375
7 NdisOpenConﬁguration shutdown 0.9375
8 NdisOpenConﬁguration closesocket 0.9375
9 NdisCloseConﬁguration WSACleanup 0.8750
10 NdisCloseConﬁguration connect 0.8750
11 NdisCloseConﬁguration shutdown 0.8750
12 NdisCloseConﬁguration closesocket 0.8750
13 NdisInitializeWrapper connect 0.5625
14 NdisInitializeWrapper WSACleanup 0.5625
15 NdisInitializeWrapper shutdown 0.5625
16 NdisInitializeWrapper closesocket 0.5625
17 NdisMRegisterMiniport closesocket 0.4844
18 NdisMRegisterMiniport shutdown 0.4844
19 NdisMRegisterMiniport WSACleanup 0.4844
20 NdisMRegisterMiniport connect 0.4844
21 NdisMRegisterAdapterShutdownHandler WSACleanup 0.4688
22 NdisMRegisterAdapterShutdownHandler connect 0.4688
23 NdisMRegisterAdapterShutdownHandler closesocket 0.4688
24 NdisMRegisterAdapterShutdownHandler shutdown 0.4688
25 QueryPerformanceCounter closesocket 0.4688
26 QueryPerformanceCounter shutdown 0.4688
27 QueryPerformanceCounter connect 0.4688
28 QueryPerformanceCounter WSACleanup 0.4688
29 NdisReadConﬁguration shutdown 0.4393
30 NdisReadConﬁguration closesocket 0.4393
used with care.
The clustering of services is again shown clearly, i.e., several application
level services show the same Service Error Permeability values. This indi-
cates that they fail together; when one service fail, several other services
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fail too. 91C111 had in total 71 propagation paths with a Service Error
Permeability value above 0.0.
Table 6.5: Selection of Class 1 error propagation paths for atadisk, based
on Service Error Permeability (SEP), for the BF model.
# OS-Driver OS-Application SEP
1 DSK Init GetFileTime 1.0000
2 DSK Init GetFileInformationByHandle 1.0000
3 DSK Init CloseHandle 1.0000
4 READ PORT USHORT CloseHandle 1.0000
5 READ PORT USHORT GetFileInformationByHandle 1.0000
6 READ PORT USHORT CreateFile 1.0000
7 DetectATADisk CreateFile 1.0000
8 DetectATADisk WriteFile 1.0000
9 DetectATADisk CloseHandle 1.0000
10 DetectATADisk SetEndOfFile 1.0000
Table 6.5 for the CompactFlash driver shows a similar trend to the pre-
vious two tables. For this driver, two exported services show up, DSK Init
and DetectATADisk. The application level services in the list are related to
ﬁle operations, as expected for this driver. In total atadisk has 176 registered
propagation paths.
It is important to note that in Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 a higher value for
Service Error Permeability indicates higher likelihood of propagating errors
resulting in Class 1 failures. A lower value may therefore be an indication of
proneness to higher severity failures, or to a higher degree of fault tolerance.
Service Error Permeability must therefore be used in conjunction with other
measures, such as Service Error Exposure and Driver Diﬀusion.
6.3.3 Service Error Exposure
Service Error Exposure considers all driver-level services’ contribution to the
failure seen for a speciﬁc OS-Application service. Therefore, we analogously
to the Service Error Permeability only consider Class 1 failures also for
Service Error Exposure.
The number of services used by each test application was purposely kept
low, as a consequence of keeping the test applications small and simple.
Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 show the driver speciﬁc Service Error Exposure cal-
culated for each service for injections in cerﬁo serial, 91C111 and atadisk,
respectively.
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The driver speciﬁc Service Error Exposure is calculated using Equation
5.4, which is based on the Service Error Permeability values (partially) pre-
sented in the previous section. Since it is a sum of probabilities, they are not
limited, and no speciﬁc interpretation can be made on a single value. Their
use lies in the relative comparison across many services. A higher value indi-
cates that a services is more exposed to propagating errors from the drivers
considered.
Table 6.6: Service Error Exposure values for the cerﬁo serial, using the
BF model.
# Service Service Error Exposure
1 String compare 1.0730
2 GetCommState 1.0417
3 SetCommTimeouts 1.0313
4 WriteFile 1.0313
5 ReadFile 1.0313
6 CreateFile 1.0000
7 CloseHandle 1.0000
8 GetCommTimeouts 1.0000
9 SetCommState 0.0729
10 Serial Echo Error 0.0260
All three tables show the same clustering eﬀect observed for failures, in-
dicated by observing the same Service Error Exposure value. That this is the
case is not surprising. Considering for instance CreateFile and CloseHandle
in Table 6.8 it is understandable that if CreateFile returns with error, then
its handle will be invalid. A subsequent try to close it will also return an
error, and consequently the error propagates to both services.
Another useful piece of information can be seen in Table 6.6 which shows
“String compare” to have the highest Service Error Exposure value. Since
this is a check performed on the received data and no returned error code
for an OS service this indicates that in some cases erroneous data can be
received without any other service indicating an error. This corresponds to a
silent error, suggesting that data integrity checks might be needed for critical
data. Similarly, “Serial echo error” signals that the data sent to the Host
Computer in some cases is corrupted, suggesting that similar data integrity
checks may be needed at the receiving side as well.
In Table 6.7 services 5-15 are from the test application for atadisk, in-
dicating that in some cases injecting errors in the interface for 91C111 can
cause Class 1 failures also for applications not using the faulty driver.
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Table 6.7: Service Error Exposure values for 91C111 using the BF model.
# Service Service Error Exposure
1 connect 6.5020
2 shutdown 6.5020
3 WSACleanup 6.5020
4 closesocket 6.4083
5 CreateFile 0.1250
6 CloseHandle 0.1250
7 ReadFile 0.0938
8 sizeof 0.0625
9 GetFileSize 0.0625
10 GetFileTime 0.0313
11 GetFileInformationByHandle 0.0313
12 SetEndOfFile 0.0313
13 WriteFile 0.0313
14 SetFilePointer 0.0313
15 DeleteFile 0.0313
16 getaddrinfo 0.0208
Table 6.8: Service Error Exposure values for atadisk using the BF model.
# Service Service Error Exposure
1 CloseHandle 30.1790
2 CreateFile 30.1790
3 ReadFile 22.6436
4 sizeof 15.0957
5 GetFileSize 15.0832
6 WriteFile 7.54787
7 SetFilePointer 7.54787
8 DeleteFile 7.54787
9 SetEndOfFile 7.54787
10 GetFileTime 7.53537
11 GetFileInformationByHandle 7.53537
6.3.4 Service Error Diﬀusion
When considering which OS-Driver services are more likely to spread errors in
the system one can use the Service Error Diﬀusion measures, which considers
one service’s proneness to spread errors. Since we are considering driver
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services speciﬁcally we do not have the failure class restrictions that apply to
application level measures. We will therefore concentrate on the most severe
failure class, Class 3 failures.
Service Error Diﬀusion is deﬁned in Equation 5.5 as a sum over all appli-
cation level services. Since all services are aﬀected uniformly, this translates
into a simple scaling of the eﬀects with the number of services used. A
simpliﬁed expression can therefore be applied, where the application level
services are not accounted for individually. This simpliﬁed version is shown
in Equation 6.2, and is deﬁned for driver Dx and service sx.y (either: osx.y or
dsx.y):
SEx.y =
nx.y
Nx.y
(6.2)
where nx.y is the number of Class 3 failures and Nx.y the number of
injections performed for service sx.y, as above.
Table 6.9: Class 3 Service Error Diﬀusion values for cerﬁo serial using the
BF model.
# Service Service Error Diﬀusion
1 memset 0.3125
2 memcpy 0.2083
3 MmMapIoSpace 0.1528
4 LoadLibraryW 0.0909
5 FreeLibrary 0.0625
6 DisableThreadLibraryCalls 0.0625
7 LocalAlloc 0.0313
8 SetProcPermissions 0.0313
9 CreateThread 0.0234
10 HalTranslateBusAddress 0.0236
Tables 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 present the non-zero valued services for the
three drivers. One service stands out among the data, wcslen, for atadisk,
which has a Service Error Diﬀusion value of 1.0, which means that all in-
jected errors for this service resulted in a Class 3 failure. This makes this
service a top candidate for further robustness enhancement. Comparing the
number of services in these tables with the number of services used in the
OS-Driver interface for the three drivers (Table 6.1) one can observe that a
small number of services give rise to all Class 3 failures, for all three drivers.
Furthermore, it can be seen that some services cause severe failures for
all three drivers, such as memset and memcpy. These are low-level system
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Table 6.10: Class 3 Service Error Diﬀusion values for 91C111 using the
BF model.
# Service Service Error Diﬀusion
1 memset 0.2708
2 NdisAllocateMemory 0.1250
3 DisableThreadLibraryCalls 0.1250
4 QueryPerformanceCounter 0.0938
5 LoadLibraryW 0.0909
6 NdisMSynchronizeWithInterrupt 0.0781
7 FreeLibrary 0.0625
8 VirtualCopy 0.0313
9 NdisMSetAttributesEx 0.0188
10 RegOpenKeyExW 0.0093
11 NdisInitializeWrapper 0.0078
12 NdisMRegisterInterrupt 0.0077
13 KernelIoControl 0.0063
Table 6.11: Class 3 Service Error Diﬀusion values for atadisk using the
BF model.
# Service Service Error Diﬀusion
1 wcslen 1.0000
2 wcscpy 0.2727
3 memcpy 0.2708
4 memset 0.1875
5 DisableThreadLibraryCalls 0.0625
6 LocalAlloc 0.0313
7 MapPtrToProcess 0.0313
functions present in many drivers and the Service Error Diﬀusion is compa-
rable across all three drivers indicating that for these drivers propagation is
independent from the driver itself. If generic error detection and recovery
mechanisms could be deﬁned for these two services 84 Class 3 failures could
be removed across all three drivers for the BF model. This corresponds to
41% of the Class 3 failures reported for the experiments.
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6.3.5 Driver Error Diﬀusion
While Service Error Diﬀusion is used to identify individual services that
are more likely to spread errors present at the OS-Driver interface this may
become hard to overview and services may be spread across multiple drivers
making any speciﬁc driver level improvement eﬀorts costly. In this case one
may want to focus on the driver that is more prone to spreading errors,
rather than individual services. To this end we use Driver Error Diﬀusion.
Driver Error Diﬀusion can similarly to Service Error Diﬀusion be sim-
pliﬁed for Class 3 failures. Equation 6.3 presents the estimated Driver
Error Diﬀusion not considering application level services. Driver Error Dif-
fusion thus transforms to a sum of Service Error Diﬀusion values as follows:
D
x
=
∑
∀y
SEx.y =
∑
∀y
nx.y
Nx.y
(6.3)
Table 6.12 shows the Driver Error Diﬀusion values for all three drivers
using the BF model. The values presented are calculated with the simpliﬁed
expression in Equation 6.3.
Table 6.12: Driver Error Diﬀusion for all three drivers considering Class
3 failures.
Driver Diﬀusion
cerﬁo serial 1.00
91C111 0.93
atadisk 1.86
From Table 6.12 one can see that atadisk is clearly more prone to dif-
fusing errors in the system. 91C111 and cerﬁo serial are very close, with
cerﬁo serial having slightly higher value. Considering these values an eval-
uator might consider devoting extra resources to ensuring that atadisk does
not contain errors.
6.4 Comparing Error Models
There are many criteria one could have for selecting the error model to use.
Depending on the goal of the evaluation, criteria such as execution time
or number of found failures may not be equally important. Therefore, we
compare the three models on a wide range of criteria. First, a discussion on
the uses and implications of each evaluation criteria is presented, followed
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by a presentation and interpretation of the results. Table 6.13 shows an
overview of the results for the three models.
The following criteria are considered when comparing the error models:
• Number of failures found: The absolute number of failures is impor-
tant as a higher number may give more insight into how the system can
fail and consequently give better feedback to developers of the system
to improve it.
• Number of injections and execution time: The number of in-
jections inﬂuences the time required to perform the evaluation. The
relationship is not linear, since the execution time also depends on the
outcome, but more injections generally means longer execution time.
• Injection eﬃciency: The eﬃciency of the injections is measured as
the number of failures per injection. This measure helps making a
trade-oﬀ between the two previous criteria.
• Coverage: The term coverage is here used to compare diﬀerent models
ability to pinpoint certain services as potentially vulnerable. Since no
information on the real vulnerabilities exist, the comparison is based
on a best-eﬀort strategy, where the relative coverage across models is
compared.
• Implementation complexity: The complexity of the implementa-
tion is a measure of the eﬀort required to implement the error model.
Since no lab experiments with real developers have been conducted, the
comparison remains subjective. However, there are clear and distinct
diﬀerences in the implementation eﬀort needed for the studied models.
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6.4.1 Number of Failures
The absolute number of failures that an error model triggers is important
from a feedback perspective. The more cases of triggering vulnerabilities
shown, the easier it will be to identify the vulnerability and possibly remove
it.
Table 6.13 shows the number of failures found for each of the four failure
classes, error model and driver. From the table it can clearly be seen that the
BF model, having the most injections, also incur the most Class 3 failures.
The number of failures for the BF model is comparable across all three
drivers. For the other two models there are diﬀerences in the number of
Class 3 failures, indicating that there are diﬀerences between the drivers in
their ability to spread errors.
Table 6.13 further substantiate the fact that cerﬁo serial is more prone
to Class 2 failures than the other two drivers. That this behavior is driver
related, and not dependent on the error model is further supported by the
fact that the percentage of injections leading to Class 2 failure is distinctly
higher for all error models for cerﬁo serial, compared to the other two drivers.
However, it is important to note that since the approach is experimental,
all results are dependent on the speciﬁc setup used. In this case all test
applications are written in a straight-forward manner, without any explicit
fault-tolerance mechanisms. Such mechanisms will most probably change the
results of the evaluation, and the results presented indeed suggest that such
mechanisms are needed.
Furthermore, many injections do not result in any observable error prop-
agation (58-78%) within the time used for each injection, i.e., no observable
deviation from the expected behavior was observed. This is in line with mul-
tiple previous studies, e.g., [Dura˜es and Madeira, 2003], [Gu et al., 2003] and
[Jarboui et al., 2002a]. Experiments in the Class NF category are either
masked by the system, for instance parameters not used in this context or
overwritten; or handled by built-in error detection/correction mechanisms
checking incoming parameter values for correctness. Another explanation
could be that the fault is dormant in the system and has not yet propagated
to the OS-Application interface. It is important to note that all errors in-
jected were in fact activated, since the pre-proﬁling eliminates services not
used prior to injection (Section 4.6). The high number of Class NF exper-
iments indicates that there is room for improving the selection of injection
cases beyond the pre-proﬁling already carried out.
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6.4.2 Execution Time
The number of injections performed and the time required for executing the
experiments are related. An increase in the number of injections will mean
increased execution time. However, the outcome of the experiments inﬂuence
the execution time. An injection that does not lead to error propagation can
be considerably faster than one that leads to a system hang, requiring ﬁrst
that the hang, is detected and then a reboot of the system.
Table 6.14 reports the execution times for the injections performed. The
times reported include only the actual execution time, not implementation,
setup and oﬀ-line processing times.
Table 6.14: Experiment execution times.
Execution Time
Driver Error Model hours minutes
BF 38 14
cerio serial DT 5 15
FZ 20 44
BF 17 20
91C111 DT 1 56
FZ 7 48
BF 20 51
atadisk DT 2 56
FZ 11 55
From the table it can clearly be seen that the BF model, having the most
injections, also has the longest execution time. The time required for BF is
roughly twice as much as for FZ and seven to eight times as much as DT. As
noted above the outcome of the experiments inﬂuence the execution time, and
this might diﬀer across drivers. In our setup cerﬁo serial and atadisk both
take longer time when failing, which also inﬂuences the execution time.
A factor inﬂuencing the eﬀective experiment time is the degree of opera-
tor involvement. The operator is required to specify the experiment to run
(which driver, error model etc). The setup time is the same for all models.
Additionally, some injections force the system into a state where it cannot
automatically reboot, requiring a manual reboot by the operator. Conse-
quently, without external reboot mechanisms the experiment is delayed until
the operator is notiﬁed and can perform the reboot, which can prolong the
execution time substantially. This additional delay is not part of the execu-
tion time in Table 6.14 since no assumption is made on the presence of the
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operator. The issue of manual reboots is further discussed in Section 6.6.
6.4.3 Injection Eﬃciency
The absolute number of failures each error model gives rise to also needs to be
put in contrast to the number of injections performed, to give an indication
of the eﬃciency of the model. Figure 6.1 graphically shows the data in Table
6.13. It can be seen that the overall trend is similar across all three drivers.
This would clearly favor models incurring fewer injections, especially DT,
but also the FZ injections
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Figure 6.1: Injection eﬃciency.
The other criteria used are quantitative in nature, where a relative scale
of “goodness” can be deﬁned and used to rank the models. One aspect that
can not be compared quantitatively is a model’s ability to assess the “true”
propagation patterns of the system. An eﬃcient model may be one giving a
bigger “bang for the buck”, at least if ﬁnding failure triggering vulnerabilities,
but may still be misleading. A separate concern is therefore to inspect the
diﬀerences in propagation results for the three models studied, represented
by the Driver Error Diﬀusion values for all three models and drivers in Table
6.15.
Table 6.15 shows that there are indeed diﬀerences across the results of
the three models. DT and FZ identify the serial driver to be the most
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Table 6.15: Driver Diﬀusion for Class 3 failures.
Driver BF DT FZ
cerﬁo serial 1.00 1.50 1.93
91C111 0.93 0.98 0.59
atadisk 1.86 0.63 0.19
vulnerable driver, whereas BF pin-points atadisk to be the most vulnerable,
with the serial and Ethernet drivers having very similar values. It can also be
observed that the results for atadisk is clearly more spread than for the other
two drivers, with 91C111 being fairly consistent across all three models. This
indicates that the services for 91C111 giving rise to Class 3 failures suﬀer
from “uniform” vulnerabilities, i.e., any small change in the data supplied will
trigger failures. On the contrary, services used by atadisk have vulnerabilities
triggered only for more speciﬁc values, in this case triggered by bit-ﬂips.
A straightforward view of the results is presented in Table 6.13, where
the number of experiments in each failure class is detailed, both in actual
numbers and as percentages of all injections.
The ﬁrst observation is that for all drivers and error models the percentage
of injections ending up as Class 3 failures is below 5%, indicating that the
OS is capable of handling many perturbations and avoiding a catastrophic
failure.
Table 6.16: Class 3 Service Error Diﬀusion values for cerﬁo serial using the
DT error model.
# Service Service Error Diﬀusion
1 MmMapIoSpace 0.5000
2 LocalAlloc 0.4000
3 LoadLibraryW 0.2500
4 SetProcPermissions 0.2000
5 memcpy 0.0909
6 CreateThread 0.0625
When comparing the error models, clear diﬀerences can be identiﬁed.
For instance, where for Driver Error Diﬀusion DT previously identiﬁed
cerﬁo serial as the most diﬀusive driver, 91C111 has a higher ratio of Class
3 failures for this error model. Only considering the ratio may in this case be
misleading, as cerﬁo serial in this case has more services with high Service
Error Diﬀusion compared to 91C111 for DT, as seen from Tables 6.16 and
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Table 6.17: Class 3 Service Error Diﬀusion values for 91C111 using the
DT error model.
# Service Service Error Diﬀusion
1 LoadLibraryW 0.2500
2 memcpy 0.1818
3 NdisAllocateMemory 0.1764
4 RegOpenKeyExW 0.1500
5 memset 0.1333
6 NdisMRegisterInterrupt 0.0555
7 NdisMSetAttributesEx 0.0322
6.17. Similarly, where Driver Error Diﬀusion with the BF model indicates
atadisk to be by far the most diﬀusive driver, the ratios of Class 3 failures
show them to be relatively close. This is an eﬀect of diﬀusion being a “sum
of probabilities”. Diﬀusion shows that atadisk has more services (especially
wsclen with 1.0) with a high permeability than 91C111 (Tables 6.10 and
6.11).
6.4.4 Coverage: Identifying Services
Table 6.18 depicts services incurring Class 3 failures and the number of
failures for each service/error model. BF outperforms the other error models,
both in terms of the number of identiﬁed vulnerable services, and the total
number of Class 3 failures (more clearly visible in Table 6.13). BF identiﬁes
22 individual services, DT 12 and FZ 11 services.
Considering which services the diﬀerent models uniquely identiﬁes, i.e.,
services which only one model identiﬁes, again BF outperforms DT and FZ.
BF identiﬁes seven services and FZ two, which are not identiﬁed by any other
error model. DT identiﬁes no such unique services. From the number of fail-
ures identiﬁed, FZ identiﬁes several services with only one case, suggesting
that the random nature of he FZ error model has a higher probability of ﬁnd-
ing unique service vulnerabilities. Whereas the more systematic injections
performed for BF typically reveal more than one failure.
6.4.5 Implementation Complexity
The implementation cost, measured as the time required for the implementa-
tion of an error model is naturally subjective. The amount of programming
experience, knowledge of the area and the the availability of tools and docu-
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Table 6.18: Services identiﬁed by Class 3 failures.
# Service BF DT FZ
1 CreateThread 3 1 0
2 DDKReg GetWindowInfo 0 0 1
3 DisableThreadLibraryCalls 8 0 1
4 FreeLibrary 4 0 1
5 HalTranslateBusAddress 3 0 5
6 KernelIOControl 1 0 0
7 LoadLibraryW 2 2 0
8 LocalAlloc 2 4 0
9 MapPtrToProcess 2 1 1
10 memcpy 46 3 34
11 memset 74 3 18
12 MmMapIoSpace 11 9 27
13 NdisAllocateMemory 12 3 0
14 NdisInitializeWrapper 1 0 0
15 NdisMRegisterInterrupt 1 1 0
16 NdisMSetAttributesEx 3 1 1
17 NdisMSynchronizeWithInterrupt 5 0 0
18 QueryPerformanceCounter 3 0 0
19 RegOpenKeyExW 1 3 0
20 SetProcPermissions 1 1 9
21 VirtualAlloc 0 0 1
22 VirtualCopy 4 0 0
23 wcscpy 6 0 0
24 wcslen 11 0 0
mentation all inﬂuence the required time. However, some observations during
the course of implementing the injection framework suggests that there are
diﬀerences across the error models.
Whereas Table 6.14 shows that BF and FZ are clearly more expensive
in terms of execution time compared to DT, a major drawback with the
DT error model is the cost for implementation. The diﬀerence lies in that for
every function in the service interface the data type of each parameter needs
to be tracked, such that the right injector can be chosen. BF and FZ on the
other hand do not have this requirement, making their implementation costs
considerably cheaper. Both use simple injection technologies, making the two
models comparable in terms of implementation costs. Additionally, the time
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required for deﬁning the injection cases for each data type is considerable
higher for the DT model.
The cost for the DT model could potentially be reduced by use of auto-
matic parsing tools and/or reﬂection-capable programming languages. The
implementation cost is also a one-time cost for each driver which might be ac-
ceptable if the experiments are to be repeated in a regression testing fashion.
Furthermore, the cost might be acceptable in comparison to other veriﬁca-
tion eﬀorts used. Further research on the true costs for such error models is
indeed warranted.
It is also important to note that even though the BF and FZ model do
not require data type tracking they can beneﬁt from it. By knowing the
data type used, the number of bits targeted can be limited for data types
not using all bits anyway (such as 8-bit integers). This technique has been
applied in the experiments presented in this thesis.
6.5 Composite Error Model
Two major ﬁndings can be extracted from the previously presented results,
namely: a) that BF identiﬁes the most Class 3 failures, both in terms of
absolute number and in the number of individual services identiﬁed, and b)
FZ, even though not triggering as many failures as BF identiﬁes, identiﬁes
Class 3 failures for additional services, beyond those identiﬁed by BF and
DT combined.
Even though these results must be interpreted in the context of our case
study they show diﬀerent error models, although being injected on the same
level and therefore being comparable, have diﬀerent properties. It would
be desirable to combine the models (BF and FZ) into a combined model,
drawing on the strengths of both models. We do this by combining the two
models into a so called composite model (CO).
For the composite model we will focus on the Class 3 failure class as it
in most cases is the critical class for robustness evaluation. The main hurdle
for use of the BF model was the comparatively high number of injections.
Thus we ﬁrst focus on reducing the number of injections required by studying
the impact each bit injection has and selecting only a subset of the bits for
injections. Furthermore the number of injections required for the FZ model
is studied to ﬁnd a reasonable injection set. The following subsections will
detail these studies.
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6.5.1 Distinguishing Control vs Data
As mentioned, the number of required injections for BF increases the re-
quired execution time dramatically compared to the other two models. The
high number of cases for each parameter is due to the fact that one injection
is made for each bit in the parameter value, thus typically 32 injections per
parameter. For a parameter of type int holding an integer value this uniform
injection may represent a valid selection of error values. However, in many
cases, especially for device drivers written in C, an integer value may not
actually be used to represent all 32-bit integer values. Instead only a small
subset of the values are used, and consequently only a small subset of the
bits. It is therefore conceivable that not all 32 bits need to be targeted.
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f C
la
ss
 3
 s
er
vi
ce
 fa
ilu
re
s
Bit position
Figure 6.2: The number of services identiﬁed by Class 3 failures by the
BF model.
Figure 6.2 shows for each of the targeted bits how many services where
identiﬁed having Class 3 failures when bit-ﬂips were injected in that bit.
It can from the ﬁgure clearly be seen that there is no uniform distribution
across the bits. The lower order bits, bits 0-9, identify more services than the
other bits, with the exception of the most signiﬁcant bit (31) which typically
has special signiﬁcance, such as being the sign bit for signed data types.
Figure 6.2 show the number of speciﬁc services identiﬁed with vulnera-
bilities for each service, but not whether the services identiﬁed by bit 0 are
the same as those for bit 1. For this we use Figure 6.3 which shows the cu-
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Figure 6.3: Moving from bit 0 and upwards the number of services increases
until bit 10.
mulative number of identiﬁed services. Reading the ﬁgure from left to right
it shows how many services are identiﬁed by ﬁrst injecting in bit 0, followed
by addition of injections in bit 1, then 2 and so on. It shows that the set of
vulnerable services increases in size up till bit 9 where twenty diﬀerent ser-
vices were identiﬁed. Another service is found at bit 27 and the last one at
bit 31, which as previously mentioned often have special signiﬁcance. Closer
inspection reveals that the service ﬁrst found at bit 27 is also identiﬁed by
bit 31.
The observations made regarding the impact of individual bits suggests
that the subset of bits for which bit-ﬂip injections should be made can be
reduced to only include bits 0-9 and 31, i.e., in total 11 bits compared to
the original 32 bits considered. This translates into a reduction of injections
by 49.8% in total compared to the full set used previously. Some fault in-
jection tools support such speciﬁcation of injections, like Xception [Carreira
et al., 1998].
When studying the parameters used for services identiﬁed by BF, but not
by FZ, shows a clear trend: many of these parameters are control values, like
pointers to data, handles to ﬁles, modules, functions etc. Such parameters
are intuitively more sensitive to small value changes, i.e., changes caused by
ﬂipping lower order bits. As an example consider a pointer to some data
stored in an allocated memory area. Large changes to the pointer value
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(changes of higher order bits) are more likely to cause the erroneous value to
lie outside the allocated memory area than a smaller change. Memory access
errors though being severe can be detected by the system (in some cases),
however, small changes may be harder to detect and may cause failures that
are harder to prevent. Similarly, the FZ model, using random values, is more
likely to choose values that are well outside the expected data range. This
is reﬂected in the diﬀerence observed between the two models. On the other
hand, FZ’s random nature means it can ﬁnd vulnerabilities not found by
more “structured” approaches, reﬂected in the fact that FZ identiﬁes several
additional service failures on top of those found by BF alone.
6.5.2 The Number of Injections for Fuzzing
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Figure 6.4: Stability of Diﬀusion for the FZmodel with respect to the number
of injections.
Since the FZ model, in contrast to BF and DT, requires the evaluator
to set the number of injections to be performed, this becomes an important
question for judging the usefulness of the FZ error model. Previously, we
have already shown how the ﬁfteen injections performed provide comparable
and useful results. One question remaining is whether ﬁfteen injections is
suﬃcient for assessing error propagation. Figure 6.4 shows how the Driver
Error Diﬀusion values stabilize as the number of injections is increased. The
values stabilize after roughly ten injections, but there are some diﬀerences
across the drivers suggesting that stabilization may also be driver dependent.
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However, for these three drivers the curves remain clearly separated for any
number of injections shown.
6.5.3 Composite Model & Eﬀectiveness
The results from the previous section clearly show the need for using multi-
ple error models. When resources are plentiful it is therefore recommendable
to use multiple error models to get comprehensive coverage. To decrease
the cost of evaluation (in implementation and experimentation time/eﬀort)
this may not be desirable. In this section we therefore propose and evalu-
ate a composite model (CO). The new CO model combines the BF model
using least signiﬁcant bits (together with the most signiﬁcant one) alongside
a series of FZ experiments. Section 6.5.2 indicates that even as few as ten
FZ injections give stable Driver Error Diﬀusion values. This number was
chosen to decrease the overall number of injections, but it is reasonable that
more FZ injections will increase the probability of ﬁnding “rare” cases.
Table 6.19: Diﬀusion values for the three drivers
Driver Diﬀusion
cerﬁo serial 1.58
91C111 0.91
atadisk 1.01
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Figure 6.5: Failure class distribution for CO compared to BF, DT and FZ.
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The CO model is evaluated by considering the BF injections in bit 0-
9 and bit 31, together with the ﬁrst ten FZ injections. CO identiﬁes all
services having Class 3 failures but one (VirtualAlloc) compared to the
full set of BF + FZ injections. An overview of the results is shown in
Figure 6.5. The ﬁgure shows that the results achieved with this subset of
injection is comparable with the results for the other models alone, making
its ability to assess propagation eﬀects on par with the other models. This is
further substantiated by the Driver Error Diﬀusion values for the CO model
presented in Table 6.19.
0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
cerfio_serial 91C111 atadisk
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f i
n
je
ct
io
n
s
All BF & FZ
CO only
Figure 6.6: The number of injections for the composite model compared to
bit-ﬂips and fuzzing together.
The number of injections required is compared in Figure 6.6. The ﬁg-
ure clearly shows that the number of injections is well below half of the
experiments required for the full set of BF and FZ, which translates into
considerable save in experimentation time.
6.6 Discussion
This section discusses some important aspects of the work and the results
provided for the case study.
Imports vs. Exports
In the system model presented in Chapter 3 a distinction is made between
imports and exports. The data presented in this chapter has not made any
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distinction between imported and exported services. The reason is simple,
in no case were an injection in an exported service able to trigger a Class
3 failure in the system.
Table 6.20: A comparison between the results for imported and exported
services.
Driver Interface Class 3 Class 2 Class 1
export 0 31 3
cerﬁo serial import 74 450 35
export 0 0 0
91C111 import 64 50 416
export 0 0 43
atadisk import 66 3 257
There could be many reasons for this eﬀect. First of all the number
of services in the exported interface is lower than the imported (typically
around 10 compared to 30-40), which makes it reasonable that most failures
will be found in the larger set. Secondly, the exported interface is a standard
interface, used by many drivers. It is therefore likely that the OS takes special
care to validate misuses of these services and that major ﬂaws have already
been detected during testing. Thirdly these services very closely matches
OS-Application services, which suggests that the amount of additional work
done by the OS is small for these services. Consequently, the eﬀects errors
can have will be mostly on the applications themselves, as Class 2 and Class
1 failures.
Experimental Techniques
As with any experimental evaluation technique it is important to consider the
limitations of the chosen approach. Uncertainties are introduced at multiple
levels and they need to be identiﬁed and understood to properly interpret
the results.
First of all the error model used and evaluated here are generic. They are
not based on any speciﬁc system scenario, but rather represent the subset
of data level errors occurring at the OS-Driver interface. If system-speciﬁc
faults are to be considered more speciﬁc error models need to be included as
well or instead of the generic ones presented here. Furthermore, even for the
subset of conceivable errors appearing at this interface only a small fraction
is actually used. The results provided in this chapter supports our belief
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that these are representative for a wider selection of errors since even though
there are diﬀerences between the models, they overall show a similar pattern.
Secondly, the results presented are inﬂuenced by external factors such
as the selected workload and the composition of the system (the selected
OS components). To minimize the variability of the results and to minimize
unpredictable inﬂuences we use a targeted generic workload and minimize
the number of system components (see section 3.3). For a speciﬁc system a
workload closely resembling the expected one should be used as well, and the
system should be composed such that it resembles the ﬁnal system as close
as possible.
Finally, the experimental procedures themselves may be a source of in-
ﬂuence on the ﬁnal results, both in terms of what and how the outcomes are
observed, and any undesirable inﬂuence caused by the added software used
for the experimentation. We have followed common practise in the selec-
tion of observation points, namely from a user perspective. Furthermore, we
have minimized the number of components required for the execution of the
experiments and made eﬀorts to minimize any potential impact they might
have. However, as the experiments have not yet been repeated in a similar
environment we cannot be 100% certain that no such inﬂuence exists.
Vulnerability vs. Bug
An interesting question arises when studying the results presented is whether
the presence of Class 2 and Class 3 failures is an indication of “bugs” in
the system. The answer is both yes and no, since a vulnerability discovered
by experimental fault injection may, or may not be present in a deployed
system2. A common case, especially for device drivers, is that documentation
states that certain rules should be obeyed when using speciﬁc services. These
rules may not be enforced, for performance reasons, e.g., the cost of checking
each parameter value for a driver may be too high. Instead a “gentlemen’s
agreement” is used, where the OS assumes that services are not misused. If
a driver does misuse such a service it may not be considered a bug in the
system in the traditional sense, but surely is a robustness vulnerability. Such
vulnerabilities have recently attracted more attention in research, since they
constitutes threats to the system’s security where an attacker can render the
system non-responsive and thereby threaten the availability of the system.
As previously mentioned we focus on robustness and therefore consider
all discovered failures of the system vulnerabilities.
2Hence the use of the term vulnerability instead of bug.
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Random vs. Structured Injection
There is an ongoing debate in the testing community whether random test-
ing is an appropriate testing technique in general, or one should aim for
more classical techniques, such as equivalence calls or boundary value test-
ing Hamlet [2006]. Our choice of models reﬂect this conﬂict, where DT and
BF represent more structured approaches, whereas FZ introduces random-
ness. The results presented also supports many researchers view on random
testing, namely that it has many weaknesses, but may in some cases be
preferred, because no alternative is deﬁnitely better.
The advantage of structured approaches is that they can draw from ex-
isting knowledge when selecting injection cases, this is for instance very clear
in the case of DT. DT is on the other hand limited to the ability of the
evaluator to select appropriate injection cases, an inherently very diﬃcult
task. BF makes this task simpler, by deﬁning injections based on the rep-
resentation of the injection target (the parameter value), but is still limited
to the speciﬁc modiﬁcations done by ﬂipping the bits. FZ imposes no such
restrictions, simply choosing randomly selected values.
The results clearly show that BF ﬁnds more vulnerabilities, in more ser-
vices, and that DT is clearly more eﬃcient (requires fewer injections) than
FZ. However, FZ is able to identify services beyond the set identiﬁed by
BF and DT, also with a limited number of injections.
Overall, the results favor using multiple error models, and the composite
model shows that using the two models requiring the least implementation
eﬀort can give very promising results.
Operator Involvement
The degree to which the operator (the person setting up the experiments
and supervising them) is involved in the process aﬀects the eﬀective time
required to perform the experiments. First of all the operator is required
to conﬁgure the system and specify which experiments to perform. For the
framework used in this thesis this time is the same for each error model. The
second task is to supervise the experiments and when needed manually restart
boards that have hung. For the experiments presented here, it happens in
many cases that the system crashes without being able to automatically
restart itself. In these cases the operator (in this case the author self) has to
manually force a cold restart of the target board. Table 6.21 presents data
on the amount of manual reboots required.
When the system is unable to restart automatically experiments are de-
layed until the operator notices the problem and takes action. The Host
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Table 6.21: The percentage of Class 3 failures that required the boards to
be manually rebooted by the evaluator.
Driver Error Model Manual reboots [%]
BF 8.1
cerﬁo serial DT 46.7
FZ 15.2
BF 54.7
91C111 DT 23.1
FZ 37.0
BF 9.1
atadisk DT 25.0
FZ 16.7
Computer is equipped with a watchdog timer that notiﬁes the operator if no
log messages have been received within the last four minutes, well beyond the
execution time of an experiment that is automatically self rebooted (which
is also triggered by a watchdog timeout as described in Section 4.5.3).
Since only eleven services overall have failures requiring the operator to
manually reboot the machines, the number of such reboots for a given driver
and error model depends on how these services are used, giving rise to the
diﬀerences reported in Table 6.21.
A further development of the injection framework would be to implement
the hardware required to automatically reboot the target board when the
host machine watchdog is triggered.
As described previously, a generic time penalty is assigned every manually
rebooted experiment. The times reported in Table 6.14 are therefore not
considering the operator time.
The results in Table 6.21 indicates the eﬃciency achievable with watch-
dog timers monitoring system processes. For many of the injected errors a
system level monitoring watchdog, which restarts failing processes could in-
crease the availability of the system. This requires that “micro-rebooting” of
the targeted components is possible. Such strategies have for instance been
deployed in [Candea et al., 2004; Herder et al., 2007].
Extraction of Bit Proﬁles
Section 6.5.1 uses the bit proﬁles to ﬁnd which bits ﬁnd the most service
failures. A very practical question is of course if the found proﬁle is generally
applicable to many systems or if the results are speciﬁc to the setup used for
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these experiments. To get a clear picture of this more drivers and systems
would have to be proﬁled, and relations to speciﬁc drivers and service types
further evaluated.
6.7 Related Work
There have been several eﬀorts made to compare error models and to ﬁnd
representative errors to inject for speciﬁc systems and purposes. In this
section we review some of the most relevant eﬀorts that relate to the work
in this thesis. We have therefore limited the selection to those that consider
software faults, especially with focus on OS’s and robustness evaluations. A
longer treatment of related work is found in Chapter 2.
Albinet et al. have also studied errors in device driver by injecting errors
in the OS-Driver interface [Albinet et al., 2004]. The error model used is
DT using the terminology in this thesis, but with a lower number of injection
cases compared to ours. Injection on a Linux-based system shows a higher
ratio of kernel hangs than observed in this chapter. This may be due to
diﬀerences between the two systems, or the drivers tested.
Arlat et al. study the dependability of microkernel-based system using
fault injection. The MAFALDA tool is used to inject faults and perform fail-
ure mode analysis. The error model consists of both injections in parameter
values to microkernel services and injections in both code and data segments
of a component. For both locations bit-ﬂips are used to simulate both soft-
ware and hardware faults. The type of injections is partially similar to ours
(service parameters) but encompass only the BF model. The results for pa-
rameter injection show a very low ratio of kernel hangs and crashes, possibly
suggesting that microkernel architectures are better at handling these types
of errors than monolithic systems.
Jarboui et al. compare BF and DT error models for the Linux kernel
[Jarboui et al., 2002b,a]. Firstly they also ﬁnd a distinct diﬀerence in the
number of injections required for BF compared to DT. Similarly to our
results the number of severe outcomes are small and both models show similar
behavior in terms of failure mode distributions. The also compare these
results with errors injected inside the kernel code (which we have not done)
and observe a higher ratio of severe outcomes suggesting that there is a
certain level of parameter validation performed for kernel services present in
the system.
The fuzzing model was ﬁrst used on for utility programs for UNIX sys-
tems [Miller et al., 1990] and has later been applied also for protocols and
application interfaces [Howard and Lipner, 2006; Fre]. Oehlert makes a dis-
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tinction between intelligent and unintelligent fuzzing [Oehlert, 2005]. The
former more closely resembles our DT model, where knowledge about the
format used is assumed. The latter does not require any prior knowledge
and may therefore better explore unexpected inputs, which was also shown
in the results presented in this chapter.
To the best of our knowledge this thesis represents a ﬁrst eﬀort to use
fuzzing at the OS-Driver interface and the ﬁrst time fuzzing is quantitatively
compared to other error models in a comparable setting.
6.8 Summary of Research Contributions
This chapter presents a comparative study of three diﬀerent error models:
bit-ﬂips (BF), data-type (DT) and fuzzing (FZ). The models are compared
using data from a representative case study conducted on Windows CE .Net.
Furthermore, the robustness measures introduced in Chapter 5 are used to
compare the three models on their abilities to trigger error propagation in
the system. Overall the following key observations are made, which can be
used as input and recommendations for future robustness evaluations:
• The measures derived in Chapter 5 are shown to be useful for studying
failure and propagation characteristics of the OS, identifying services
and drivers with potential robustness vulnerabilities.
• The BF model ﬁnds more vulnerabilities than the other models. It also
identiﬁes more services in the OS-Driver interface having vulnerabilities
making it the preferred choice for robustness evaluations.
• All three models are well suited to study error propagation character-
istics using especially the Driver Error Diﬀusion measures. Some dif-
ferences across the models are observed, relating to the use of control
values in the interfaces.
• TheDTmodel uses the fewest injections, followed by the FZmodel and
the BF model. The use of proﬁling can reduce the number of injections
for BF and a careful study of the number of injections for FZ shows
that one can perform experiments with relatively few injections.
• In terms of implementation costs the DT model is the most costly.
BF and FZ are comparable but the time required for any implementa-
tion depends on many factors, including skills, experiences and avail-
ability of tools and documentation.
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• For identifying service vulnerabilities the BF model is the preferred
choice. However, the random nature of FZ allows for ﬁnding other
vulnerabilities that the other two models do not ﬁnd.
• A new composite error model is deﬁned as a composition of bit-ﬂips
and fuzzing injections. A subset of the available bits for a parameter
are targeted after a proﬁling step revealing which bits have a higher
impact on the system.
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Chapter 7
Error Timing Models - When
to Inject
When - in the time domain - should errors be injected?
Services used in driver/OS interactions are typically invoked multiple
times during the lifetime of the driver. Therefore, when injecting errors in
services which are called multiple times the time at which an error is injected
will obviously aﬀect the outcome of the experiment. Consequently, control-
ling the time at which the error is injected is a crucial part of the robustness
evaluation. Multiple tools have been developed which allow for control of
the time of injection. Most tools allow injection based on user-deﬁned events
or according to some time distribution. However, surprisingly little research
has been spent on strategies for selecting injection times, beyond time dis-
tributions.
This chapter is devoted to a novel timing model used for robustness eval-
uation of OS’s to errors in device drivers. It helps answering RQ5 - when to
inject - by deﬁning a usage proﬁle of a driver, which can be used to control
and select the time at which the errors are injected. Extensive experimen-
tation shows that controlling the time of injection is indeed important, and
furthermore that its eﬀectiveness depends on the usage proﬁle of the driver.
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7.1 Introduction
When discussing timing issues for fault injection two aspects of the errors
injected are relevant: the time at which it is injected and the duration it
stays active. This chapter focuses on the former property of an error.
For the duration of injected errors we focus on software related errors.
The system is assumed to function properly when no errors are injected.
The duration of injected errors is transient. Transient errors appear and
then disappear shortly thereafter. This model reﬂects Heisenbugs, i.e., those
software faults which due to external conditions do not deterministically
reoccur every time the system is used. Such faults are hard to ﬁnd with
traditional testing techniques and may therefore occur even in well tested
systems. Injections are performed in the OS-Driver interface, thus limiting
the potential injection instances to when services in this interface are used.
The transient model translates into the error being injected once for the
targeted service and then disappearing before the second call to the same
service.
Two main generic strategies exist to trigger the injection of an error:
event-triggered and time-triggered. In the former approach speciﬁc events
are used to trigger the injection, and in the latter approach time is used
to trigger injection. Event-driven injection typically allows for a more ﬁne-
grained control of the individual injections, but requires the triggering events
to be deﬁned. Time-triggered injection relies on a larger number of injections,
distributed over time, and consequently requires more injections.
This chapter presents an approach extending the event-triggered approach
presented in Chapter 6, where errors are injected in the ﬁrst call to a service,
a so called ﬁrst-occurrence approach. First-occurrence only targets the ﬁrst
call to a service, disregarding any subsequent calls. The usage proﬁle of the
driver is used to build a usage model of the driver, and the service calls to
be targeted can be selected to cover a wider spectrum of system states.
The rest of the chapter will be structured as follows: First a discussion on
the two alternative timing models provides the foundation and background
needed for the rest of the chapter. The driver usage proﬁle model is presented
and discussed, followed by a description of the evaluation criteria used for the
experimental evaluation of the approach. The description of the the imple-
mentation and the results are then presented and discussed. The conclusions
made and a summary of the research contributions follows in the last section.
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7.2 Timing Models
The time at which an error is injected is also referred to as the triggering
mechanism for the error. The need for controlling and monitoring the trigger-
ing event has previously been identiﬁed as important, but inherently diﬃcult
[Whittaker, 2003]. Several of the fault injection tools surveyed in Section 2.3
allow for controlling the triggering of errors, at least to some extent. On an
abstract level an error is always triggered by an event.
For practical purposes one makes a distinction between events triggered
by special events taking place in the system, and those triggered by time
alone, giving rise to the two classes of timing models for fault injection,
event-triggered and time-triggered.
7.2.1 Event-Trigger
In the event-triggered case, the most common approach for software is
location-based injection. This strategy is based on the premise that since
the system’s vulnerable states cannot generally be postulated a-priori, the
events triggering injection are based on reaching certain locations in the code
of a module. The simplest of such strategies is to inject the ﬁrst time a certain
location is reached (ﬁrst-occurrence strategy).
A location-based approach is relevant especially for code injection, where
errors (or faults) are injected directly into the source code (or executable
binary) to mimic software faults [Dura˜es and Madeira, 2002; Ng and Chen,
2001], or into the instruction stream of the CPU [Gu et al., 2003]. This comes
from the fact that the software faults mimicked have speciﬁc locations in the
code.
A variation of the ﬁrst-occurrence approach is to use an n-occurrence
trigger, i.e., the error is injected after n calls to a service, or after reaching
a location for the nth time. This approach is a generalization of the ﬁrst-
occurrence approach, but requires the user to set the value of n, which is
far from trivial. The approach is implemented for instance in the FERRARI
tool [Kanawati et al., 1995].
In [Tsai et al., 1999] CPU registers and memory are targeted for fault
injection using bit-ﬂips. To maximize the activation rate of faults, and their
impact, the timing of the injections are controlled by the workload in the
system. Oﬄine analysis detects paths through the workload for a given set
of inputs and faults are injected along the paths. Alternatively, the activation
rate of the CPU is used to perform injections at peak-usage times.
The advantage of the event-triggered approach is that it can be tailored
to evaluate speciﬁc locations in a system, or as speciﬁc events take place.
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It can therefore speed up the evaluation process by reducing the number
of injected errors and focusing on only the relevant events in the system.
The disadvantage is that often these events need to be deﬁned by the user.
Selecting them is a diﬃcult process, possibly requiring deep understanding
of the system, its components and their interaction.
7.2.2 Time-Trigger
When using a time-triggered approach a timeout is deﬁned, after which the
error is injected. Typically a large number of injections are performed, and
their injection times follow some speciﬁc distribution (e.g., uniform, normal,
exponential etc) [Kao and Iyer, 1994; Han et al., 1995; Rodriguez et al., 2002].
In this case, often the location is also randomly selected across a set of pre-
deﬁned locations. This approach is common when simulating physical faults
(radiation, EMI etc.) which are inherently “random” in nature [Karlsson
et al., 1994].
Alternatively, the triggering event is deﬁned as a combination of time and
location, such that after the timeout has elapsed the error is injected at a pre-
deﬁned location, possibly using ﬁrst-occurrence, or after the nth occurrence
of a call. FERRARI, for instance, allows for specifying a time distribution
(such as uniform) after which the fault is injected [Kanawati et al., 1992,
1995].
Many fault injection tools support both event and time-triggered injection
[Carreira et al., 1998; Kanawati et al., 1995], but still leaves the burden of
choosing events and/or distributions to the user.
The time-triggered strategy does away with the burden of selecting trig-
gering events, but on the other hand instead relies on a large number of
injections to get statistically signiﬁcant results. In any case a distribution
needs to be selected and justiﬁed.
7.3 Driver Usage Proﬁle
As seen from Section 7.2 both models have advantages and disadvantages.
Since eﬀectiveness is one of the key goals of robustness evaluation and with
our focus on software faults we have opted for an event-driven approach.
The event-driver approach is more suitable for driver errors as it is easier to
control and is more ﬁne-grained. It is also more suitable for software faults.
As many services are called multiple times during the execution of the
test applications the question arises which of these calls to target. Targeting
each call will generally not be possible due to the large number of calls. Thus
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a selection of a subset is required. The simplest, and most straight-forward
approach is to use the ﬁrst-occurrence approach. This is indeed the approach
used in the previous chapter and in several other projects. However, when
injecting in interfaces between components (such as drivers), the injected
error may stem from several distinct locations in the component, i.e., may
have several distinct fault origins. Thus, injection on ﬁrst-occurrence will only
target a subset of those potential fault locations, namely those corresponding
to the ﬁrst call. Subsequent calls to a service will not be targeted, even
though the driver (and indeed the whole system) may be in a diﬀerent state
which may be of interest to evaluate.
We have developed a methodology to select the relevant service invocation
based on the observation that a service request from an application translates
into one, or more calls into the driver by the OS. In any practical context only
a small subset of the possible sequences of calls that can be made are actually
observed. As an example, it does not make sense for an application to read
from a ﬁle before it has been opened, although there is nothing stopping it
from trying. Since we base our evaluation on a system which is functional,
it can be expected that such behavior is not present when the workload used
is executed. Thus, the operational behavior of the driver can be broken
down into a series of calls to the driver, where certain sub-sequences are
more frequent than others. Such subsequences represent common sequences
of calls made from applications, thereby deﬁning the “operations” performed
by the driver, such as “creating a ﬁle”, or “setting connection parameters”
etc. Such an elementary sequence of calls is called a call block. In our
model, the call blocks are used to trigger the injection of errors in the OS-
Driver interface. Thereby giving a more ﬁne-grained control over the time of
injection, compared to ﬁrst-occurrence and time-triggered injection.
The driver usage proﬁle is deﬁned as an ordered list of calls to services
provided by the driver (the dsx.y services in Figure 3.1). This deﬁnition is
slightly diﬀerent from the traditional deﬁnition of an operational proﬁle as
deﬁned for instance by Musa [Musa, 1993]. The operational proﬁle is typ-
ically deﬁned as the frequency distribution across a component’s functions.
Our usage proﬁle additionally considers the order in which the functions are
called. The list of calls made is termed the call string of the driver. The
call string is further divided into a set of call blocks, which are disjoint sub-
sequences of the call string.
7.3.1 Call String
Figure 7.1 illustrates the driver usage proﬁle as a time-service diagram. The
calls made to drivers services are illustrated as rectangles in the ﬁgure (a−d).
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The call string is formed by assigning tokens to each service from a predeﬁned
alphabet and then for each call adding one token to the list. The call string for
the example in Figure7.1 is thus ababcdabdab. As can be seen, some sequences
of calls are repeating, forming call blocks as subsequences of the call string
(α, β and γ). Note that sequential execution of the driver is assumed.
Time
b baa
α1 α2 β α3 γ α4
c d db baa
Figure 7.1: Example of called services.
7.3.2 Call Blocks
The example in Figure 7.1 shows that services a and b are called multiple
times during the execution. Each call to service a is followed by a call to
b; a and b thus form a call block, which is repeated during the execution
of the driver. The sequences cd and d are not repeating, and cannot be
added to any other call block. These sequences form the non-repeating call
blocks. The call string is thus split into call blocks as indicated in Figure
7.1. Using a conventional regular expression syntax the the sequence can be
represented compactly as (ab){2}cd(ab)(d)(ab), where (ab){2} means
that the sequence ab is repeated twice.
Currently the assignment of call blocks is performed through a combina-
tion of identiﬁcation of repeating blocks and a priori knowledge regarding the
functionality of the driver. As call string grow in size automated techniques
will be required to handle the large number of tokens. Section 7.6 discusses
the use of special data structures to automate call block identiﬁcation.
In ﬁgure 7.2 a similar call block structure is illustrated, and additionally
shows the services called within each call block. When targeting service si
using the ﬁrst-occurrence approach injections are performed only the ﬁrst
call to that service. Subsequent calls to si, for instance in α2 or α3, are not
targeted. Using the call block strategy multiple calls to si can be targeted.
7.3.3 Operational Phases
In general, a driver’s lifetime can be split into three disjoint phases: initializa-
tion, working and clean up phases, as seen in Figure 7.3. In the initialization
phase the driver sets up required data structures and registers its presence
with the OS. Thereafter follows the working phase, where the driver performs
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Time
α1 α2 α3 α4β γ
si sj sk si sm
si sj sk si sm
Figure 7.2: Example of a driver calling OS services in diﬀerent call blocks.
work on behalf of applications or the OS itself. Finally, the clean up phase
unregisters the driver with the OS and releases any resources held.
The operational phases become relevant when discussing selection of call
blocks for injection. Intuitively it can be expected that failures in the initial-
ization and clean up phases are more severe than in the working phase, as in
these phases the driver interacts with many OS services which may aﬀect the
state not only of the driver but the whole system. The working phase on the
other hand, is where drivers spend the most time (may therefore have been
more extensively tested) and perturbations may be expected and therefore
considered by developers.
time
Initialization
phase
Operational phase Clean up phase
Figure 7.3: The operational phases of a driver.
In this work we are mostly focusing on the driver’s operational phase.
However, with application level knowledge, similar phases can be deﬁned
also for the workload used. Looking at the workload used for the case study
(Section 4.5.4), the driver speciﬁc test applications can be decomposed into
two rounds of initialization, working and clean up phases, as illustrated in
Figure 7.4. Note that this is speciﬁc to these test applications and requires
access to and knowledge of the applications.
Each call block is targeted for injection, i.e., each operation performed
by the driver. For call blocks that are repeated multiple times a ﬁltering
may take place, to reduce the number of injections. Preferably at least one
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time
Round 2
Initialization
Operational
Clean up
Round 1
Initialization
Operational
Clean up
Figure 7.4: The operational phases of the workload.
call block per operational phase should in this case be targeted. For each
call block, the ﬁrst occurrence approach can be used on each service called
in that call block. Note that typically not all services are called in each call
block, giving rise to some call blocks requiring many injections and some few.
7.4 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the usefulness of the proposed approach an implementation has
been made for the Windows CE .Net. The serial port driver and the Ether-
net driver were selected and call blocks were derived for both drivers.
The proposed approach will be compared to a traditional ﬁrst-
occurrence approach. The main criteria used for the comparison will be
the number of injections required, the failure class distribution observed and
the number of severe vulnerabilities observed for each of the two approaches.
This section ﬁrst presents the two drivers, the injection strategy and
details the selected call blocks identiﬁed for each of the drivers.
7.4.1 Targeted Drivers
Two drivers are selected for this case study, the serial port driver
(cerﬁo serial) and Ethernet driver (91C111). The two drivers are well suit-
able for evaluation as they a) represent functionality found in all modern
OS’s, and b) represent diﬀerent functionalities, giving rise to a diﬀerent us-
age proﬁle of the OS.
The diﬀerence in OS usage proﬁle can be illustrated by studying the
frequencies at which OS services are called by the drivers for some workload,
in our case the test applications described in Section 4.5.4. Figure 7.5 and
7.6 show the diﬀerence in proﬁle for the two drivers. The x-axes show the
services called by the two drivers and the y-axes show the number of calls
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made to each service. The two ﬁgures clearly show that the cerﬁo serial calls
a higher number of services and more frequently than 91C111.
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Figure 7.5: Call proﬁle for cerﬁo serial
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Figure 7.6: Call proﬁle of 91C111
cerﬁo serial uses 41 services. On average a service is invoked 30.5 times
for the given workload with a standard deviation of 53.5 and median of 2.
This reﬂects the fact that there are some services that are used frequently
(for reading/writing, synchronization etc.) and some only once or twice (like
conﬁguration of the device). For 91C111 the average number of invocations
is 5.4 with a median of 1 and standard deviation of 11.7.
Both ﬁgures show that many services are called multiple times, indicating
that ﬁrst-occurrence may not ﬁnd all vulnerabilities. The diﬀerence between
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Figure 7.7: The experimental setup.
the two drivers also suggests that as more services are called frequently for
cerﬁo serial it is to be expected that the call block approach will be more
eﬀective for this driver.
7.4.2 Error Model
Building on the results from Chapter 6 the bit-ﬂip (BF) model was chosen
to evaluate the two approaches. The model was chosen as it is the most
vulnerability-revealing model of the ones evaluated in Chapter 6 and will
therefore better explore the potential of both approaches. Focus will be put
on the most severe class of failures and experiments are therefore focused
on the import interface of the drivers, which was the only one to experience
Class 3 failures in Chapter 6.
7.4.3 Injection
The experimental setup used for the injection diﬀers slightly from the one
used in the previous chapter in that a new Interceptor module (tracker) has
been introduced between the OS and the targeted driver. The experimental
setup is shown in Figure 7.7. For the call block approach the injector is
conﬁgured to inject errors when the tracker signals that the targeted call
block is reached. Apart from these changes the setup remains the same as
previously described.
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Before injections can be made, a proﬁling execution of the driver is per-
formed. During this error-free execution the tracker module records all calls
being made to the driver, i.e., it records the call string for the driver. For
the two drivers and the workload used for these experiments the call strings
were both deterministic, i.e., every time the workload was executed without
injecting errors the same call string was generated. This is a simpliﬁcation
and a result of choosing a simple and deterministic workload. Using a deter-
ministic workload reduced the triggering of injections in a speciﬁc call block
to counting calls made to OS services. Section 7.6 further discusses this issue.
7.4.4 Call Strings and Call Blocks
This section reports on the call strings and call blocks identiﬁed for the two
targeted drivers.
Serial Port Driver
The workload for cerﬁo serial ﬁrst writes a string of characters to the serial
port which are read by the host computer connected to it. The host computer
echoes the same string back and they are read one by one by the application.
This process is then repeated once more. The workload generates calls to the
driver, forming the call string shown in Figure 7.8, represented as a regular
expression. In total the call string for the serial port driver contains 152
tokens.
The ﬁrst call performed is an initialization call to the driver, DllMain.
Such an entry point exists for each driver. After this follows a series of calls
to perform the services requested.
In Figure 7.8 the tokens assigned are listed in Table 7.1, which shows
the Stream interface entry points provided by cerﬁo serial. Additionally, the
DllMain function called when the Dll is loaded is assigned the token D.
More detailed information on the Stream interface and device drivers for
Windows CE .Net can be found in [Boling, 2003].
The calls to DllMain and to COM Init make up the initialization phase
of the driver. The working phase (which of course is workload dependent)
consists of a series of calls to COM Open, COM Read, COM Write,
COM Close and COM IOControl. The the clean up phase of the work-
load ﬁnishes with the call to COM Close. The pattern is then repeated
once more.
The call string in Figure 7.8 is split into call blocks, as illustrated in Table
7.2 and Figure 7.9. Five call blocks are identiﬁed (δ, α, β, γ and ω), some of
which are repeating. For the remainder of the presentation in this chapter
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Table 7.1: Stream interface for serial driver.
Number Name Purpose
0 COM Init Initializing the driver.
1 COM Deinit Depricated
2 COM Open Open a connection to the device or a ﬁle.
3 COM Close Close a previously opened connection or
ﬁle.
4 COM Read Read from an open connection or ﬁle.
5 COM Write Write to an open connection ﬁle.
6 COM Seek Move within the ﬁle. Usually do not work
on connection-oriented devices.
7 COM IOControl Send control commands to the device. Are
typically device speciﬁc.
8 COM PowerDown Tell the device to move to a power saving
state.
9 COM PowerUp Tell device to come back from power sav-
ing states.
D02775(747){23}732775(747){23}73
Figure 7.8: The serial driver call string.
we term the targeted call blocks δ, α, β1, γ1, ω1, β2, γ2 and ω2 as shown along
the x-axis in Figure 7.9. Note that the x-axis indicates time as sequences of
call blocks, not physical time, i.e., the length of a box does not represent the
execution time of the service.
Table 7.2: Call blocks for cerﬁo serial.
Call block Tokens Occurrences
δ pre-load 1
α 0 1
β 2775 2
γ 747 46
ω 73 2
For the call blocks that reoccur once (β and ω) we target each instance
of the call block. Call block γ repeats all in all 46 times, and targeting each
of them would clearly be very time consuming. Therefore, we target one
instance of γ in each repeating sequence. For the ﬁrst sequence we target
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Figure 7.9: The call blocks for the serial port.
the ﬁrst instance and for the second we have chosen one instance arbitrarily
(the sixth).
Ethernet Driver
The network card driver workload works in a similar fashion as
cerﬁo serial workload. A message is sent over the network and is echoed
back by the host computer. However, as the NDIS wrapper is used instead
for the Stream interface for the Ethernet driver a slightly diﬀerent tracker
mechanism is used (the driver exports Stream functions as well though as
part of being a proper driver).
Table 7.3: NDIS callback functions for the passthrough wrapper.
Number Name
1 MiniportInitialize
3 MiniportSend
3 MiniportSendPackets
4 MiniportQueryInformation
5 MiniportProcessSetPowerOid
6 MiniportSetInformation
7 MiniportReturnPacket
8 MiniportTransferData
9 MiniportHalt
10 MiniportReset
11 MiniportCancelSendPackets
12 MiniportDevicePnPEvent
13 MiniportAdapterShutdown
The NDIS architecture is a layered one, with the upper layer being proto-
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col layers (TCP/IP etc) and the lower layer being the device driver (termed
miniport driver). The layered model, with its deﬁned interfaces, makes it
possible to introduce new ﬁltering layers in-between existing layers (which
is what some ﬁrewalls and anti-virus software do). A passthrough wrap-
per is implemented, that is added on top of the miniport driver targeted
(91C111.dll). The passthrough wrapper, as the name suggests, does not al-
ter the data in any way, simply passes it through to the miniport driver. The
purpose is only to track the calls made to the driver. The callback functions
exported are summarized in Table 7.3. Less than ten functions were exer-
cised for our workload, which allowed us to still use single numerical tokens
for the call string. Note that this is no real limitation to the approach, since
any alphabet could have been used.
D1(4){9}1(4){15}666(4){10}666444336663444(3){9}
Figure 7.10: The Ethernet driver call string.
The call string for the Ethernet driver is shown in Figure 7.10. Again, the
ﬁrst call is to DllMain. Additionally the driver has a speciﬁc setup export
(DriverEntry) which together forms the ﬁrst entry in the call string (D).
Table 7.4: Call blocks for the Ethernet driver.
Call block Tokens Occurrences
δ DllMain + DriverEntry 1
α 1 4444 44444 2
β 444 444 1
γ 666 444 2
µ 444 4444 1
ω 33 666 63644 333333333 1
As for cerﬁo serial a manual inspection gave rise to the call blocks illus-
trated in Figure 7.11. As the Ethernet driver gave rise to signiﬁcantly fewer
call blocks we target all call blocks using any services. For some call blocks no
OS services were used, and consequently no injections were performed. Sim-
ilarly, the last call block (ω) gives rise to no calls made to the OS. Therefore,
it was not further split into call blocks.
7.5 Result of Evaluation
Fault injection experiments were carried out for both drivers. Injections were
performed using both the ﬁrst-occurrence approach and the proposed call-
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Figure 7.11: The network driver call blocks.
block approach. An overview of the results is shown in Table 7.5 and a
more detailed view is shown in Table 7.6. Note the use of the the previously
introduced names for identifying the call blocks. The results are graphically
illustrated in Figures 7.12 and 7.13. A discussion and further interpretation
of these results is found in the Section 7.6.
Table 7.5: Comparing the ﬁrst-occurrence and call block approaches on the
number of injections and the number of experiment outcomes in the most
severe failure class (Class 3).
Serial driver Network driver
Trigger #Injections #Class 3 #Injections #Class 3
First occurrence 2428 10 1818 12
Call blocks 8408 13 2356 12
7.5.1 Serial Port Driver
The distribution of outcomes across failure classes is shown in Figure 7.12.
For comparison purposes the outcome of the ﬁrst-occurrence injections are
shown as well. Additionally the number of injections for each call block is
shown as opaque, black bars. For illustrative purposes the Class NF is not
shown, but all data is found in Table 7.6.
Call blocks γ1 and γ2 exhibit the lowest number of Class 3 failures. These
call blocks correspond to the working phase of the driver, were it is only send-
ing and receiving data. Since the work done in this phase corresponds to the
main part of a driver’s lifetime, it is reasonable to expect it to be suﬃciently
well speciﬁed and understood for the OS to be implemented tolerating many
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ﬂuctuation in device/driver behavior. A small diﬀerence in Class 2 behavior
can also be observed, with γ2 having a slightly higher ratio.
Compared to the working phase, the initialization phase of the driver
shows a higher ratio of Class 3 failures (δ and α). Similarly, the initialization
phase of the test application (β) shows a high ratio of Class 3 failures. The
same holds for the clean up phase of the test application (ω). Whereas ω1
and ω2 show close to identical distributions, β2 shows more Class 1 failures
than β1.
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Figure 7.12: Failure class distribution and number of injections for the ﬁrst-
occurrence approach and for each call block of cerﬁo serial.
From Figure 7.12 it can also be seen that the ﬁrst initialization call block
δ is less prone to Class 3 failures than the second call block in the initial-
ization phase, α. When DllMain is called (i.e., in δ) driver developers are
discouraged (in the documentation) to include any time consuming or com-
plex operations, restricting to only initialization of synchronization objects
and other lightweight operations. This minimizes calls made to the OS in this
critical phase of the system. Consequently we observe fewer Class 3 failure.
However, as the these operations may now fail, with the whole driver being
unable to make progress, we see a rise in Class 2 failures instead compared
to α.
Comparing with the ﬁrst-occurrence injections it can clearly be seen that
the ﬁrst-occurrence approach gives very similar results as the call blocks in
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the initialization phase. This behavior is of course expected, since it injects
in the ﬁrst call to each service used by the driver.
Not only the distribution across failure classes is of interest, but also the
number services found to have severe (Class 3) failures. Table 7.7 presents
the result for cerﬁo serial. From the 41 services being targeted, 13 services
caused Class 3 failures. Compared with the ﬁrst-occurrence approach this is
an increase of three services, i.e., three services not previously found to have
Class 3 failures were identiﬁed. This indicates that choosing the triggering
event for injection for the serial port driver has a signiﬁcant impact on the
results obtained and that ﬁrst-occurrence is not suﬃcient for a comprehensive
evaluation.
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Table 7.7: The services having Class 3 failures for cerﬁo serial. Services not
identiﬁed by ﬁrst-occurrence are marked with X.
Service/Call block FO δ α β1 γ1 ω1 β2 γ2 ω2
CreateThread x x x
DisableThreadLibraryCalls x x
EventModify X X
FreeLibrary x x
HalTranslateBusAddress x x
InitializeCriticalSection X
InterlockedDecrement X
LoadLibraryW x x
LocalAlloc x x
memcpy x x x
memset x x x
MmMapIoSpace x
SetProcPermissions x x x
TransBusAddrToStatic X
7.5.2 Ethernet driver
Table 7.6 and Figure 7.13 show that call block δ shows a very similar dis-
tribution as the ﬁrst-occurrence approach. For call blocks µ, γ2 and ω the
driver does not perform any calls to the OS, and consequently no injections
were performed and these call blocks are not shown in Figure 7.13.
The call blocks α2, β and γ1 show a very similar behavior, due to the fact
that only one services is used for all three call blocks. Therefore the same
amount of injections are performed. No injections in call block α1 show any
Class 3 failures. Overall no new services were found to have Class 3 failures
(see Table 7.5).
7.6 Discussion
This section interprets and discusses the results of the case study. Focus is
mostly on the most severe class of failures, Class 3.
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Figure 7.13: Failure class distribution and number of injections for each call
block of 91C111. Call blocks without injections are excluded.
7.6.1 Diﬀerence in Driver Types
The results for the two drivers show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence across them. For
the serial driver a good number of new services were found to experience
Class 3 failures. The Ethernet driver on the other hand did not get any
additional service vulnerabilities with the new call block approach.
Section 7.4.1 shows that the serial driver uses more services, and more
frequently than the Ethernet driver, suggesting that it would be more sus-
ceptible to call block injections, and this is indeed also the case. For the
Ethernet driver no new Class 3 failures where identiﬁed and the δ call block
shows a very similar behavior to the ﬁrst-occurrence injections, further sub-
stantiating the intuition.
Further analysis on the calls made for each call block is presented in
Figures 7.14 and 7.15. Figure 7.14 shows the call proﬁle for cerﬁo serial, i.e.,
the number of calls made by the driver for each of the call blocks identiﬁed.
It can clearly be observed that the calls made are spread throughout the
lifetime of the driver, with call block β having the most calls.
Figure 7.15 shows the call proﬁle for the Ethernet driver. It shows that the
Ethernet driver is more active in the initialization phase of the driver (to the
left in the ﬁgures) than in the working phase. Compared with cerﬁo serial in
Figure 7.14 the distribution of calls is clearly geared towards the initialization
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Figure 7.14: The call proﬁle for the serial driver.
phase.
This explains why the call block approach ﬁnds more new vulnerabilities
for the serial drivers than for the Ethernet driver. It conﬁrms that for drivers
which perform few calls, and especially during the initialization phase, ﬁrst-
occurrence is to be preferred.
The proﬁling of the drivers show that the eﬀectiveness of the approach
can to some degree be predicted and suggests that a proﬁling of the targeted
drivers should be conducted before triggering techniques are selected, to min-
imize the time for implementation and number of injections required. Note
that such proﬁling can be conducted prior to injection any errors! However,
proﬁles, such as Figures 7.14 and 7.15 does require call blocks to be deﬁned.
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Figure 7.15: The call proﬁle for the Ethernet driver.
7.6.2 Comparing with First Occurrence
The ﬁrst-occurrence approach has several distinct advantages compared to
the call block approach. First and foremost it uses fewer injections. It is also
appropriate when doing code level injections (Table 7.5), where the location
of the modeled fault coincides with the injected error.
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The higher number of injections for the call block approach translates into
longer time required for performing the evaluation. This can be somewhat
lessened by performing pre-proﬁling to remove non-signiﬁcant experiments.
Unfortunately, the higher number of injections is inherently inevitable since
the call block approach injects in multiple invocations of a service, whereas
ﬁrst-occurrence only injects in the ﬁrst call to a service.
The additional costs give rise to a trade-oﬀ with the usefulness of the
results. New service vulnerabilities can indeed be identiﬁed using the call
block approach, as shown in Section 7.5. First-occurrence found ten Class
3 services, whereas the call block injections found thirteen. This represents
an increase of 30%. On the other hand, for the Ethernet driver no additional
services are identiﬁed due to its call proﬁle being geared towards the initial
phase.
7.6.3 Identifying Call Blocks
The length of a call string varies depending on the workload used to generate
it. Manual inspection was suﬃcient to identify call blocks for the experiments
presented in this chapter. However, this will not be feasible for longer call
strings. For longer call strings some level of automation is required.
The repeating nature of call blocks is what makes them identiﬁable in
the call string. To identify a repeating sequence of tokens from a given
alphabet in a string is a well studied problem. Examples of uses is to identify
repeating sequences in DNA. Multiple data structures and algorithms have
been devised for this purpose. Many examples of such problems can be found
for instance in [Gusﬁeld, 1997]. We have explored the use of suﬃx trees, a
special tree data structure, which ﬁnds repeating sequences quickly. However,
further research is needed to develop appropriate tools and techniques to fully
take advantage of this data structure.
Figure 7.12 and 7.13 show that some call blocks are more useful in iden-
tifying Class 3 failures. These call blocks typically belong to either the
initialization or clean up phases of the driver and workload. By focusing
mostly on the initialization (like ﬁrst-occurrence) and clean up phases one
could potentially reduce the number of injections required.
7.6.4 Workload
With operational phases and call blocks forming the basis for the usage pro-
ﬁle it is important to identify representative workloads to be used to drive
experiments. Representative of the system’s expected workload once it be-
comes operational. In many cases no, or only partial information is available
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regarding the expected operational proﬁle. If not known, a common ap-
proach is to use a synthetic workload, exercising the system in a diverse way
[Johansson, 2001]. The alternative to using a synthetic workload is to use
real-world applications. However, many applications are not suitable to be
used directly, due to required user inputs, non-determinism etc.
As call blocks represent higher level operations carried out on the driver it
is important that the call string is stable across runs, i.e., that the same call
string is generated every time the workload is executed. The workload used
in this thesis is indeed stable and deterministic, and gives rise to the same
call string for each run. This is an important property for any workload used
in a comparative purpose and is a well established approach in the bench-
marking community, like the standard tests in SPEC [SPE]. A deterministic
workload is key for achieving reproducibility, an important property iden-
tiﬁed for dependability benchmarks [Johansson, 2001; Kanoun et al., 2005].
As one still strives after using real-world workloads, an approach is to modify
applications by removing sources of non-determinism, such as user inputs,
by using speciﬁc user scenarios or use cases.
Another source of non-determinism for device drivers is the fact that they
can, in general, be accessed by several applications concurrently. Depending
on the semantics of the device (or driver) this may be supported or not.
A serial driver does for instance not generally accept concurrent accesses,
whereas a network card driver typically does. For the experiments in this
thesis we have deliberately focused on single-access application scenarios.
This is a simpliﬁcation and extending the approach to handle concurrency
is a topic for future research. Concurrent accesses would give rise to in-
terleaved tokens in the call string, belonging to diﬀerent processes/tasks.
Furthermore, the implementation of triggers will be more complex than the
current one (based on simple counters), since online pattern recognition is
required. Whether concurrent access should at all be considered for compar-
ative (benchmarking) purposes can be discussed, as it gives rise to potential
issues with reproducibility.
7.6.5 Error Duration
As previously described we have used a transient duration model for the in-
jected errors, i.e., each error appears once and then disappears for subsequent
invocations of the same services. Our injection framework does support in-
termittent (error disappears after n invocations) as well as permanent errors.
However, none of these models have been evaluated yet.
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7.6.6 Timing Errors
For this work we have considered the time of injection. This is not to be
confused with timing errors, which change the timing behavior of the system
by for instance delaying or dropping calls being issued. Since many devices
require speciﬁc timing requirements to be met, this may be a relevant error
model for evaluating device drivers and OS’s. Experimental support for this
error model is implemented in the fault injection framework developed, but
no systematic evaluation has yet been carried out using this model.
7.7 Related Work
The call block strategy is one of several that uses a proﬁle of the system
to trigger injection. In [Tsai et al., 1999] stress-based injections are per-
formed, where injection is synchronized with high workload activity in the
system. Similarly application resource usage is analyzed to guide injection
into resources actively used.
Tsai and Singh [2000] used a setup very similar to ours, but with the intent
to test applications on Windows NT by corruption of parameter values to
library calls. The ﬁrst-occurrence strategy is used, and a comment is made
that regarding injection in subsequent calls: “...preliminary results showed
that such injections produced similar results.” [Tsai and Singh, 2000, page
4]. We believe that this assertion does not generally hold. However, the
results for the network driver shows that depending on the call proﬁle of the
targeted component, diﬀerent behaviors are observed. This suggests that
more research is needed to completely characterize for which components
ﬁrst-occurrence is most suitable and for which not.
In this work we do not consider distributed systems explicitly. For dis-
tributed systems the concept of global state is of key importance and one
may want to inject errors at particular local and/or global states. Whereas
the technique presented here is suitable for local states, it does not handle
global states of distributed systems, where even detection of speciﬁc global
events/states is diﬃcult. Some work has been done within this speciﬁc area,
for instance the Loki tool [Chandra et al., 2004].
7.8 Summary of Research Contributions
The time at which a fault is injected can have an impact on the robustness
evaluation of a system. In the context of device drivers for OS’s, this chap-
ter has established that selection of the triggering events (controlling error
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timing) does impact the evaluation results. Furthermore, it is shown that a
proﬁling of the driver reveals its sensitivity to the timing of injections.
The following distinct contributions are put forward in this chapter:
• A novel timing model for device drivers is presented. The new model
is based on the concept of a call block, a subsequence of calls to the
driver corresponding to higher level operations.
• It is detailed how the proposed model can be used to identify injection
triggers for device drivers used in fault injection.
• A large case study for two device drivers show that selecting the error
timing impacts the robustness evaluation, especially for drivers which
actively use OS services throughout their lifetime.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion & Future Research
What have we learned, and how do we move forward?
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing its main contributions
and discussing their relevance to the research community.
Additionally, this chapter aims to broaden the scope of the techniques
used by surveying and discussing their usability in enhancing the depend-
ability of OS’s. Diﬀerent areas of dependability enhancements are discussed,
covering both fault-removal and fault-tolerance techniques.
The work in this thesis forms the basis for many interesting new research
directions. The thesis is therefore concluded by scoping out multiple future
directions of research. This includes both reﬁnements and extensions as well
as new exiting problems warranting further research.
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8.1 Contributions
This section recaps the research questions posed in Chapter 1 and discusses
the individual contributions made and their relevance.
8.1.1 Category 1: Conceptual
Research Question 1: How do errors in device drivers propagate in an
OS? What is a good model for identiﬁcation of such propagation paths?
Errors in device drivers have been shown to cause many failures in
OS’s and to propagate to applications running on the OS. Our model of
an OS allows us to capture both errors causing severe failures in the system
and those data errors propagating to applications through the OS.
The results presented in Chapter 6 clearly show that there is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence across services regarding error propagation. Some services are
identiﬁed to be robust, i.e, severe system states cannot be provoked through
it. Other services can lead to severe consequences, including a complete
system crash. Furthermore, it is shown that the context in which the service
is used, e.g., the driver using it, has a signiﬁcant impact on its damage
potential.
Research Question 2: What are quantiﬁable measures of robustness
proﬁling of OS’s?
Chapter 5 presents a framework with which error propagation across the
OS can be estimated. The measures presented allow for identifying individual
services more vulnerable to propagating errors, either as sources or sinks.
As such they are useful for discriminating services based on susceptibility
to propagating errors, which gives developers hints on which services are
more likely to experience problems during runtime. Furthermore, they allow
discrimination across drivers and applications, which can be used to prioritize
across multiple contending drivers/applications or for veriﬁcation resource
planning by managers. Components with higher exposure or diﬀusion should
be the ﬁrst targets for improvements.
Overall, the measures deﬁned provide evaluators with the tools to make
informed decisions, on various levels.
8.1.2 Category 2: Experimental Validation
Research Question 3: Where to inject? Where are errors representing
faults in drivers best injected? What are the advantages and disadvantages
of diﬀerent locations?
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The use of standard interfaces is beneﬁcial since it facilitates both in-
jection of errors and observing their eﬀects with minimal intrusion on the
system studied. It gives clear and easily interpretable feedback to the evalu-
ator on where errors propagate and which services and drivers are more likely
to spread them if they are present.
Research Question 4: What to inject? Which error model should be
used for robustness evaluation? What are the trade-oﬀs that can be made?
Chapter 6 evaluates three contemporary error models, chosen based on
their suitability for injection at the OS-Driver interface and their prior use for
this purpose. The contributions here are two-fold. First, to the best of our
knowledge this thesis is the ﬁrst comprehensive comparison across multiple
error models at the interface level. This study highlights the strengths and
weaknesses of the models, highlighting diﬀerences across them. Secondly, our
comparison evaluates the models on the number of identiﬁed failures, cov-
erage of services, execution time, eﬃciency and implementation complexity.
This allows selecting the most appropriate error model, based on trade-oﬀs
across the parameters.
For the case study performed bit-ﬂips reveal the most severe (Class 3)
failures and provoke failures in the highest number of services. Additional
services having severe failures can be identiﬁed using the Fuzzing error model.
The least number of injections were incurred by the data type error model.
Chapter 6 further shows how a new composite model can be deﬁned,
combining the bit-ﬂip and Fuzzing error models to achieve a good trade-oﬀ
between eﬃciency, coverage and number of injections performed.
Research Question 5: When to inject? Which timing model should
be used for injection?
The timing model used controls the time at which errors are injected,
i.e., the events triggering injections. Classically, errors are injected either on
ﬁrst-occurrence, i.e., the ﬁrst time a service is called, or injected according
to some predeﬁned time distribution. Chapter 7 proposes a novel timing
model based on the usage proﬁle of the component interface, in this case the
OS-Driver interface. By ﬁrst proﬁling the operations performed on the driver
injections can be concentrated on operations using the concept of call blocks,
i.e., repeating sequences of calls.
The new timing models allows for more focused injections, giving more
comprehensive results, without requiring deep knowledge of the services in
the OS-Driver interface. Furthermore, proﬁling of drivers reveal that certain
types of drivers are more sensitive in the initialization phase, whereas some
are sensitive also in the working and clean up phase, suggesting that the
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ﬁrst-occurrence approach may be more suitable for the former case.
8.1.3 Injection Framework
For carrying out all the fault injection experiments required a ﬂexible and
scalable fault injection framework for Windows CE .Net has been imple-
mented. The framework allows for easy and fast extension to new error mod-
els using a plugin model for error models. The ﬂexible architecture makes it
easy to implement new error models and to incorporate new drivers.
8.2 Applications of Robustness Evaluation
This section illustrates how the robustness evaluation framework presented
in the previous chapters can be used to enhance the robustness of an OS.
Such evaluations can serve primarily three purposes, a) as support in the
testing of systems, b) as a source for developer feedback, helping developers
build more robust code by highlighting potential robustness bottlenecks using
robustness proﬁles, and c) as input to active robustness enhancing activities,
such as addition of error detection and recovery modules. The following
sections detail each of these potential uses of robustness evaluation.
8.2.1 Robustness Proﬁling
Robustness evaluation of platforms, such as OS’s, is useful because it can
provide useful feedback to the developers of applications built on top of
such platforms. By providing so called robustness proﬁles, a developer is
made aware of potential robustness vulnerabilities in the system and is better
equipped to make decisions on which OS services to use and the consequences
that might come from using them.
Robustness proﬁles give information on where potential robustness bot-
tlenecks may exist in a system or component. The robustness proﬁle can, for
instance, consist of a subset of the measures presented in Chapter 5. The
information gained can be used to raise awareness among developers on the
consequences faults can have for speciﬁc services. When possible, developers
can elect to use diﬀerent services to achieve the same goal in a safer manner.
Robustness proﬁles can be used as input to testers, which can focus testing
on those parts of the system using vulnerable services. Robustness proﬁles
also can be used to focus code inspections and design reviews on those parts
more likely to cause damage in the system.
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8.2.2 Robustness Evaluation in Testing
Robustness evaluation can be considered a special branch of testing, where
focus is put on the non-functional requirements of the system. Typically
a robustness evaluation requires an acceptable level of functionality to be
present in the system being evaluated, i.e., the used workload must success-
fully execute on the OS without any errors. This implies that functional
testing of the system has been carried out.
There are three phases of testing where robustness evaluation focusing on
device drivers may be of great assistant:
• Acceptance Testing: To verify that the OS and its drivers behave
at a reasonable level
• Integration Testing: To verify that a driver can be integrated and
used in the system
• Regression Testing: When major conﬁguration changes have been
performed the robustness of the system needs to be re-evaluated
Acceptance Testing
As part of the requirements for a speciﬁc software component requirements
on robustness may be included. This may involve specifying which services
may propagate errors and/or at which severity, for instance by specifying
that no service may cause a crash of the system, no matter which values it is
used with. As such the presented robustness evaluation framework may be
used to validate or invalidate such properties.
Integration Testing
When integrating components with each other one needs to make sure that
interaction across components works as expected. Furthermore, one may be
interested in evaluating the consequences faults in one component have on
the other component(s). When misbehaving components are able to cause
severe failures they may either require additional focused veriﬁcation eﬀorts
or may need to be equipped with error handling capabilities.
The technique presented in this thesis is well suited for testing the inte-
gration of new drivers in the OS as it works on the OS-Driver interface level,
which is where the interaction takes place. It is important to note though that
the error propagation proﬁling is not aimed at evaluating drivers speciﬁcally,
but the OS-Driver interaction. Therefore, detected vulnerabilities for a new
driver should not automatically be “blamed” solely on the driver. Similarly,
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robustness proﬁling does not focus on the functionality of a speciﬁc driver,
and is therefore a complement to functional testing, not a replacement.
Regression Testing
As components evolve as part of the development process their error propa-
gation abilities may change, to the better or the worse. As part of regression
testing campaigns error propagation can be evaluated such that new propaga-
tion paths are detected as soon as possible and may be treated appropriately.
The scalability and automation possibilities of interface-based fault injec-
tion makes it excellent for regression testing. Using the pre-proﬁling approach
described the injections are adopted to any changes in workload on the sys-
tem. Additional injections for new services are easily deﬁned. New error
models require minimal changes to the system before inclusion.
8.2.3 Robustness Enhancing Wrappers
In many cases modiﬁcations to system components exhibiting robustness
vulnerabilities are not possible, or even desirable. This is for instance the
case for pure black-box systems, where the lack of access to source code pro-
hibits any modiﬁcations. Even with access to source code, legal reasons may
prohibit modifying the code. Typical robustness enhancing modiﬁcations
include addition of error checking and handling code, such as executable as-
sertions [Voas and Miller, 1994b; Hiller, 2000]. For systems geared towards
high performance it may not be viable to add time-consuming checks to the
components involved, especially for general-purpose systems such as OS’s.
As an alternative to modifying the involved components an attractive
alternative is to add new components “wrapping” the original component
[Fraser et al., 1999; Ghosh et al., 1999; Mitchem et al., 2000]. Such wrappers
can be added where needed and thus be applied on a policy basis or where
likely to be most eﬀective [Hiller et al., 2002a]. Error propagation analysis
can be used to identify prominent propagation paths, such as in [Hiller et al.,
2002a].
The data collected from fault injection experiments can be used to design
assertions, which can be implemented as wrappers [Voas, 1997b; Whisnant
et al., 2004]. It can also be used to enhance the wrappers design by other
means. Several research projects have looked into the use of wrappers for
enhancing OS robustness and security. In [Arlat et al., 2002] the authors de-
scribe fault injection campaigns carried out on two microkernel-based OS’s.
Robustness enhancing wrappers are added to some functional components of
the OS by formally deﬁning predicates that must hold over the course of the
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execution. This requires access to internal states of the OS which is imple-
mented using reﬂection. It is noted that even when such access is possible,
the deﬁnition of (correct) predicates is time-consuming and diﬃcult. The
required formal models of behavior may in practice make the approach ex-
tremely diﬃcult to implement for general purpose COTS OS’s. The authors
propose to instead use operational consistency checks, such as acceptance or
validity checks.
In [Fetzer and Xiao, 2002b,a] wrappers are used to track non-robust ar-
guments to C libraries made by applications. Stateful wrappers keep track
of memory allocations on the heap and stack and can verify that accesses are
only made to allocated memory, presented ﬁrst in [Fetzer and Xiao, 2001] (a
similar technique is presented in [DeVale and Koopman, 2001] for exception
hardening of I/O libraries). For memory not present on the heap or on the
stack signal handlers are set up to track any access violations. Furthermore,
data structures are validated using existing validation functions provided by
the system and when such functions are not available, state information is
kept similar to memory allocation to verify the correctness of arguments. If
a violation is found, a safe return code is returned to the application.
Nooks is an add-on subsystem to an OS, protecting the OS from a vast
majority of failures in device drivers [Swift et al., 2005]. Drivers are iso-
lated (i.e., wrapped) within lightweight protection domains. All interaction
with the kernel is tracked, to both isolate failures and for facilitating cleanup
procedures. The protection is achieved by limiting a driver’s write access
to kernel memory and by kernel object tracking mechanisms. Nooks can
protect against memory violations and kernel structure corruption. Fault in-
jection was used to validate the approach and can be used to deﬁne speciﬁc
parameter checks to improve failure isolation. In later work [Swift et al.,
2006], the authors extended the recovery capabilities of the system by intro-
ducing shadow drivers. Shadow drivers temporarily takes over while drivers
are reloaded and restarted, the system also handles state information trans-
fer to the newly started driver, making recovery transparent to the user of
the system. The micro reboot strategy is a promising recovery approach, as
it avoids time consuming and possibly disruptive system reboots [Candea
et al., 2004; Herder et al., 2007].
8.3 Outlook on the Future
This section reﬂects on the themes presented by discussing and speculating
on future steps in research needed for them to further evolve.
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8.3.1 Fault Injection Technology
The fault injection performed for this thesis is based on intercepting calls
made in device drivers. Thus it is based on real calls made in the system,
i.e., a workload is needed to generate the required calls. This is in contrast
to approach where test harnesses are set up to simulate operational condi-
tions, where each service can be tested in isolation. The beneﬁt of the latter
approach is that more injections can be performed per time unit, but on the
other hand it requires operational conditions to be set up, which may be dif-
ﬁcult to do, especially for low-level system software, such as device drivers.
Since both approaches have merits a comprehensive evaluation of both on a
larger project would give insights and guidance on where one is more useful
than the other.
For the fault injection approach presented here to gain widespread accep-
tance and adoption it needs to be incorporated into a proper tool set. Such a
tool set must minimize the semantical burden on the evaluator and automate
the process of evaluation as much as possible, still allowing for user-driver
extensibility and scalability. These areas of the presented approach need to
be handled by the tool:
• Proﬁling of the targeted driver, including identiﬁcation of all used ser-
vices and automatic generation of injection wrapper.
• Provide a selection of error models that the evaluator can choose from,
as well as a standard interface for adding custom error models.
• Automatically perform the injections and collect the required logs and
store them in a database.
• Provide the evaluator with the mechanisms to automatically calculate
relevant measures, including error propagation.
• Additionally, throughout the process data must be stored in open for-
mats, e.g., XML, enabling integration with external tools and future
enhancements.
8.3.2 Error Propagation
There are many uses for information on error propagation, some already dis-
cussed previously in this chapter. In this thesis a four-graded scale has been
used to classify each experiment into diﬀerent failure classes. Propagation
is then typically studied on a failure class basis. The scale used is based on
severity, without any speciﬁc system in mind. However, further reﬁnement of
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the scale may be useful for speciﬁc systems, speciﬁcally incorporating appli-
cation level information, such as data corruption or other application speciﬁc
failures of diﬀerent severity. Developing guidelines for including application
speciﬁc failures and still preserving comparative capabilities is an interesting
challenge.
A related issue to the inclusion of application-speciﬁc information in fail-
ure classiﬁcation is to further investigate the role of the workload selection
on the outcome of the evaluation. It is well established that the used work-
load should as closely as possible resemble the real workload on the system,
i.e., one uses the operational proﬁle of the system [Musa, 1993]. However,
the used workload can also have an impact on the failure revealing capabil-
ities of the evaluation, where some workloads may be more likely to expose
propagating errors than others. For instance, applications containing some
level of error checking and correction may, transparently to the user, be able
to handle (i.e., not reporting or showing eﬀect of) many of the propagating
errors. When such applications are used “as is” they may hide important
robustness information from the evaluator. This suggests that the best op-
tion would be to use “error revealing” applications, which is what is done in
this thesis. Due to these conﬂicting goals, the composition of an “eﬃcient”
workload becomes complicated, as it might not reﬂect the actual use of the
system and therefore skew the results. More research is needed into identiﬁ-
cation of both useful and realistic workloads to be used in conjunction with
fault injection experiments.
Knowing which services may aﬀect your application can be found out by
studying the Service Exposure measure. This way individual services can
be identiﬁed and the designer of the application can verify if these services
are used in the application in the ﬁrst place, and if so, that they are used
properly and that propagating errors are handled. However, this process is
complex and can be time-consuming, especially since it needs to be redone
when changes have been made to the application. A new research direction
is therefore to deﬁne Application Exposure measures, capturing how appli-
cations are aﬀected by propagating errors. Then, techniques for assessment
of such eﬀects need to be found, for instance using fault injection. This is
a challenging task, especially for cases when no source code is available. Fi-
nally, Application Exposure and robustness proﬁles of the OS are composed
into a system-level robustness proﬁle, considering the speciﬁc applications
running on the system.
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8.3.3 Error Models
Chapter 6 evaluated the appropriateness of three error models and the results
clearly favors simpler models, such as bit-ﬂips and fuzzing , over semantically
richer models such as the data type model. This is also in line with current
advances in random testing [Hamlet, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2007]. However,
the results presented here must be interpreted in light of the speciﬁc case
study where they were found. Therefore, more research is needed in the area
of software error models, both for simpler and more complex models. The
composite model presented shows that, at least for speciﬁc systems/contexts,
models may have to be combined to be most eﬀective. These models, even
though covering a wide spectrum of properties, are of course not complete.
The set of models evaluated should therefore be enlarged, especially consid-
ering code level faults, such as mutations, to make a more comprehensive
selection of models available for system evaluators.
Also on the data level, all three models can be extended. The data-level
errors can for instance be extended with semantic knowledge of the functions
tested in the interface. Fuzzing can be extended using advances in random
testing [Hamlet, 2006]. Bit-ﬂips can be further extended to incorporate mul-
tiple ﬂips (extended from the SEU model) and further extend the work on
selective bit injections.
Another important research direction is to validate the proposed robust-
ness evaluation methodology as part of a structured development process.
This would allow for a stronger connection with the “bug-revealing” capabil-
ities of the chosen error models, an important aspect not focused on in this
thesis.
8.3.4 Error Timing
The timing model presented was developed within the context of device
drivers. However, we believe that it could be of much more general use in
component-based testing. In systems were components are seen as black
boxes and robustness evaluation is warranted, the selection of triggering
events is as diﬃcult as for device drivers. An extension of the work to such
systems could potentially further validate its usefulness and make it more
accessible to developers.
The drivers evaluated had no concurrent access patterns, simplifying the
analysis. Further research is needed to handle concurrent access patterns.
For making the call block technique more approachable it should be based
on automatic identiﬁcation of call blocks from a given call string. Whether
complete automation is possible is still an open question, but supporting
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tools can be developed based on pattern recognition techniques, such as suﬃx
trees. Initial prototype tools have been implemented and show some promise.
More research is needed in development of algorithms and tools to handle
larger data sets.
8.4 Practical Lessons Learned
During the process of working on the material for this thesis several (non-
scientiﬁc) lessons were learned. This section aims to list some of these lessons,
and the purpose is to share our experience with these systems. Some of these
may be obvious to experienced researchers, but we still hope they can be
useful for young researchers and developers.
Lesson 1: Store structured data
By moving to a structured storage of data (i.e., a database vs. simple text
ﬁles) has an associated overhead, in terms of time, eﬀort and skills required.
Our experience is that this cost is small compared to the beneﬁts gained.
Having data in a database makes it easy to change analysis tools, to modify
the analysis or extend it. It also simpliﬁes accessing the data as tools already
exist to work with databases. It is also easy to search the data for inconsis-
tencies, arising due to software bugs or incomplete log ﬁles, something which
otherwise may be hard when the amount of data increases rapidly.
Lesson 2: Use revision control
A key to any successful programming task is securing the code from accidental
(or malicious) changes. This not only includes having a structured back-
up system (that is also tested!), but also to use revision control for the
source code. This simpliﬁes the task, even when there is only one developer,
for instance when working on multiple machines. Additionally, putting the
results (the raw log ﬁles in our case) under revision control is also beneﬁcial,
as loosing such ﬁles may destroy many hours of experimentation.
Lesson 3: Don’t trust the documentation!
In many cases documentation can be outdated, or incomplete. When the
system doesn’t behave the way the documentation states it should, it may
be that the documentation is outdated and not that something is wrong. This
is especially true for articles written before the release of a software (white
papers). Make sure that you have the latest version of the documentation
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and search the Internet for users experiencing similar problems. News groups
and web forums are good places to get answers.
Lesson 4: Use the right tool for the job
Typically there are many tools (such as programming languages) that may be
used to accomplish a given task. They diﬀer in ease of use and feature set. For
instance, many high-level programming languages (such as Java/.Net) allow
for very rapid development using modern development environments and
provide simple to use interfaces to for instance build intuitive user interfaces,
interacting with databases etc. Choose the tool that is best suited for the
problem, considering the time it requires to implement the solution and the
possibilities of extending it for future needs. Choosing a tool based only on
familiarity might not be the best decision in the long run.
A last word from the author
This thesis has focused on identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses in soft-
ware systems, rather than on increasing the dependability of such systems.
As a last comment on my work I would therefore like to paraphrase a com-
ment made by Jim Gray in 1990. Namely that it is after all possible to
build truly fault tolerant systems (containing software) having a mean time
between failures of several years or more using the right techniques and tools
[Gray, 1990]. It is encouraging as a software engineer to know that such goals
are indeed achievable.
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